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Opening Remarks
1
Opening Remarks
1.1 Introduction
In the last ten years around four million people have migrated every year into the OECD
countries. After the U.S., Germany has become the second largest recipient of immi-
grants, just before the UK and Canada (OECD, 2017). In light of these mass migration
flows, migration turned into one of the most salient topics in nowadays societies. Es-
pecially the humanitarian crisis due to the conflict in Syria is prominent in the public
debate. Questions arise on how many people societies should host, how natives and gov-
ernments will be affected and most importantly, how migrants are integrated into the
host society.
The mass migration inflows into many developed democracies had furthermore a cru-
cial impact on the public perception of immigration and its consequences in the politi-
cal arena. Recent studies show that the most prominent political decisions in the year
2016, the Brexit vote in the UK and the 2016 U.S. elections, were driven by the public
concerns about immigrants and the successful anti-immigrant rhetoric of some political
parties (Klinkner, 2017; Harding, 2017). So far, empirical studies have analyzed the char-
acteristics of individuals and their attitudes toward immigrants. Most prominent factors
are fear of competition over scarce resources and culture. What is lacking is the causal
evidence of how the geographic proximity of immigrants in one’s region affects public
opinions of immigration. I provide this evidence for Germany in Chapter 2.
A related topic to the public opinion of immigration is the integration of immigrants.
Integration is a key component of the public perception and also of the social cohesion and
welfare for both natives and immigrants. Still, we observe substantial performance gaps
of immigrants in regard to natives. These performance gaps are reflected in economic
terms (Algan et al., 2010; Borjas, 1985; Chiswick, 1978) and educational terms (Dustmann
et al., 2012; Riphahn, 2003).
The educational integration of immigrant children has become a key priority for many
governments, particularly because the youth population of immigrants is one of the fastest
growing population segments. Already every third child born in Germany has a migratory
background. Yet, relatively little is known about which interventions could be effective in
2
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fostering immigrant children’s educational integration. A successful integration in early
childhood could lead to better occupational and social outcomes.
One highly debated integration measure is the granting of citizenship to immigrants.
For children, the granting of citizenship at birth is a widespread public policy in many
European countries. Literature has shown that birthright citizenship is effective in the
integration of the parents of the migrant children (Avitabile et al., 2013, 2014; Sajons,
2016). Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis demonstrate also positive effects of birthright
citizenship on the integration of immigrant children.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 digs deeper into
the issue of public perception of immigrants and its relevance. Section 1.3 deals with
the closely related topic, namely the integration of immigrants and especially immigrant
children. The following Section 1.4 explains the possibilities of causal inference and the
two most important features, exogenous variation and suitable data. Lastly, section 1.5
gives an outline of this thesis.
1.2 Public Perception of Immigrants
The public opinion toward immigration is a salient topic in many societies. It has the
potential to change the societies on several dimensions: the political, the social, and the
economic level. In what follows, I want to discuss the potential mechanism of the public
perception of immigrants and how it could change the world we are living in.
The public perception of immigrants has already changed the political arenas of many
developed countries. Many democracies have experienced shifts to a right-wing spectrum,
for example, France through the Front National, Germany through the Alternative for
Germany (AfD) or the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in Great Britain. Recent studies
also show that current political decisions such as UK’s referendum to leave the European
Union and the 2016 U.S. election were based mainly on the public debate over immigration
(Klinkner, 2017; Harding, 2017).
Public perception of immigrants has also some economic consequences. Negative pub-
lic perception of immigration can have far-reaching effects in terms of countries’ prosper-
3
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ity and growth by influencing migration patterns and lessening business attractiveness
(Siedler, 2011).
Negative public perception leads furthermore to social tensions between native and
immigrant groups and could lead to parallel societies in the host country (Dustmann
and Preston, 2001). The crucial underlying question in this context is how the actual
presence of immigrants is an important factor in the formation of the public perception
of immigrants. In Chapter 2, I address this question showing evidence on the public
perception of immigrants during a major inflow of asylum seekers, namely during the
Balkan Wars.
1.3 Integration of Immigrants
The integration of immigrants is a key policy challenge for domestic policymakers and be-
yond (OECD, 2017). Integration is important not only for immigrants, but also improves
the social cohesion between immigrants and natives. Fostering integration of immigrants
will help host societies to grow and prosper.
Gordon (1964) shows seven steps or stages for immigrants to integrate and assimilate.
Integration can only be successful if all steps interplay with each other and are tackled
by the immigrants. To those steps count for example the social interaction between
immigrants and natives, like intermarriages. But also the legal framework has to be set
in the host country to give the immigrants a chance to integrate.
One of those legal frameworks is granting citizenship of the host country. Literature
shows that citizenship is highly correlated with better integration and occupational mea-
sures. There is evidence that naturalized immigrants earn more than non-naturalized
ones (Chiswick, 1978; Steinhardt, 2012), have higher job-finding rates (Fougère and Safi,
2009; Gathmann and Keller, 2017) and experience steeper wage-tenure profiles (Bratsberg
et al., 2002). As the integration of children is especially important, many developed coun-
tries argue that it is important to integrate the children early on by granting birthright
citizenship. Chapter 3 and 4 aim to show the effects of this.
But integration and assimilation cannot be achieved alone. Gordon (1964) also men-
tions two fundamental aspects of integration which have to be fulfilled by the host coun-
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tries’ society: being free from prejudice and discrimination. And here, again, public
perception plays a crucial role.
1.4 Microeconometric Analysis
Microeconometric analysis is not insignificant when studying migration and integration.
Correlational evidence might be biased, especially through the self-selection of people,
into regions, into policy measures, into citizenship etc. Once a potential mechanism for
causal inference is found, a second obstacle arises, finding fitting data. In what follows,
I give more detailed information on exogenous variation and suitable data sets.
1.4.1 Causal Inference
When working on issues of migration and integration correlational evidence can lead to
several issues. What if people move to a certain area because it is prosperous and with a
low unemployment rate, or they move there because people are known to be the friendliest
toward people from all over the world? What if people apply for citizenship of the host
country, because they are perfectly integrated, know the language and their children
thrive in the educational system? We would find that immigrants bring prosperity and
high employment rates, we would find citizenship brings integration for both adults and
children. But we would also know that there is no causal relation.
In those situations the best case solution would be to randomly distribute immigrants
to regions. The amount of people, the academic background, innate abilities and origins
of the immigrants should be distributed by chance. Also citizenships, language courses,
and other integrative measures should also be randomly assigned among the people.
Then, the correlational evidence would give us causal effects.
To approximate random assignment, scholars have found many possibilities to produce
“as if” randomness. One of the most prominent examples is exogenous variations, for
example due to unpredicted events, such as any sort of exogenous shock. One of these was
used by Card (1990), using the example of the Mariel Boatlift, where 125,000 Cubans
suddenly came to Florida. Another is the sudden flow of refugees during the Balkan
wars, used for example by Angrist and Kugler (2003) and Speciale (2012). Another kind
5
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of exogenous variation is the introduction of political reforms on a specific cut-off date.
This allows us to compare individuals who are eligible for this political change and who
are not eligible but are in fact only for example separated by birth by a couple of days.
In this thesis I use two different approaches for the causal inference. First, in Chap-
ter 2, I use the outbreak of the Balkan Wars as an exogenous variation to instrument the
percentage of immigrants in one region since, even though the outbreak of the civil war
itself was exogenous, the settlement could not have been random.
The empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 relies on a cut-off approach. I use the ex-
ogenous variation of the introduction of birthright citizenship as a random experiment for
the granting of citizenship to second generation immigrant children. Chapter 4 combines
this approach with an lab-in-the-field experiment with the same cohort.
1.4.2 Data
Once an interesting research idea and a setting are found where causal inference is possi-
ble, one of the major issues left is suitable data. The empirical analysis in this thesis uses
a series of data sets. In what follows, I want to discuss the advantages and disadvantages
of survey, administrative and experimental data and touch shortly upon the data sets
used in this thesis.
First, I examine survey data which has several advantages. Most often survey data
spans a large range of topics like family and individual background characteristics, it
covers the opinions and attitudes of people and it gives detailed insights into personal
circumstances, especially if done in a panel setting. However, it has also some disad-
vantages. Due to the large administrative costs, survey data is limited in sample size as
every single observation is costly. Furthermore, it mostly just covers specific questions,
which are regarded important in the specific setup of the survey. Most importantly it is
always associated with the subjective answers of the individuals.
In this thesis I use several sets of survey data, especially in Chapter 2, which is
completely based on survey data, and in Chapter 3, where survey data gives additional
insights. The analysis in Chapter 2 is based mainly on the Politbarometer, a political
survey conducted for German state TV, asking a representative sample of individuals
who are allowed to vote. It gives a picture of public perception over a wide range of
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political issues. Another data set used, which has also the advantage of a panel setup
is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This data set covers a wide range of
topics and gives a large amount of control variables. Another panel used in Chapter 3
is the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) . It gives a large range of information
on children. All of the mentioned survey data sets have the disadvantage of having only
small number of observations. The largest household survey in Europe is the German
Microcensus with around 600,000 observations each year. It covers topics like family
background, income, employment, education and many other interesting variables and is
predominantly used in Chapters 2 and 3.
Second, administrative data covers the universe of the population, which solves the
problem of achieving a representative sample of the population. Furthermore, it is based
on official data records, which means subjective answers are not a problem. But most
often analysis based on administrative data runs into one particular problem, namely
the scarcity of information. Even though it most often gives a wide range of outcome
information, it is much more limited as regards background information usable as control
variables, since this is not crucial for administrative record-keeping.
The administrative data used in this thesis shows up especially in Chapter 3. Here we
not only use school entry examination data, but also school record data, which covers the
totality of children from one German federal state, Schleswig-Holstein. Both data sets
cover a wide range of information on students, for example, their kindergarten attendance,
examination data from doctors and school outcomes for children, such as school entry
age, retentions and school tracking. Unfortunately, both data sets lack crucial background
data, especially information on the parental background, such as the country of origin of
the parents, education of the parents, or citizenship of the children and the parents.
Third, experimental data can combine advantages of both survey and administrative
data. Incentivized experiments permit the behavior of individuals to be examined much
more precisely than normal survey questions. Since experimental setups are mostly in-
cluded in combination with an extensive background survey, the information provided is
more informative than the administrative data. However, experimental data runs into
the same problem as survey data. Every single observation is costly, even more so if the
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experiments are incentivized. Furthermore, representativeness is crucial when setting up
an experiment.
Chapter 4 is almost entirely based on our own collected data, which included an
incentivized experiment that was combined with an extensive survey. In particular, we
conducted a trust game as described by Berg et al. (1995) in 57 German schools in
2015. The study included over 4,000 students who completed the experiment and the
survey. It gives us the advantage of combining outcomes of a trust game with natives and
migrants, giving us an approximation of cooperative behavior between different groups
in the population, with an extensive background and social survey data set.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis spans three independent empirical studies. Each chapter gives its own con-
tribution to the discussion on the public perception of immigrants and the integration of
immigrant children.
Chapter 2 examines the public perception of immigrants during the Balkan Wars in
Germany. It provides causal evidence on how the percentage of immigrants in a region
affects the public concerns about immigrants. How society perceives events, like mass
migration flows, is crucial on a political, economic, and social level. In the chapter,
I examine to what extent the proportion of immigrants in one’s region affects public
opinion toward immigration. I focus on a specific time frame, the time during the Balkan
Wars and look at Germany, to where about 700,000 refugees fled. I use an instrumental
variables approach, where I use not only the exogenous timing of the Balkan Wars but
also the exogenous variation in the distance of German cities to Sarajevo, assuming that
the most important feature for migration into Germany is the distance to Sarajevo.
I find that the higher the percentage of immigrants in a region’s population, the
less the public is concerned about immigrants. Interestingly, the percentage of potential
right-wing voting is increased. There are reasons to believe that this effect follows from
peoples concerns about the economy and their own financial situation. European data
depicts a similar situation for several European countries.
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Chapters 3 and 4 are closely related to one another and deal with an important
integrative measure, namely the introduction of birthright citizenship. Chapter 3 focuses
on the integration effect on second-generation immigrant children and their early life
education outcomes and spans the ages five to ten. Chapter 4 goes a step further and
examines the same cohort of children in their last year of compulsory schooling and how
their integration in non-market transactions evolved.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Christina Felfe and Helmut Rainer. This chapter ex-
amines whether the introduction of birthright citizenship in Germany had an impact on
immigrant children’s educational outcomes at the first three key stages of the education
system: preschool, primary school, and secondary school. We employ a difference-in-
differences strategy which exploits a birth date cut-off determining whether a child be-
came eligible for birthright citizenship or not using a reform in the nationality law in
Germany in the year 2000. We employ two administrative data sets for our analysis,
school entry examination and school records of one German federal state, Schleswig-
Holstein.
We find that the policy (i) increased immigrant children’s participation in non-compulsory
preschool education; (ii) had positive effects on key developmental outcomes (e.g. German
language proficiency) measured at the end of the preschool period; (iii) caused immigrant
children to progress faster through primary school; and (iv) increased the likelihood of
them attending the academic track of secondary school, which paves the way for higher
education.
Chapter 4 is joint work with Christina Felfe, Martin Kocher, Helmut Rainer, and
Thomas Siedler. We focus on a fundamental aspect of migrant integration, namely non-
market interactions between natives and immigrants. A central question in this context
is how individuals of different, possibly oppositional, identities approach social dilemma
situations.
We have (i) run an artefactual field experiment based on the trust game with a large
sample (N=4,436) of German adolescents; (ii) allowed participants to condition their
strategies on the migration background of their opponents; and (iii) matched the exper-
imental data with individual background information from an extensive, self-conducted
survey.
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Our first result reveals an oppositional culture of trust and discrimination therein:
native children extend their trust in almost equal measure to native and immigrant
opponents, respectively. Immigrant children, by contrast, show a high degree of trust
towards those with whom they share a migration background, but a low willingness to
trust their native peers. On inspection, the differential trust decisions of immigrants turn
out to be statistically unjustified and not driven by wrong stereotypes, which points to
identity-based social preferences.
For our main contribution, we connect the artefactual field experiment with a natural
policy experiment which saw the introduction of a widely debated integration policy:
birthright citizenship, which automatically grants children born to foreign parents the
nationality of the host country. We find that the policy substantially reduced the degree
of trust discrimination among male, but not among female, immigrants. This effect is
accompanied by an improved educational integration of immigrant males.
10
Chapter 2
Public Perception Toward
Immigrants -
Causal Evidence from Germany
during the Balkan Wars
11
Public Perception of Immigrants
2.1 Introduction
Political and economic turmoil over the last three decades in East Europe, the Balkans,
the Middle East, and Africa has had a substantial impact on global migration flows.
The stock of foreign-born population in Western Countries is steadily increasing and is
changing the face of the European countries. Since the end of the Cold War millions
of migrants and refugees have relocated within and to Europe. These mass migration
flows not only set many developed democracies on new demographic paths but also fueled
public concerns about immigration and the integration of immigrants.
The public perception of immigration is key for societies on different political, social,
and economic levels. First, flight and migration have changed the political arena in many
Western democracies. Recent studies show that some of the most important current
political decisions, such as UK’s referendum to leave the European Union in 2016 and
the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, where influenced substantially by the public debate
over immigration (Klinkner, 2017; Harding, 2017). Pertinent intimidation by immigrant-
related rhetoric can mobilize large segments of the electorate (Hainmueller et al., 2015).
Second, negative public perception leads to social tensions between native and immigrant
groups, which contributes to social exclusion of immigrants (Dustmann and Preston,
2001). Third, negative public perception of immigration can have significant effects in
terms of countries’ prosperity and growth by influencing migration patterns and lessening
business attractiveness (Siedler, 2011). The crucial underlying question behind public
opinion toward immigration is whether individual concerns are due to a person’s actual
geographic proximity to immigrants or shaped by the mere salient presence of the topic
across the country.
In this analysis, I examine whether the fraction of immigrants in the population
has an effect on the natives’ perception of immigrants and whether these perceptions
have an impact on the political landscape. I explore this issue during the large influx
of refugees into Germany during the course of the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s. I
investigate whether the native population experiences immigrants as a pressing problem
where the actual presence of immigrants is higher in their region. This is particularly
interesting as it gives insights into the workings of a society and how the population
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experiences and interprets certain events (Smith, 1980). To dig deeper into this issue
and its potential consequences I investigate the impact on political attitudes and voting
behavior on the fringes of society in particular, looking at right-wing political placement
or voting behavior, which has a significant impact on the entire society. Finally, my
interest focuses on potential channels of public perception, since those can be addressed
or even changed by policy-makers. Such channels may be economic concerns or the fear of
job loss due to higher competition from immigrants in the labor market. These channels
can also be evaluated on a European level in order to gain insights into a broader spectrum
of countries. Taken together, I draw a comprehensive picture of causes and consequences
of public perceptions of immigrants.
To investigate the issue at hand, I look at a previous episode of a sudden immigrant
inflow, that which occurred due to the Balkan Wars. The Balkan Wars at the beginning
of the 1990s were the first wars on European soil since World War II. With the declaration
of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 began one of the deadliest wars in that
region. Two to three million people were either murdered or displaced during this time. It
set off an unprecedented wave of refugee migration from the former Yugoslavian countries
to Western Europe, only exceeded by the most recent refugee wave of 2015. At the end of
the war in March 1995, 734,970 refugees were distributed across Europe, with the largest
proportion migrating to Germany.
The migration flow from former Yugoslavia became an important part of the migration
patterns in Europe in the early 1990s. This inflow is an interesting episode to analyze for
several reasons. First, it is a quite sudden and unexpected rise in the inflow of immigrants.
Second, it centers around a very specific group of immigrants, asylum seekers, which, in
many contexts, should not foster the concerns of the native population. Third, the
situation at that time resembles the situation faced in 2015 by Germany when about one
million refugees from Syria and other countries fled there. The following analysis might,
therefore, give some insights into the natives’ reactions to such events.
Germany is an intriguing case for the study of public opinions of immigration. The
country experienced by far the largest amount of immigrants from the former Yugosla-
vian countries. About half a million refugees fled to Germany in the year 1992 alone.
Furthermore, since Germany had no well-established right-wing party in the early 1999s,
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contrary to, for example, Austria or Denmark, voting for right-wing parties was especially
small at the time; nonetheless, in times of crisis small right-wing parties can also mobilize
a non-negligible part of the electorate1. Lastly, Germany has recently experienced a sim-
ilar refugee inflow which makes conclusions from previous episodes even more important.
To establish external validity on a European level, I also extend my analysis to several
European countries at the end of my investigation.
Several data sets – administrative and survey – allow me to answer the question of
whether the proportion of immigrants in a region has an effect on the public opinion
toward immigrants. I focus on the distribution of the immigrant population across 30
West German districts in the years around the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, 1990 to
1992. For the dependent variables, I use data from Politbarometer, which includes in-
formation gathered monthly on general attitudes towards politically relevant issues. The
Politbarometer also asks the question as to what is the most pressing problem in Ger-
many at the moment. The answers to this question give insights into the workings of a
society and how the population experiences and interprets events (Smith, 1980). I con-
struct the dependent variable by setting the variable to one if refugees or immigrants are
viewed as the most pressing problem for Germany at the moment, otherwise zero. If these
perceptions also translate into political preferences, I can analyze using data on political
placement and potential voting behavior, especially when looking at the political fringe of
a society. In particular, I investigate extreme-right political placement and extreme-right
voting. Using the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) I am able to look into poten-
tial channels, for example, economic worries, such as fear of job loss or general worries
about the economic situation. Furthermore, I use data from the statistical offices of the
German federal states on the percentage of immigrants in different regions, specifically
register data from the Office of Foreigners that gives an exact percentage of foreigners in
each region. To create external validity, I investigate the channels on a European level.
I use data from the Eurobarometer and the OECD for eleven states in the years 1987 to
1995.
1In the early 1990s, a party called the Republikaner gained momentum during the migration inflows,
as did the party Alternative for Germany during the refugee crisis in 2015.
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There are no clear theoretical predictions regarding the effect of the proportion of
immigrants on natives’ concerns about immigrants. On the one hand, Campbell (1965)
suggests that prejudice arises from the conflict of interests between groups. Competition
for scarce resources can aggravate hostile behavior toward other groups. Competition
can arise over employment possibilities or over limited resources in the social system.
An important feature of this theory is that even the perception of such competition for
resources can increase intergroup conflicts. It is not necessarily the actual competition
that matters.
On the other hand, Allport (1954) in his contact theory describes that more direct con-
tact with either immigrants or refugees could decrease reservations towards immigrants.
This transformation in beliefs is due to better experiences through the contact with im-
migrants than prejudices or third-party information would have predicted. Contact on
the one hand and competition for scarce resources on the other are closely entangled and
add up to its distributional consequences. The competition between natives and immi-
grants for jobs or government spending and services is a fundamental aspect. In such
situations, LeVine and Campbell (1972) expect a negative turn to the contact theory,
where proximity could even lead to increasing hostility. According to the theory, it might
be possible to find positive perceptions of immigration in the proximity of immigrants
(Allport, 1954), but also negative reactions from the fraction of the population which
perceives competition for scarce resources (Esses et al., 1998).
Correlational evidence shows that the higher the proportion of immigrants in a region,
the more concerned the population is about immigration, as it views immigrants and
asylum seekers as the most pressing problem facing Germany. These findings would
suggest that the proportion of immigrants during the Balkan Wars indeed has had a
negative effect on natives’ perception of immigrants.
To examine the causal effect of the percentage of immigrants in one region on the
public perception of natives of immigrants, I use an exogenous variation. To prevent
any potential bias or reverse causality, I rely on an instrumental variables (IV) approach
using the distance to Sarajevo during the Balkan Wars as an IV for the proportion of
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immigrants in West German regions2. This approach offers the possibility of analyzing
how attitudes change based on the decisions of immigrants to migrate to regions close to
their home country during the war. The mere distance right after the outbreak of the
Balkan Wars can be assumed to be exogenous to preexisting attitudes of natives towards
immigrants and their economic and political concerns.
Using this IV approach to estimate a causal effect between the proportion of foreigners
and natives’ perception of immigrants, I find that a one percent increase in immigrants
leads to a five percentage points (ppt) decrease in natives’ concerns about asylum seekers,
and an eight ppt decrease towards immigrants in general. This amounts to a ten percent
change in the mean. Whereas OLS estimates find an increase in concerns about immi-
grants, the IV approach shows a substantial decrease in the natives’ apprehensiveness
in regions with a high percentage of immigrants. When examining the political fringe
of society, the results are different, as I find an increase of potential right-wing voting
behavior, which is in line with the findings from previous literature. Furthermore, the
higher proportion of immigrants lead to a higher increase in worries about the economy
and one’s own financial situation. This result stems mainly from lower educated per-
sons and persons with low incomes. Evidence from Europe underline the results from
Germany. Several robustness checks confirm the results.
What is missing so far in the literature is, on the one hand, the combination of the
two literature strands; as Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) point out, so far the literature
on attitudes toward immigration and the effects of immigration on the political arena
have developed in isolation. This study is an attempt to combine these two strands. On
the other hand, causal evidence in contrast to correlational evidence on the proximity of
immigrants on the public perception of immigration is scarce. To establish such causal
evidence is another contribution of this analysis to the literature. In this chapter, I
take the first step to shedding light on the public perception of immigrants by asking (i)
how is the public perception of immigrants different across the country in the light of a
massive inflow of immigrants and (ii) how does this perception interplay with individual
2A similar approach for European countries was used by Angrist and Kugler (2003) and Speciale
(2012).
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backgrounds and potential channels. In what follows, I highlight the contribution of the
paper to the related literature.
I contribute to the literature in several ways. First, I contribute to the strand of
literature on attitudes towards migrants, but in doing so, use causal interference from
an exogenous inflow shock. Second, like Halla et al. (ming), I look at how natives’
voting behavior changes when the migrant population increases. Because Germany, unlike
Austria, did not have a well-established right-wing party at that time, I instead look at
self-placement on the political spectrum, and also provide evidence for very small right-
wing parties. I enhance the analysis using an exogenous shock and, by also including
personal attitudes, I can identify the channels for different political placements. Third,
I am not looking only at migrants in general, but at the inflow of asylum seekers, a
group of people who are looking for refuge in the host country. That is, they do not
have economic reasons for migrating, and thus should not be any threat to existing job
opportunities. Refugees do not compete for jobs with the native population but might
very well be perceived as a competition for financial resources.
There is an extensive literature studying the effects of immigration on the attitudes
of natives, from both a within-country and cross-national perspectives (Card et al., 2012;
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Across OECD countries there is heterogeneity in the
impact of immigrant populations on the perception natives have of them. In countries
where those perceptions seem rather negative, the negative attitudes stem from a lower
level of education (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010) and per-
sonal characteristics (Steinhardt and Poutvaara, 2015). Additional factors for negative
perceptions are perceived higher crime rates (Fitzgerald et al., 2012) and there are am-
biguous results for the fear of losing jobs (Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller et al., 2015). The
literature on such attitudes deals with the question of how natives’ attitudes are affected
by the presence of immigrants. Dustmann and Preston (2007), Pedersen et al. (2006) and
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) study the effects of negative sentiments toward immigrants.
More recent studies focus on the effects of immigrants on the voting behavior of
natives and find quite ambiguous results. Beginning with Otto and Steinhardt (2014),
who find positive impacts of immigrants on right-wing parties, several other papers deal
with the relationship between immigrants and the rise of right-wing parties. Halla et al.
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(ming) and Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) look at how natives’ voting behavior is affected
by the number of immigrants in their neighborhoods and conclude that an increased
percentage of immigrants in one’s region is related to higher voter turnouts for right-
wing parties. Furthermore, Barone et al. (2016) and Brunner and Kuhn (2014) look
at Italy and Switzerland. In contrast, Steinmayr (2016) finds negative effects on voter
turnout for right-wing parties when looking at the most recent episode of refugee inflow
in Austria. On a similar topic, Geishecker and Siedler (2011) look at how the fear of job
loss can foster right-wing voting.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the back-
ground and the different data sets used for my analysis are discussed in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 2.5 discusses the used identifica-
tion strategy at length. Section 2.6 presents the main results and provides a series of
robustness checks and heterogeneous effects. Section 2.7 provides the conclusion.
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2.2 The Balkan Wars and the Public Perception in
Germany
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, many countries in East Europe experienced violent
structural processes, especially in former Yugoslavia. The unstable economic and politi-
cal situation of the 1980s motivated an independence movement that gained momentum
throughout the former Yugoslavian region, culminating in June 1991 in the declaration of
independence by Slovenia and Croatia, which in turn, led to Europe’s deadliest conflict
since World War II. Between August and September 1991, 80,000 Croats were displaced
from the Croatian regions where Serbs were in power. At the end of 1991, Germany
acknowledged Slovenia and Croatia as independent states; other EU countries then fol-
lowed suit. At the beginning of 1992, a referendum on independence was held in Bosnia.
This led to a siege of the city Sarajevo, which culminated in the terrible massacre of
Srebrenica in 1995, in which 8,000 Moslems were killed. In December 1995, a peace
agreement was reached and the war finally ended. Two to three million people became
victims of the war, as they fled, were expelled, or murdered. Almost half of the refugees
went to Germany (see Figure 2.1), causing a tremendous inflow of asylum seekers in the
early 1990s.
Figure 2.1: Asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia by host country
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Notes: These data stems from estimations by the UNHCR in March
1995. At that point in time around 734,970 refugees were distributed
around Europe.
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Germany, which until then had no experience in large immigrant inflows (except for
the guest worker program of the 1950s and 1960s3), was the largest recipient of asylum
seekers from the Balkan Wars in the early 1990s. UNHCR reported in March 1995 that
Germany was the host country for almost half of the refugees from this civil war (see
Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.2 gives us an overview of the applications of asylum seekers in the years
between 1990 and 2015 in Germany, where we can see two main peaks. One of them
was in 1992 during the Balkan Wars, during the time period assessed by this analysis,
and another occurred in recent years with its peak in 2015. Bureaucrats and courts were
swamped with asylum inquiries. The increase in asylum inquiries led, on the one hand,
to extended stays of asylum seekers in Germany, as they were allowed to stay until their
inquiry was processed and, on the other, to occasional violent resentment on the part of
the native population.
Following an extreme peak of asylum seekers in 1992, Germany ratified the asylum
compromise (Asylkompromiss) in 1993, setting strict rules for asylum seekers and their
inquiries, while procedures were speeded up. EASY (Erstverteilung der Asylsuchenden =
a system to first distribute asylum seekers around the German regions) was introduced
and asylum seekers had to stay in their assigned region. Asylum seekers from countries
which were perceived as safe by the German federal government or asylum seekers who
first passed through so-called safe countries were not permitted to apply for asylum status
in Germany.
These new measures substantially decreased the number of asylum seekers in Ger-
many. The allocation of immigrants, however, was not enforced by any sanctions. Even
if immigrants were allocated to one region, they would shortly thereafter move to an-
other region. Some municipalities were overwhelmed by immigrants which led to an
3From 1955 onward Germany started a so-called guest worker program to satisfy the immense need
for immigrant labor in order to rebuild Germany. The first countries sending immigrant labor were Italy
(1955), Spain and Greece (1960), with other countries like Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964) and Yugoslavia
(1968) following suit. Recruited immigrant workers were called guest workers (Gastarbeiter). The name
already implied that the stay of the workers were expected to be only temporary (Algan et al., 2012).
Hence, the willingness of immigrants to integrate and thus effective integration policies were completely
lacking. Overall 14 million immigrants came to Germany during the years of the guest worker program,
with around 11 million people leaving the country again. In the early 1970s, the immigrant population
constituted 4.9% of the German population. In the wake of the first oil crisis in 1973 the guest worker
program was canceled due to the economic decline which made the hiring of foreign workers obsolete.
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official complaint by the municipalities in 1995. From this followed an allocation proce-
dure in 1996, which sanctioned immigrants by cutting off any financial help if they moved
to another region.
Figure 2.2: Applications of asylum seekers in Germany (in thousands)
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The public perception of immigrants and in particular refugees and the media coverage
were quite ambiguous at that time. On the one hand, it was acknowledged that the Balkan
Wars and the subsequent migration flows constituted the most serious humanitarian crisis
since World War II and that help for refugees was essential. On the other hand, public
concerns were fueled by how Germany would be able to handle the inflow of so many
people, and more essentially how all immigrants and refugees could be integrated. At
that time Germany also experienced an uprising of far-right political movements and
criminal behavior against refugees, but also immigrants in general.
Comparing media coverage between the years 1992 and 2015 shows some similarities
in the documentation of the refugee crisis during the Balkan Wars and the refugee crisis
due to the Syrian civil war. These similarities cover the necessity for humanitarian help,
the hostility of some parts of the population against immigrants and the blaming of the
European Union for not dealing with the problem. This highlights the importance of the
topic even 25 years later.
2.3 Data
In order to answer the research questions empirically and to establish a relationship
between the share of immigrants in a region to the attitudes of natives, I require compre-
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hensive data. First, I use population data from all the regions in my sample to calculate
the immigrant shares for every region (see the first line in Table 2.1). Furthermore, I use
immigrant inflow data from the OECD over this period to measure immigrants in one
country. These are all 30 West German regions4, which are smaller than a federal state,
but larger than counties. The population data is gathered from the statistical offices of
the federal states.
Second, I draw upon two social surveys in Germany, the Politbarometer and the
German Socio-Economic Panel. Both datasets are available at regional level and for the
given time frame. Third, for evidence on the European level, I infer from data from the
Eurobarometer and data from the OECD. In what follows, I describe the three data sets
in more detail.
2.3.1 Politbarometer
The Politbarometer is a monthly survey conducted from the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen
(election research group) for German state TV. The survey targets the voting population
in Germany and asks about parties, politicians and the most pressing issues in society. I
restrict the years of the analysis to one year before the outbreak of the war, 1990, and
two years afterward, 1991 and 1992, and the months of September to December since
the outbreak of the Balkan War occurred in September. The restrictions leave us with a
sample size of 11,939 individuals. The Politbarometer asks the following question:
What is in your opinion the most important problem the federal republic is facing at
the moment?
Even though this question gives more details on the relative ranking of problems
rather than the absolute measurement of public anxieties, it provides insights into the
workings of society and how the population perceives certain events (Smith, 1980).
The questionnaire offers several possible answers. This closed question approach has
the advantage of describing changes in public opinion over time and differences among
different regions (Schuman and Scott, 1987) As the main objective of this analysis is
public opinion toward migration, I construct the following binary variables:
4Regierungsbezirke in German
22
Public Perception of Immigrants
• Immigrants as a Problem: equals one if asylum seekers or foreigners are the most
pressing or second most pressing problem Germany is facing, zero otherwise
• Asylum Seekers as a Problem: equals one if asylum seekers are the most pressing
or second most pressing problem Germany is facing, zero otherwise
• Foreigner as a Problem: equals one if foreigners are the most pressing or second
most pressing problem Germany is facing, zero otherwise
Table 2.1 shows, on the one hand, an increase of 1 percentage point (ppt) of the
foreign population in Germany before and after the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and,
on the other, a substantial increase before and after the outbreak of the civil war in
terms of public opinion toward immigration. The increase of the variable “Immigrants
as a Problem” of over 50 percentage points (ppt) is especially noticeable. This increase
is mainly driven by the variable “Asylum Seekers as a Problem” (an increase of 40 ppt),
but also the variable “Foreigners as a Problem” sees a quite substantial increase (14.3
ppt).
The literature suggests that the presence of foreigners may also have an effect on the
political attitudes of natives. This is of particular interest as in Hainmueller et al. (2015)
it was pointed out that so far there is no connection between public attitudes and the
political process. It is important when looking at that fringe of society which might be
mobilized by anti-immigrant rhetoric. This is especially true for far-right extremism. To
evaluate this, I use survey data from the Politbarometer to construct the following binary
variables:
• Extreme-right Placement: equals one if the person places him/herself on the most
extreme right of the political scale from 1 to 10, otherwise zero.
• Extreme-right Voting: captures potential extreme-right voting behavior (Repub-
likaner or NPD5) if elections were to be held on the Sunday following the interview.
Even though there is no substantial shift in the extreme-right political placement,
there is a positive shift in the extreme-right voting of 2.5 ppt. Although this is survey
5For a detailed description of the extreme-right political landscape in Germany in the early 1990s
see Otto and Steinhardt (2014).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - Politbarometer
Mean Before After Difference
Foreigners 0.087 0.080 0.090 0.010***
Public Opinion Toward Immigrants
Foreigners as Problem 0.143 0.047 0.190 0.143***
Asylum Seekers as Problem 0.337 0.069 0.47 0.401***
Immigrants as Problem 0.468 0.114 0.643 0.529***
Voting Behavior
Extreme-right Placement 0.062 0.058 0.063 0.005
Extreme-right Voting 0.025 0.008 0.033 0.025***
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is
restricted to the months September-December. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1991
and 1992 and also to the months September-December. The variables Foreigner as a Problem and
Asylum Seekers as a Problem stem from the Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named
either of them as the first or second most prominent problem in Germany. The variable Immigrants
as a Problem combines both of the previous variables and is set to 1 if either of them is equal to
1. Extreme-right Placement stems also from the Politbarometer and is set to 1 if the respondent set
its own political placement to 1 on a ten-step scale. Extreme-right Voting, also generated from the
Politbarometer is set to 1 if the respondent would vote either Republikaner or NPD if on Sunday
elections were held.
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data and not actual voting behavior and might therefore show a biased picture, observed
differences still give insights in the political landscape at the time. If we look at the
election outcomes from the year 1994, we see that the Republikaner won 1.9 % of the
electorate, which is similar to the survey results. The largest results were achieved in the
federal states Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hessia, the federal states in the south of
Germany, closest to the former Yugoslavian countries. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows
the individual covariates before and after the outbreak of the Balkan War, which do not
change over time.
2.3.2 German Socio-Economic Panel
Anti-migrant sentiments could stem from a variety of reasons. The most prominent ar-
gument is the economic well-being of citizens, notably in the context of the perceived
competition for scarce resources, such as jobs or governmental spending. The German
Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) gives me the opportunity to further investigate natives’
public opinions, especially regarding their potential channels which lead to negative per-
ceptions of immigrants. As interviews were conducted mainly at the beginning of each
year, I restrict my sample to individuals interviewed between the months January to June
in the years 1991 to 1993. This gives me a sample of 17,529 individuals. The GSOEP
allows me to construct the following binary variables:
• Job Insecurity: equals one if individuals are worried about losing their jobs, zero
otherwise
• Worry about the Economic Situation: equals one if individuals are worried about
the economy in general, zero otherwise
• Worry about one’s own Financial Situation: equals one if individuals are worried
about their own financial situation, zero otherwise
Concerns over scarce resources seem also to have increased in this time period. “Worry
about the Economic Situation” in general increases by 13 ppt., “Worry about one’s own
Economic Situation” increases by 2.4 ppt., and the “Job Insecurity” increases by 1.9 ppt.
Table A.2 in the Appendix not only shows that, except for those under 25 years of age,
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population characteristics do not change over time, but also that the samples of the two
data sets, Politbarometer and GSOEP, are similar.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - GSOEP
Mean Before After Difference
Channels
Worry about the Economic Situation 0.272 0.187 0.317 0.13***
Worry about one’s own Financial Situation 0.109 0.094 0.117 0.024***
Job Insecurity 0.056 0.043 0.062 0.019***
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is
restricted to the months January to June 1991. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1992
and 1993 and also to the months January to June. Worry about the Economic Situation, Worry
about one’s own Economic Situaion and Job Insecurity are all also generated from the GSOEP and
are set to 1 if individuals are very worried about the individual subjects.
2.3.3 Eurobarometer and OECD Data
Other countries in Europe have also received substantial amounts of immigrants. To check
whether the findings from Germany are also applicable to a broader set of countries, I
use data from the Eurobarometer. I use data from eleven European countries: Belgium,
UK, Italy, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. Since I can draw only on such a small sample of countries, I have extended
the time horizon and analyzed the years between 1987 and 1995. In addition, I am
only using data from surveys conducted in the fall, normally between September and
November, in order to use only those surveys conducted during wartime.
These restrictions lead to a sample of 167,789 observations. There are no questions
regarding immigrants or asylum seekers in these datasets at that time period, but I am
able to look at some variables related to politics and economics. Specifically, I analyze the
effect of the geographic proximity of immigrants on the right-wing political placement, the
attitudes towards the economy as a whole and on the financial situation of the household
of the native population:
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - Eurobarometer
Mean Before After Difference
Inflow of Foreigners 165,562 150,517 176,362 25,845***
Extreme-right Placement 0.054 0.06 0.05 -0.01***
Worry about the Economic Situation 0.441 0.365 0.494 0.13***
Worry about one’s own Financial Situation 0.281 0.26 0.296 0.036***
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is restricted
to September to December 1987-1990. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1991-1995 and
also to the months September to December. Worry about the Economic Situation, Worry about
one’s own Economic Situaion and Job Insecurity are all also generated from the Eurobarometer and
are set to 1 if individuals are very worried on the individual subjects. Information on the Inflow of
Foreigners stems from OECD data.
• Extreme-right Placement: equals one if the person places him/herself on the most
extreme right of a scale of 1 to 10, otherwise zero.
• Worry about the Economic Situation: equals one if individuals are worried about
the economy in general, zero otherwise
• Worry about one’s own Financial Situation: equals one if individuals are worried
about their own financial situation, zero otherwise
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables before and during the Balkan
Wars. One can observe a substantial increase in the worries about the economic situation
and a smaller increase in the worry over one’s own financial situation in the European
countries. The extreme-right political placement even decreases in Europe. Furthermore,
I use immigrant inflow data from the OECD over this period to measure immigrants in
one country. Table 2.3 displays that over the years the countries experienced an average
inflow of foreigners of 165,562. The largest recipient were Germany and the UK.
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2.4 Empirical Approach
This section introduces first the equation of interest and describes why OLS regression
might lead to biased results. In the next step, I present a fixed effects framework and its
potential caveats before lastly turn to the IV identification strategy used in this analysis.
2.4.1 OLS Regression
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the effect of the geographic proximity of
immigrants on the public perception of immigration of the native population. In order
to estimate a causal effect of the immigrants on the public perception of immigration
one would like to calculate the difference in public opinion toward immigration from
individuals living in one region without any immigrant with an individual living in one
region with the presence of immigrants. Ideally, if one lives in a region with and without
immigrants would be decided randomly.
Obviously, in a globalized world it is almost impossible to find regions without any
immigrants presence. Therefore, I investigate the effect of the intensity of the presence
of immigrants on the public opinion of immigration. To establish a relationship between
the share of immigrants in one’s region and the public perception of native inhabitants
the ordinary least square equation appears as follows:
Yi = α + βln(sst) + γXi + ist (2.1)
where Yi is an individual perception and ln(sst) the log of immigrant percentages
in region s in year t. Measuring the share of immigrants in the population instead of
the labor force is important as natives in regions with high shares of immigrants might
live next to them and experience immigrants in their everyday lives and thus form their
opinions of immigrants, but might not work with them.
When just looking at the correlation between the percentage of immigrants in the
region and natives’ perception toward immigration is not clear in which direction the
causality is working. What we would like to see is that immigrants come into a region
and because of this the public changes its perception toward immigrants, in a positive or
negative way, which theoretically is not clear. But it could also be that because of either
28
Public Perception of Immigrants
positive or negative view toward immigration migration patterns are shaped. In order to
tackle this problem, I am introducing regional fixed effects, which I present in the next
subsection.
2.4.2 Fixed Effects Regression
Region and time fixed effects are introduced in order to control for unobserved but time-
invariant omitted variables, like a general negative attitudes toward immigration due to
previous immigration flows into the region. In particular, the settlement of workers from
the former Yugoslavian countries at the end of the guestworker programme were relatively
stable since 1974 until the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. Introducing region fixed effects,
control for this settlement pattern. It is important to control for observed confounding
factors. If omitted variables are fixed on a regional level, it is possible to control for them
by implementing region dummies (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Yi = α + βln(sst) + γXi + τWarY earst + ψRegions + ist (2.2)
where
WarY earst is a binary variable which indicates the years 1991 and 1992
Regions are 30 region fixed effects
There are however reasons to believe that these results are biased. For example, im-
proved labor market conditions can attract immigrants and improve attitudes toward
immigrants, as they are needed to bolster the workforce. Changing labor market con-
ditions might not be completely captured by observed variables like unemployment rate
or income. In this instance, OLS estimates would be biased downward. An economic
downturn can increase the immigrant inflow due to lower housing prices, but can also
negatively influence attitudes toward immigrants as people lose their jobs and need some-
body to blame, a scenario that would push FE estimates upward.To be able to deal with
these potential biases, I am furthermore using an IV for the percentages of immigrants
in order to get causal estimates, which I explain and discuss in the following subsections.
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2.4.3 Instrumental Variables Strategy
As seen in Figure 2.2, Germany experienced a sharp increase of Yugoslavs among its
immigrants, suggesting that the distance to Sarajevo during the Balkan Wars may be a
good predictor for the share of foreigners in the early 1990s. Furthermore, Figure 2.3
shows the percentage change in foreign shares between 1991 and 1992, the peak of the
immigrant inflow. Even though it only shows raw inflow data, a tendency is observable
that regions in the south experienced a higher inflow.
As set out in the previous subsection, OLS regressions on the effect on natives’ atti-
tudes of the percentage of immigrants in a region might be biased. To avoid any biased
result and to be able to look at causal inference, I instrument the percentage of immi-
grants by the distance to Sarajevo, using the Balkan Wars as an exogenous shock. The
first stage estimate appears as follows:
ln(sst) = τWarY earst + ψRegions + bstpis + ηist (2.3)
where
WarY earst controls for a war years t,
Regions includes region dummies s,
and bst is the distance from Sarajevo ∗ WarY earst = 1991/1992.
30
Public Perception of Immigrants
Figure 2.3: Inflow of immigrants during the Balkan Wars
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Source: Foreign Statistics 1990-1992, own calculations
I compute the distance to Sarajevo by taking the distance from Sarajevo to the capital
of each region by using data from Google Maps. The distances vary between 992 km from
Sarajevo to Munich in the south of Germany, and 1820 km from Sarajevo to Kiel in the
north6.
I now proceed with the predicted values l̂n(sst) to estimate the second stage of the IV
approach (see equation 2.4). The resulting estimate β corresponds to the local average
treatment effect (LATE).
Yi = α + βl̂n(sst) + τWarY earst + ψRegions + γXi + εist (2.4)
where
WarY earst controls for a war years t,
Regions includes region dummies s,
and Xit controls for individual background characteristics
Exclusion restriction requires that the instrument must not be correlated with the
error term in the structural equation. In this context, the exclusion restriction requires
6Angrist and Kugler (2003) and Speciale (2012) used a similar strategy for Europe, which I will use
to underline my results also on the European level.
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that the mere distance between Sarajevo during the Balkan Wars and any German region
is not correlated with the public perception of immigrants over time, other than by
changing the percentage of immigrants in this country. The main concern that in general
the distance to Sarajevo could be correlated with natives’ attitudes, as the distance is
correlated with other attitude-forming characteristics, can be ruled out. I discuss threats
to identification in the following section. The validity of the instrument is presented in
the next section.
2.5 The Instrument
In this section I contrast the results from using the instrument on a regional and an
individual level, I discuss the distance measure and give examples for different possibilities
of measuring the distance. Lastly, I discuss why other potential distributional mechanisms
do not confound the instrument.
Before looking at the results of this study, it is crucial to have an in-depth evaluation
of the instrument that I am using to verify the connection between the percentage of
immigrants in a region and possible effects on the attitudes of natives. As is shown in
the Table 2.4, the instrument is highly significant on a 1% level. The point estimate of
-0.012 is equivalent to a 1.2 ppt decrease of immigrants in a population by a 1,000 km
distance. Bearing in mind that the difference between the cities closest to and furthest
from Sarajevo in Germany is about 900 km, the estimate comes close to the effect of the
inflow of asylum seekers during the 1990s.
Data set — Using different data sets could also lead to the possibility that the different
data set composition will lead to different first stage results. As seen in Table 2.4, the
estimate for the effect of the distance during the Balkan Wars is the same for both data
sets, 1,000 km difference amounts of a decrease of 1.2 ppt.
Distance measures — A further critique is whether the distance measure using
Google maps is biased since it is measured with the present street infrastructure, which
might not resemble the infrastructure of the early 1990s. To address this issue, I use an
alternative measure for distance, calculating the direct distance to the calibrated center
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Table 2.4: First-stage results - different samples
Politbarometer GSOEP
Distance*war years -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 11,939 17,529
War Dummy yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
of the district. Table 2.5 displays the difference of these two distance measures. The
mean of the direct distance is around 400 km shorter than the distance calculated with
street infrastructure.
Table 2.5: Alternative distance measures
Mean Minimum Maximum
Sarajevo-Capital in km 1,408.2 992 1,820
Sarajevo-Centroid in km 1,033.41 690,75 1,306.21
Zagreb-City in min. 786 506 1038
Notes: The variable Google-City is calculated with the online service Google maps and shows the
kilometers of the fastest way to the main city of the district. Sarajevo-Centroid is the calculated
direct distance to the calibrated center of the district. Zagreb-City in min. displays train rides in
minutes from Zagreb to the region.
Reviewing the media outlets of that time shows that many asylum seekers came by
train to Germany7. Distances covered by train or by car can vary quite substantially,
in particular because Germany opened its first high-speed train track in 1991. I explore
whether it makes a difference if I use distances by car or by train by using a rich dataset
of train timetables from the year 1991. As asylum seekers were transported out from
7A phenomenon which was also observed during the refugee crisis in 2015.
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the war zone from Zagreb, I am calculating the train rides in minutes from Zagreb to
the cities in the region, which had either access to the ICE (high-speed train) or were
fastest to reach. Table 2.5 shows the average minutes, 786, which corresponds to about
13 hours. Again, the closest city is Munich with 8.5 hours and the most remote city is
Kiel with around 17 hours.
Furthermore, the effect of the distance might not be linear. Non-linearity arises when,
for example, with every kilometer of distance the costs for per kilometer decrease. I use
the log of the distance measure for a potential non-linear effect to address this issue.
Table 2.6: First-stage results - alternative distance measures
Sarajevo-Centroid Zagreb-City in 100
min.
Log(distance)
Distance*war years -0.025*** -0.001** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.005)
Observations 11,939 11,939 11,939
War Year Dummy yes yes yes
Regional Dummies yes yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
Table 2.6 shows that the sign of the coefficient of 1,000 km distance to Sarajevo
difference does not change by using an alternative measure. The coefficient doubles,
however, as it does when using the log of distance. This means that there is also not
much change using a non-linear effect. The effect of the distance for train rides seems
rather weak, as the immigrant share changes by 0.1 percent for every 100 min train ride.
Timing — For the main analysis, I use a dummy variable for the two war years, 1991
and 1992, to control for variation in time. To increase accuracy I introduce year dummies
in Table 2.7. This has no significant effect on the first stage. Furthermore, I introduce
a time trend instead of a wartime dummy variable, which also does not change the first
stage estimates.
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Table 2.7: First-stage results - different time controls
Time
Dummies
Time
Trend
Distance*war years -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.000)
Observations 11,939 11,939
Time Dummies yes no
Time Trend no yes
Regional Dummies yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
What else is related — Distance can also be related to a lot of things. As the region
dummies should control for many regional variations, I would like to relate the instrument
to several individual characteristics. Table 2.8 shows the result for characteristics such
as income, employment, primary education, and religion. Neither the coefficients nor the
F-statistics are significant.
Table 2.8: What else could be related with distance?
Income Employment Low
Education
Catholic
Distance*war years -4.081 -0.006 -0.012 0.044
(18.193) (0.043) (0.043) (0.337)
F-statistics 5.95 2.25 7.16 121.56
Observations 17,529 11,939 11,939 11,939
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes
Regional Dummies yes yes yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Königssteiner Schlüssel— In contrast to former studies like Angrist and Kugler
(2003) and Speciale (2012), the main identification strategy in this project is used by
instrumenting the percentage of foreigners in just one country, Germany, instead of all
European countries. A valid concern in this context is that Germany at that time already
had a distributional mechanism in place, the so-called Königssteiner Schlüssel. Under this
distributional mechanism, asylum seekers were first taken to the nearest home for asylum
seekers, where they applied for official asylum status. These registered asylum seekers
were then supposed to be distributed across the country following a mechanism calculated
on the basis of population and tax revenues.8
Evaluating the data at hand reveals that Baden-Württemberg, a German federal
state in the south, experienced an increase of around 50,000 persons from the former
Yugoslavian countries between 1991 and 1992, which is around 20% of all Yugoslavs
coming to Germany that year. Schleswig-Holstein, in contrast, experienced an increase of
1630, or 2.4%. If we compare that to the quotas set by the Königssteiner Schlüssel, Baden-
Württemberg received over 7 ppt more people from the former Yugoslavian countries than
it was supposed to, and Schleswig-Holstein, 1 ppt fewer.
The Königssteiner Schlüssel was first and foremost a mechanism for distributing asy-
lum seekers across federal states. In order to control for this distribution over federal
states, I do not use region dummies when calculating the first stage, but I introduce
federal state dummies while using regional clusters. The different estimation strategy
leads to a different coefficient, namely -0.430 (see table 2.9), which is still significant.
When controlling for a variable displaying the percentage distribution of the Königssteiner
Schlüssel, the variable distance*war years is not impacted. Also controlling for the pop-
ulation size and tax revenues in 100,000 has no impact. Again, neither of these elements
has a confounding effect on the effect of the distance to Sarajevo during the Balkan Wars.
Even calculating the real distributional mechanism by using 1/3 population and 2/3 tax
income it has no effect.
A further evidence for the plausibility of the instrument stems from the results of
the first stage in the years 1992-1994. After the Asylkompromiss in 1993, distribution
8More precisely, distribution was calculated taking into account tax revenues weighted by two-thirds
and population weighted by one-third.
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Table 2.9: Distance to Sarajevo vs. Königssteiner Schlüssel
1990-92 1992-94
Distance*war years -0.430* -0.480** -0.648** -0.151 -0.195 -0.244
(0.225) (0.235) (0.304) (0.342) (0.350) (0.365)
KS -0.570* -0.533+
(0.311) (0.347)
Population -0.006** -0.004*
(0.003) (0.002)
Tax Revenues 0.415* 0.243*
(0.218) (0.150)
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal State Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Data comes from the federal statistical offices. This table shows several variations of the
first stage, controlling for potential effects of the Königssteiner Schlüssel, or an effect of an asylum
agreement which was undertaken in the light of high inflows of asylum seekers. Standard errors are
clustered on a region level. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
mechanisms were enforced more severely and the number of asylum seekers in those years
declined. By looking at the right-hand part of the table, it is possible to observe that the
coefficient of interest, Distance*war years, is now much smaller and not significant any-
more, which means that the previous assumption that with every km from Sarajevo the
percentage of immigrants in the population is no longer valid. This leads to the conclu-
sion that the negative effect of the distance to Sarajevo on the percentage of immigrants
in the years between 1991 and 1992 correlated to the distance to Sarajevo.
2.6 Results
This section presents first the differences between OLS regression results, fixed effects
regression results and the causal evidence from the IV strategy. It proceeds with a
sensitivity analysis, where I look at (i) different answers to what are the most pressing
problems of the country, (ii) previous settlement structure, (iii) reduced form estimates
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with and without a t-wild bootstrap cluster. Next, I investigate the fringe of society by
looking at right-wing political placement and voting behavior. Furthermore, I investigate
potential channels for the findings, which might be connected to perceived competition
for scarce resources, such as fear of job loss, and worries over the economy and one’s own
financial situation. I also examine at the outcomes for different groups of the population.
The section concludes with checking the external validity of the results by using European
data for eleven countries during the years 1987 and 1995.
2.6.1 Correlation vs. Causal Evidence
Looking at simple OLS estimates, we see that an increased proportion of immigrants
in a region leads to a higher probability that foreigners are seen as a problem by the
population. In particular, a one percent increase of foreigners increases the probability
that immigrants are seen as a problem by 0.107 percentage points (ppt). Introducing
individual controls like age, gender, education, employment status, and denomination
has no effect on the result. This small positive effect is even more emphasized when
introducing region and war fixed effects. In Table 2.10 we can see that a one percent
increase in the share of foreigners increases the probability of concerns over immigrants
by 1.265 ppt. in the fixed-effect model.
Table 2.10 shows a different picture of the causal effect of the percentage of immigrants
on the perception that immigrants are seen as a problem, that is, the IV results. It
shows that, in comparison to the OLS and the FE estimates, it does not have a positive
effect but rather a substantial negative effect on the probability that individuals perceive
immigrants as a problem, namely -8.055 ppt. This results suggests a 12.5% decrease in
the mean. The F-statistic is also reasonable large to exclude a weak instrument. This
means that the more immigrants in a region, the fewer individuals see them as a problem.
This is in line with the contact theory by Allport (1954), where natives who are in contact
with migrants experience the proximity to migrants as more positive than people who
are not in such close contact.
Once the variable is split into Asylum Seekers as a Problem and Foreigners as a
Problem it is observable that the main driver of the effect are the asylum seekers seen as
a problem, as a one percent increase in foreigners leads to a 1.189 ppt. increase in the
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Table 2.10: Results on the public perception of immigrants
Immigrants
OLS FE IV OLS FE IV
ln(% of Foreigners) 0.107*** 1.265*** -8.185** 0.112*** 1.263 -8.055**
(0.010) (0.101) (3.758) (0.010) (0.101) (3.713)
Observations 11,939 11,939 11,939 11,935 11,935 11,935
F-statistics 13.10 13.22
Distance*war years -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
War Year Dummy no yes yes no yes yes
Region Dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Individual Controls no no no yes yes yes
Notes: The variable Immigrants as a Problem stems from the Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the
respondent named either of them as the first or second most prominent problem in Germany. The
variable Immigrants as a Problem combines both of the previous variables and is set to 1 if either of
them is equal to 1. All estimates include region dummies and a time trend. The mean of the variable
during the Balkan Wars is reported in []. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil
status, employment status and denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows
the kilometers from Sarajevo to the main city of the district. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
perception that asylum seekers are one of the main problems in Germany. Also, in this
case, we can see that the driver of the effect is clearly asylum seekers (see Table 2.11).
They are seen as less of a problem by -5.610 ppt., which is an eighth of the overall increase
during the Balkan Wars. Foreigners, in general, do not seem to have a significant effect
on negative perceptions.
2.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Major problem — So far, the dependent variables were coded as 1 if immigrants
(asylum seekers or foreigners) were the most or the second most pressing problem in
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Table 2.11: Results on the public perception of asylum seekers or foreigners
Asylum Seekers Foreigners
OLS FE IV OLS FE IV
ln(% of Foreigners) 0.084*** 1.188*** -5.526* 0.026*** 0.150* -2.607
(0.009) (0.105) (3.136) (0.007) (0.084) (2.228)
Observations 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935
F-statistics 13.22 13.22
Distance*war years -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
War Time Dummy no yes yes no yes yes
Region Dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The variables Foreigner as a Problem and Asylum Seekers as a Problem stem from the
Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named either of them as the first or second
most prominent problem in Germany. The variable Immigrants as a Problem combines both of the
previous variables and is set to 1 if either of them is equal to 1. All estimates include region dummies
and a time trend. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status
and denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo
to the main city of the district. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗)
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
Germany. To check whether the effect comes not from the second most pressing problem,
but that it is really in the mind of the population, I show also the results for just the
most pressing problem. Table A.4 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics.
Table 2.12 displays the 2nd stage results for the most pressing problem in Germany.
The coefficient for Immigrants as a Problem is slightly smaller than in 2.10, so is also
the variable for asylum seekers. This result indicates that the effect is not driven by the
second most pressing problem but rather by the most prominent.
Other problems — The results on the public perception of immigration so far are
based on the answer to what the most pressing problem in the country is. It is possible
that, in the regions where more immigrants are residing, other problems dominate, but
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Table 2.12: Immigrants as major problem in Germany
Immigrants Asylum
Seekers
Foreigners
IV IV IV
ln(% of Foreigners) -7.462** -5.440* -2.021
(3.407) (2.820) (1.824)
Observations 11,935 11,935 11,935
F-statistics 13.22 13.22 13.22
Distance*war years -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
War Time Dummy yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes
Notes: The variables Immigrants as a Problem, Foreigner as a Problem and Asylum Seekers as a
Problem stem from the Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named either of them as
the first or second most prominent problem in Germany. The variable Immigrants as a Problem
combines both of the previous variables and is set to 1 if either of them is equal to 1. All estimates
include region dummies and a time trend. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil
status, employment status and denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows
the kilometers from Sarajevo to the main city of the district. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Table 2.13: Results on other potential problems
Right-wing
Extremism
Ethnic
Germans
Social
Problems
Environment Reunifica-
tion
ln(% of Foreigners) -1.713 0.951 2.264 0.595 -1.885
(1.242) (1.129) (3.258) (2.907) (3.391)
Observations 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935
F-statistics 13.22 13.22 13.22 13.22 13.22
Distance*war years -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The variables Right-wing Extremism as a Problem, Ethnic Germans as a Problem , Social
Problems, Environment as a Problem, and Reunification as a Problem stem from the Politbarometer
and are set to 1 if the respondent named either of them as the first or second most prominent problem
in Germany. The variable Immigrants as a Problem combines both of the previous variables and
is set to 1 if either of them is equal to 1. All estimates include region dummies and a time trend.
Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status and denomination.
Distance is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo to the main city of
the district. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance
at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
are essentially related to the immigrants. This could be housing, or job availability, which
I have summarized into Social Problems. Other arguments, as for example the reunifica-
tion of Germany, or the environment, cannot be directly connected to the percentage of
immigrants in a region. If another problem, connected to immigrants or otherwise, could
be explained by the identification strategy, it would show that the results are biased.
Table 2.13 shows the coefficients for several alternative answers. Right Extremism
is the problem arising from extreme right-wing violence and parties. Ethnic Germans
relates to ethnic Germans from Eastern European countries as the most pressing problem.
Social Problems are connected to job insecurity, housing, pensions etc. Environment is a
binary variable set to one if the environment is the most important problem in Germany.
Reunification is the problem related to unification and its financing. Descriptive statistics
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how these problems have changed before and during the Balkan Wars are displayed
in Table A.5. Neither of the coefficients shows a significant effect, which means that
(i) in regions with more immigrants the negative effects stem not from other problems
overlapping the concerns about immigrants and (ii) these problems are not affected by
the percentage of immigrants in one region
Ethnic enclaves— After leaving the war zone, migrants might not have gone to the
nearest region, but to a region where friends and maybe family members were already
residing. Moving to relatives means that the percentage of foreigners in a region during
the early 1990s was not driven by the distance to Sarajevo, but by the settlement structure
of former migrants. This could violate the exclusion restriction of the IV and thus bias
the results because attitudes of natives might be already different in regions where we
find higher percentages of foreigners already before the war started. But account should
be taken of the regional fixed effects., as already described in Section 2.4.2.
Reduced Form — Another concern is the clustering of the standard errors. An
obvious level of clustering would be at the regional level. Since in the analysis there
are only 30 regions, it would be too small a cluster size to calculate reliable standard
errors. I deal with this issue by first presenting the reduced form in Table 2.14 and then
comparing these results with a t-wild cluster bootstrap approach9 .
The reduced form equation appears as follows:
Yi = τWarY earst + ψRegions + bstpis + ηist (2.5)
where
WarY earst controls for a war years t,
Regions includes region dummies s,
and bst is the distance from Sarajevo ∗ WarY earst = 1991/1992.
The coefficient of the reduced form estimate can be interpreted as follows: 1000
km distance from Sarajevo during the Balkan Wars increases the negative perception
9I estimate the wild cluster bootstrap standard errors using 1000 replications under H1 as discussed
in Cameron et al. (2008).
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of immigrants by 9.7 ppt. Hence, the reverse conclusion indicates that living closer to
Sarajevo and therefore experiencing more immigrants in one’s region leads to a decrease
of negative concerns, which is a decrease in the mean of around 15%.
Table 2.14: Reduced form results on public perception of
immigrants, asylum seekers and foreigners
Immigrants Asylum Seekers Foreigners
RF RF
t-wild
cluster
RF RF
t-wild
cluster
RF RF
t-wild
cluster
Distance*war years 0.097*** 0.097 0.067** 0.067 0.029 0.029
(0.034) [0.02] (0.031) [0.15] (0.025) [0.30]
Observations 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The variables Foreigner as a Problem and Asylum Seekers as a Problem stem from the
Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named either of them as the first or second
most prominent problem in Germany. The variable Immigrants as a Problem combines both of the
previous variables and is set to 1 if either of them is equal to 1. All estimates include region dummies
and year dummies. Robust standard errors and t-wild cluster bootstrap p-values are reported in
parentheses. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status and
denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo to
the main city of the district. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
2.6.3 Immigrants and Politics
A high percentage of foreigners in a region has a negative effect on the increase in seeing
either immigrants or asylum seekers as a problem, a result that is quite contrary to
most of the literature so far, which states that a higher percentage of immigrants is also
related to an increase in extreme-right voting. The interesting question is now whether
this more positive view of immigrants will also relate to political interests. To evaluate
this, I look at three different, related variables. First, if individuals change their own
political placement, second, would they be more or less likely to vote for extreme-right
parties and third, are they even interested in politics?
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Table 2.15: Results on extreme-right political placement and voting
Extreme-right Placement Extreme-right Voting
FE IV FE IV
ln(% of Foreigners) -0.013 2.357 0.307*** 2.487**
(0.054) (1.806) (0.040) (1.217)
Observations 11,935 11,935 11,935 11,935
F-statistics 13.22 13.22
Distance*war year -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: Extreme-right Placement stems also from the Politbarometer and is set to 1 if the respondent
set its own political placement to 1 on a ten-step scale. Extreme-right Voting, also generated from
the Politbarometer is set to 1 if the respondent would vote either Republikaner or NPD if on Sunday
elections were held. Political Interest is generated from the GSOEP and is set to 1 if the respondent
is very interested in politics. All estimates include region dummy variables and a wartime dummy
variable. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status and
denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo
to the main city of the district. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗)
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
There is no significant effect on a higher extreme-right political placement. A higher
percentage of immigrants actually led to a higher percentage of those potentially voting
for extreme-right parties, namely by 2.487 ppt., which is actually the mean difference
between before and after the beginning of the war. This finding is actually in line with
the previous literature. The interest in politics seems not to be changed.
2.6.4 Immigrants and Economic Worries
If public concerns toward immigrants do not increase, but the probability of voting for
extreme-right parties does, the question is why? One explanation could be that natives
fear immigrants as they fear job losses due to the higher supply of labor. For this
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analysis, I use only natives who are actually employed, as unemployed persons are not
likely to fear job loss. The results in the first sample point at first to increased job
insecurity. Controlling for individual characteristics reveals that an increased percentage
of foreigners actually has a negative correlation on job insecurity. An increase of the
immigrant inflow decreases the fear of job loss by 0.861 ppt, which means that worrying
about job loss cannot be an explanatory factor for increased right-wing voting.
Table 2.16: Results on job and economic insecurity
Job Insecurity One’s Own Economic Situation Economic Situation
FE IV FE IV FE IV
ln(% of Foreigners) -0.027 0.861 0.091+ 3.893* 1.155*** 5.403*
(0.050) (1.588) (0.061) (2.144) (0.087) (2.830)
Observations 9,379 9,397 16,559 16,559 16,601 16,601
F-statistics 12.37 16.27 16.86
Distance*war years -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Worry about the Economic Situation, Worry about one’s own Economic Situation and Job
Insecurity are all also generated from the GSOEP and are set to 1 if individuals are very worried
on the individual subjects. All estimates include region dummy variables and a wartime dummy
variable. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status and
denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo
to the main city of the district. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗)
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
What can, however, explain extreme-right voting is the effect of the percentage of
immigrants on the worry about the individual economic situation and the worry about
the overall economic situation. This finding is also in line with previous literature, as it
is not job insecurity that is the main driver of extreme-right voting in the light of a high
percentage of immigrants, but individual economic well-being.
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Table 2.17: Reduced form results on public perception of immigrants - hetero-
geneities
Low Educ High Educ Employed
RF RF t-wild
cluster
RF RF t-wild
cluster
RF RF t-wild
cluster
Distance*war years 0.139*** 0.139 0.032 0.032 0.082* 0.082
(0.050) [0.06] (0.069) [0.63] (0.044) [0.10]
Observations 5,778 5,778 2,681 2,681 7,062 7,062
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The variables Immigrants as a Problem stems from the Politbarometer and are set to 1 if
the respondent named either of them as the first or second most prominent problem in Germany.
The variable Immigrants as a Problem combines both of the previous variables and is set to 1 if
either of them is equal to 1. All estimates include region dummies and year dummies. Individual
controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status and denomination. Distance
is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo to the main city of the
district. Robust standard errors and t-wild cluster bootstrap p-value are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
2.6.5 Heterogeneities
The important question is what are the characteristics of some of the behavior seen. We
know from the extensive literature that certain characteristics are related to attitudes
toward immigration. Such characteristics are education, income, sex, age, and also bit-
terness. Because of this I also analyze the perception of immigrants by social categories,
namely low and high education and employment. Table 2.17 shows that a low education
level and people who are employed that are the driving factors making the difference
between regions with more or fewer immigrants. The same holds for right-wing voting,
as seen in the Table 2.18.
When examining which part of societies are more worried over the economy or their
own financial situation, I use the GSOEP data and stratify the sample again, by low
and high educated individuals, the employed, but also individuals who were earning an
equivalent of under 500e net. The effect on the worry about the economy stems mainly
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Table 2.18: Reduced form results on extreme-right voting - heterogeneities
Low Educ High Educ Employed
RF RF t-wild
cluster
RF RF t-wild
cluster
RF RF t-wild
cluster
Distance*war years -0.067*** -0.067 0.001 0.001 -0.030* -0.030
(0.023) [0.07] (0.013) [0.95] (0.018) [0.08]
Observations 5,778 5,778 2,681 2,681 7,062 7,062
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The variables Foreigner as a Problem and Asylum Seekers as a Problem stem from the
Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named either of them as the first or second
most prominent problem in Germany. The variable Immigrants as a Problem combines both of the
previous variables and is set to 1 if either of them is equal to 1. All estimates include region dummies
and year dummies. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment
status and denomination. Distance is measured with Google maps and shows the kilometers from
Sarajevo to the main city of the district. Robust standard errors and t-wild cluster bootstrap p-value
are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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from lower educated individuals. Not surprisingly, individuals earning under 500e net
are among those especially worried about their own financial situation, but so are both
low and high educated individuals.
49
Public Perception of Immigrants
Ta
bl
e
2.
19
:
R
ed
uc
ed
fo
rm
re
su
lt
s
on
w
or
ri
es
ov
er
th
e
ec
on
om
ic
si
tu
at
io
n
-
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
ie
s
Lo
w
Ed
uc
H
ig
h
Ed
uc
Em
pl
oy
ed
U
nd
er
50
0e
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
D
ist
an
ce
*w
ar
ye
ar
s
-0
.1
05
*
-0
.1
05
0.
09
6
0.
09
6
-0
.0
68
*
-0
.0
68
-0
.0
57
-0
.0
57
(0
.0
61
)
[0
.1
6]
(0
.0
66
)
[0
.0
8]
(0
.0
39
)
[0
.1
0]
(0
.0
43
)
[0
.2
5]
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
4,
35
4
4,
35
4
3,
08
8
3,
08
8
9,
75
1
9,
75
1
8,
56
2
8,
56
2
W
ar
Ye
ar
D
um
m
y
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
R
eg
io
n
D
um
m
ie
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
In
di
vi
du
al
C
on
tr
ol
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
N
ot
es
:
T
he
va
ria
bl
e
W
or
ry
ab
ou
tt
he
Ec
on
om
ic
Si
tu
at
io
n
st
em
fro
m
th
e
G
SO
EP
an
d
ar
e
se
tt
o
1
if
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
na
m
ed
ei
th
er
of
th
em
as
th
e
fir
st
or
se
co
nd
m
os
t
pr
om
in
en
t
pr
ob
le
m
in
G
er
m
an
y.
A
ll
es
tim
at
es
in
cl
ud
e
re
gi
on
du
m
m
y
va
ria
bl
e
an
d
a
wa
rt
im
e
du
m
m
y
va
ria
bl
e.
In
di
vi
du
al
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
ge
nd
er
,a
ge
,e
du
ca
tio
n,
ci
vi
ls
ta
tu
s,
em
pl
oy
m
en
ts
ta
tu
sa
nd
de
no
m
in
at
io
n.
D
ist
an
ce
is
m
ea
su
re
d
w
ith
G
oo
gl
e
m
ap
s
an
d
sh
ow
st
he
ki
lo
m
et
er
s
fro
m
Sa
ra
je
vo
to
th
e
m
ai
n
ci
ty
of
th
e
di
st
ric
t.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
an
d
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
bo
ot
st
ra
p
p-
va
lu
es
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
∗∗
∗
(∗
∗ )
(∗
)
in
di
ca
te
s
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
th
e
1%
(5
%
)
(1
0%
)
le
ve
l.
50
Public Perception of Immigrants
Ta
bl
e
2.
20
:
R
ed
uc
ed
fo
rm
re
su
lt
s
on
w
or
ri
es
ov
er
on
e’
s
ow
n
fin
an
ci
al
si
tu
at
io
n
-
he
te
ro
ge
ne
it
ie
s
Lo
w
Ed
uc
H
ig
h
Ed
uc
Em
pl
oy
ed
U
nd
er
50
0e
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
R
F
R
F
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
D
ist
an
ce
*w
ar
ye
ar
s
-0
.0
83
*
-0
.0
83
-0
.0
74
*
-0
.0
74
-0
.0
39
-0
.0
39
-0
.0
52
*
-0
.0
52
(0
.0
49
)
[0
.2
5]
(0
.0
44
)
[0
.0
8]
(0
.0
28
)
[0
.2
2]
(0
.0
31
)
[0
.1
4]
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
4,
33
8
4,
33
8
3,
08
2
3,
08
2
9,
74
2
9,
74
2
8,
52
5
8,
52
5
W
ar
Ye
ar
D
um
m
y
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
R
eg
io
n
D
um
m
ie
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
In
di
vi
du
al
C
on
tr
ol
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
N
ot
es
:
T
he
va
ria
bl
es
Fo
re
ig
ne
r
as
a
Pr
ob
le
m
an
d
As
yl
um
Se
ek
er
s
as
a
Pr
ob
le
m
st
em
fro
m
th
e
Po
lit
ba
ro
m
et
er
an
d
ar
e
se
t
to
1
if
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
na
m
ed
ei
th
er
of
th
em
as
th
e
fir
st
or
se
co
nd
m
os
t
pr
om
in
en
t
pr
ob
le
m
in
G
er
m
an
y.
T
he
va
ria
bl
e
Im
m
ig
ra
nt
s
as
a
Pr
ob
le
m
co
m
bi
ne
s
bo
th
of
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
va
ria
bl
es
an
d
is
se
tt
o
1
if
ei
th
er
of
th
em
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1.
A
ll
es
tim
at
es
in
cl
ud
e
re
gi
on
du
m
m
ie
sa
nd
ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s.
In
di
vi
du
al
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
ge
nd
er
,a
ge
,e
du
ca
tio
n,
ci
vi
ls
ta
tu
s,
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
st
at
us
an
d
de
no
m
in
at
io
n.
D
ist
an
ce
is
m
ea
su
re
d
w
ith
G
oo
gl
e
m
ap
s
an
d
sh
ow
s
th
e
ki
lo
m
et
er
s
fro
m
Sa
ra
je
vo
to
th
e
m
ai
n
ci
ty
of
th
e
di
st
ric
t.
R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
an
d
t-
w
ild
cl
us
te
r
bo
ot
st
ra
p
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
∗∗
∗
(∗
∗ )
(∗
)
in
di
ca
te
s
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
th
e
1%
(5
%
)
(1
0%
)
le
ve
l.
51
Public Perception of Immigrants
2.6.6 Public Perception in Europe
Germany is an interesting country for which to study immigration, as it has turned out to
be one of the most attractive European countries for immigrants in the last few decades.
Not only did it experience the highest inflow of immigrants during the Balkan Wars,
but also in the recent immigration crisis of 2015. Still, it was not the only country to
experience high immigrant inflows in those periods.
Table 2.21: European public perceptions
Extreme-Right Placement Economic Situation One’s Own Economic Situation
FE IV FE IV FE IV
Inflow foreigners -0.001 -0.003 0.054*** 0.100*** 0.012*** 0.008
in 100,000 (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.021) (0.003) (0.019)
Observations 84,167 84,167 53,135 53,135 53,135 53,135
F-statistics 4,353 1,879 1,879
Distance*war years -0.559*** -0.434*** -0.435***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
War Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: All the variables are coming from the Eurobarometer between 1987 and 1995. Extreme-
Right Placement is set to 1 if individuals place themselves on a 9 or 10 on a ten-point-scale of
political placement between left and right. Economic Situation and One’s Own Economic Situation
are set to 1 if individuals have the feeling that the economy in general or one’s own economic
situation in the household are worse than last year. All estimates include country dummies and
a time trend. Individual controls include gender, age, education, civil status, employment status
and denomination. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Distance is measured with
Google maps and shows the kilometers from Sarajevo to the main city of the country. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗)
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
Table 2.21 shows that the first stage of the IV approach is also highly significant in
the European context. A 1,000 km distance to Sarajevo decreases immigrant inflow by
55,900. I set the war year dummy equal to one in the years between 1991 and 1995.
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The results of the second stage in the European sample point in the direction of the
results for Germany. It also seems that, in the European context, the population saw no
change in the extreme right-wing political placement. Additionally, there is evidence of
an increased insecurity regarding the performance of the economy as a whole and of one’s
personal financial situation. The fact that this result can also be found in the European
context is striking.
2.7 Conclusion
In the last decades, migration to Western countries has increased substantially. Migration
has become a salient topic in the public debate in many developed democracies. The
public concerns about immigration have an impact on societies on several levels, political,
economic and social. The causal effect of the actual geographic proximity of immigrants
on individuals’ perception of immigration, however, has barely been studied.
This study explores how the proportion of foreigners in one region can affect the
attitudes of natives in that region toward immigrants. This analysis also investigates
the exact type of immigrants toward which this concerns are directed, asylum seekers.
Identification is based on the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s. Drawing on two social
surveys – Politbarometer and GSOEP – allows me to employ an IV approach. I pro-
vide evidence that the larger the proportion of immigrants in a region, the weaker the
public concerns toward immigrants, especially towards asylum seekers. Nonetheless, the
geographic proximity to immigrants increases extreme-right voting at the fringe of the
society. It additionally shows that a larger proportion of foreigners in a region leads
to more concern about the economic situation in general and one’s individual economic
situation in particular among the natives. This evidence is also verified in the European
context, using data of the Eurobarometer for the years 1987 to 1995.
This analysis gives not only causal evidence of the effect of geographic proximity to
immigrants on public perceptions but also combines two strands of literature, attitudes
toward immigrants and the effect of immigration on the political arena. Furthermore, I
provide evidence on the public perception of immigration in the light of a mass inflow
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of asylum seekers and thus, might give further insights in the recent inflow of asylum
seekers in 2015 and the public perception of this event.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of individual covariate variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - Politbarometer
Mean Before After Differ-
ence
Individual Covariates
Male 0.48 0.475 0.482 0.007
Under 25 years old 0.105 0.111 0.102 -0.009
Over 60 years old 0.124 0.121 0.125 0.004
Hauptschule 0.484 0.477 0.488 0.011
Realschule 0.283 0.295 0.277 -0.018**
Abitur 0.225 0.220 0.227 0.007
Married 0.008 0.009 0.007 -0.001
Employed 0.592 0.590 0.593 0.003
Catholic 0.426 0.429 0.424 -0.004
Protestant 0.445 0.451 0.442 -0.009
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is
restricted to the months September-December. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1991
and 1992 and also to the months September-December.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of individual covariate variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - GSOEP
Mean Before After Differ-
ence
Individual Covariates
Male 0.477 0.478 0.476 -0.002
Under 25 years old 0.139 0.155 0.130 -0.024***
Over 65 years old 0.155 0.150 0.157 0.007
Elementary Education 0.263 0.262 0.263 0.000
Secondary Education 0.546 0.549 0.544 -0.005
Tertiary Education 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.000)
Married 0.665 0.659 0.668 0.009
Employed 0.587 0.595 0.584 -0.011
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is
restricted to the months January to June. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1992 and
1993 and also to the months January to June.
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of characteristics variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - Eurobarometer
Mean Before After Differ-
ence
Male 0.484 0.478 0.488 0.009***
Under 25 0.146 0.154 0.139 -0.015***
Over 65 0.145 0.141 0.148 0.007***
Low Education 0.283 0.301 0.268 -0.033***
Intermediate Education 0.374 0.362 0.385 0.023***
High Education 0.343 0.337 0.347 0.01***
Married 0.647 0.652 0.642 -0.0***
Employed 0.737 0.755 0.723 -0.032***
Catholic 0.448 0.461 0.44 -0.021***
Protestant 0.175 0.167 0.18 0.014***
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is
restricted fall surveys before 1991. After refers to the years after the outbreak, after 1991 until 1995.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - major problem
Mean Before After Differ-
ence
Public Perception of Immigrants
Foreigner as a Major Problem 0.104 0 .023 0.144 0.121***
Asylum Seekers as a Major Problem 0.25 0.032 0.358 0.326***
Immigrants as a Major Problem 0.354 0.055 0.502 0.448***
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is restricted
to the months September-December. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1991 and 1992 and
also to the months September-December. The variables Foreigner as a Major Problem and Asylum
Seekers as a Major Problem stem from the Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named
either of them as the first most prominent problem in Germany. The variable Immigrants as a Major
Problem combines both of the previous variables and is set to 1 if either of them is equal to 1.
Table A.5: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables before and after
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars - other problems
Mean Before After Differ-
ence
Other Problems
Right-wing Extremism as a Problem 0.052 0.002 0.077 0.075***
Ethnic Germans as a Problem 0.021 0.035 0.014 -0.021***
Social Problems 0.266 0.307 0.246 -0.061***
Environment as a Problem 0.155 0.251 0.108 -0.143***
Reunification as a Problem 0.362 0.564 0.262 -0.302***
Notes: Before refers to the year before the outbreak of the civil war on the Balkan and it is
restricted to the months September-December. After refers to the years after the outbreak, 1991
and 1992 and also to the months September-December. The variables Right-wing Extremism as
a Problem and Ethnic Germans as a Problem, Social Problems, Environment as a Problem, and
Reunification as a Problem stem from the Politbarometer and are set to 1 if the respondent named
either of them as the first most prominent problem in Germany.
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3.1 Introduction
Children with migrational backgrounds constitute the fastest-growing segment of the
population in many countries across the developed world, shaping these societies for the
future (Dustmann et al., 2012; Tienda and Haskins, 2008). Immigrant families bring
many strengths to their host countries, but they also present serious policy challenges. A
core concern, hotly debated by scholars and policymakers alike, is the educational per-
formance of immigrant children. Although there are some countries where certain groups
of immigrant children do educationally at least as well as children of the native-born,
there are many others where they are, on average, outperformed by their native peers in
school. In Europe, for example, a good deal of evidence points to a substantial immigrant
disadvantage in multiple indicators of academic achievement.10 Not surprisingly, tackling
this disadvantage has become a key priority for many governments. Yet, relatively little
is known about which interventions could be effective in fostering immigrant children’s
educational integration.
In this project, we examine one important instrument of integration policy: immi-
grant children’s access to the host-country nationality. Specifically, we exploit a natural
experiment in Germany which saw the introduction of conditional birthright citizenship.
Through the reform, a significant portion of immigrant children automatically acquired
German nationality by birth, and thus the same legal rights – and as such political and
professional opportunities – as their native counterparts. From this, as we will argue
in more detail below, it can be hypothesized that the reform increased the returns on
education for immigrants, created incentives for human capital investments, and thus
fostered immigrant children’s educational integration.
To assess the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, we take a dynamic view of the
education process and analyze the impact of birthright citizenship on a series of edu-
cational indicators measured at the first three stages of the German education system:
preschool, primary school and secondary school. Some specific questions we address
include: did the introduction of birthright citizenship affect immigrant children’s partici-
pation in non-compulsory preschool education and their developmental outcomes at this
10For an overview of ethnic education inequalities across European countries, see Dustmann et al.
(2012).
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educational stage? Did it accelerate their progress through primary school? And was
there an effect on immigrant children’s selection into different secondary school tracks?
Taken as a whole, the answers to these questions allow us to gauge the extent to which
granting citizenship to immigrant children affects their educational outcomes both in the
short and the longer term.
The citizenship reform we examine was introduced in Germany at the turn of the
millennium; it essentially constituted a change from jus sanguinis (right of blood) to
jus soli (right of soil). Under jus sanguinis, only descendants of home-country nationals
receive citizenship. By contrast, under jus soli, every individual born on the national
territory is eligible for citizenship.11 The German reform allows us to exploit one partic-
ular feature:12 all children born to foreign parents from 1st January 2000 onward were
automatically granted citizenship if at least one parent had been a legal resident in Ger-
many for eight or more years at the time of birth. This setting provides us with a birth
date cut-off regarding the entitlement to automatic birthright citizenship. We rely on
this exogenous source of identification and employ a difference-in-differences design (DiD)
which not only compares immigrant children born shortly before and shortly after the
cut-off date, but also draws upon immigrant children from the preceding birth cohort as a
control group – an approach that allows netting out possible age and seasonal differences
between children born in different semesters.
Two unique administrative data sets covering the student population of one federal
state of Germany, Schleswig-Holstein (a state with 2.9 mio. inhabitants), allow us to
implement our empirical approach and to provide answers to the questions raised at
the outset. First, we use administrative records from school entry examinations. These
records contain physicians’ assessments of children’s language proficiency, socio-emotional
maturity and overall school readiness at age six. An accompanying questionnaire, filled
out by parents, provides (retrospective) information on children’s preschool enrollment
and family background. Our baseline analysis relies on the records of immigrant children
born between July 1998 and June 2000 and examined for school entry in 2005 and 2006.
11Birthright citizenship has historically been in place in the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom, but has only recently been introduced in some European countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece,
Germany) while in others its introduction is currently being discussed (e.g., Italy).
12The reform also changed other features of Germany’s nationality law, which we discuss in Section
3.3.1.
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Second, we rely on administrative school registers. These registers contain information
on children’s progress through primary school, primary teachers’ track recommendations
and children’s selection into secondary school track. We use school registers from 2009
and 2010, the time when the cohorts under study were scheduled to start secondary
school.
Besides being one of the main immigrant destination countries, studying the case of
Germany has at least one further advantage. In the German education system, there are
essentially three parental decisions to be made: (i) whether to enroll a child in preschool;
(ii) when to enroll a child for compulsory primary school; and (iii) which educational track
a child shall follow in secondary school. In making the latter two decisions, parents can
draw upon official recommendations. In particular, prior to primary school enrollment,
pediatricians assess a child’s “school readiness” and may recommend deferred school
entry. In a similar vein, teachers make a recommendation for a child’s secondary school
track in the final year of primary school. In several federal states, among them Schleswig-
Holstein, official recommendations are meant to guide parental decision-making, but are
non-binding, i.e., the educational decisions are at parents’ discretion. As such, we are
able to ask whether (possible) effects of the reform are driven by changes in official
recommendations, parental educational choices, or a combination thereof.
We obtain three sets of results related to the different educational phases. The key
result for the preschool period is that the introduction of birthright citizenship led to an
increase in immigrant children’s enrollment in non-compulsory preschool by 3.4% – an
effect which appears to close the enrollment gap between native and immigrant children
completely. Turning to developmental outcomes measured at the end of the preschool pe-
riod, we find a significant increase in immigrant children’s German language proficiency
as well as their socio-emotional maturity (by 6.0% and 2.1%, respectively). During the
primary school phase, our results suggest the following impacts of birthright citizenship:
the average school starting age of immigrant children decreases by 1.6 months, which
translates in more than a doubling of the incidence of early school entry. As regards
educational progress, we find a reduction in the probability of grade repetition among
immigrant children by 24.6% – an effect which corresponds to a closure of the immigrant-
native gap by one half. Finally, and most importantly for immigrants’ longer-term out-
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comes, we detect a significant increase in immigrant children’s probability of attending
the academic track of secondary school by 49.0%. This effect reduces the immigrant-
native academic-track enrollment gap by almost one-half. Moreover, it is not only driven
by improved teachers’ track recommendations for immigrant children, but also by an
adjustment of immigrant parents’ secondary school track choices. In particular, we ob-
serve an increase in the proportion of immigrant children attending the academic track
of secondary school without an official recommendation by 52.3%.
We view our study as making three contributions to the literature. First, we contribute
to a growing literature identifying the causal determinants of immigrant children’s edu-
cational integration. In contrast to most existing studies, which employ decomposition
methods to analyze factors responsible for the educational gap between immigrant chil-
dren and their native peers (see Section 3.2 for an overview), we make use of an exogenous
policy variation. Second, we recognize that education is a dynamic process that proceeds
in stages and provide a nuanced picture of the effects of birthright citizenship as immi-
grant children go through the first three critical stages of this process (i.e., preschool,
primary school and secondary school). In contrast, previous work has typically focused
on one stage of this process in isolation. In fact, much of the literature examining ethnic
educational gaps relies on data from the Program of International Student Assessment
(PISA) and thus focuses on the secondary education stage only (e.g., Dustmann et al.,
2012).13 Finally, our setting allows us to study immigrant parents’ choices regarding
their children’s education. As such, we contribute to the current political and scientific
discussion on how to overcome one of the main obstacles to immigrant children’s educa-
tional integration: their parents’ behavior which is frequently characterized by a lack of
13The same is true for a contemporaneously written technical report by Clots and Sajons (2014).
Although the issues we are interested in are similar to those explored in Clots and Sajons (2014), our
approach differs markedly from theirs. Most importantly, the administrative data we have at hand allow
us to study the reform’s effect from an early life cycle perspective, i.e., across the first three critical
stages of the German education system. Clots and Sajons (2014) draw upon survey data from the
National Education Panel Study (NEPS) and focus on the secondary school stage in isolation. Second,
we analyze not only children’s educational outcomes, but examine simultaneously the role of official
recommendations as well as parents’ decisions for immigrant children’s educational integration. Last,
but not least, our identification strategy compares immigrant children born shortly before and after
the reform’s cut-off date, and draws upon immigrant children from adjacent birth cohorts as a control
group. In contrast, the identification strategy chosen by Clots and Sajons (2014) relies on a comparison
between immigrant and native children, a group for which it is unclear whether the underlying identifying
assumption – a stable difference in educational outcomes between children born in different semesters –
holds.
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effective interactions with schools and other institutions that promote the development
of their children (Diehl et al., 2016).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
the related literature and discuss potential mechanisms underlying the effect of birthright
citizenship on immigrant children’s educational integration. Section 3.3 describes the
institutional background. Section 3.4 introduces the empirical strategy. Section 3.5
describes the data used for the analysis. Section 3.6 presents the main results and provides
a series of sensitivity checks. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature and Potential Mechanisms
There is a large literature studying the educational inequalities between immigrant and
native children, both from a cross-national and a within-country perspective (see Diehl
et al. (2016) and Suárez-Orozco et al. (2015) for recent overviews). Across OECD coun-
tries, there is considerable heterogeneity in immigrant children’s educational achievements
(see, e.g., Algan et al., 2010; Entorf and Minoiu, 2005). In countries where immigrant
children are, on average, outperformed by their peers (e.g., in Continental Europe), the
achievement gap is associated with factors such as family background, language spoken at
home and specific features of the educational system, such as tracking (e.g., Akresh and
Akresh, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2012; Lüdemann and Schwerdt, 2013; Schnepf, 2007).14
An emerging literature deals with the integrative impact of educational policies. A
few studies provide a picture of the beneficial impacts of preschool on the educational
achievement of immigrant children (Drange and Telle, 2017; Cornelissen et al., 2016;
Felfe and Huber, 2015). (Currie and Thomas, 1999) refer specifically to the quality of
preschools and show that participation in Head Start – a high quality preschool program
in the United States – closes one fourth of the gap in test scores between hispanic children
and non-hispanic white children, and two-thirds of the gap in the probability of grade
retention. Some other related studies conduct cross-country comparisons of test scores
14An additional factor for the low educational attainment of certain immigrant groups (e.g., hispanic
children in the US) is racial segregation and the associated low quality of the schools disproportionably
frequented by immigrants (Wells, 2009). This factor is less relevant for Europe (Dronkers and Levels,
2007), as the quality variation between European schools is smaller than that of schools in the United
states (Scheerens and Bosker, 1997).
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resulting from PISA and relate better test performance to school systems with reduced
ability tracking and a low share of private schools (Cobb-Clark et al., 2012; Ruhose and
Schwerdt, 2016; Schneeweis, 2011).
We instead focus on the impact of one increasingly common, yet still contentious
integration policy: birthright citizenship. In what follows, we highlight some potential
mechanisms explaining why and how birthright citizenship may influence immigrant chil-
dren’s educational integration.
Citizenship improves a person’s legal position by allowing for full political partici-
pation, thus improving a person’s standing in society. Citizenship also improves pro-
fessional opportunities. First, in Germany, it opens the door to any job requiring civil
servant status.15 Second, there is evidence that naturalized immigrants earn more than
non-naturalized ones (Chiswick, 1978; Steinhardt, 2012), have higher job-finding rates
(Fougère and Safi, 2009; Gathmann and Keller, 2017) and experience steeper wage-
tenure profiles (Bratsberg et al., 2002).16 Thus, it can be argued that the introduction
of birthright citizenship in Germany represents a positive shock to the long-run rate of
return to education for immigrant children.
This, in turn, may trigger human capital investments by parents that foster immigrant
children’s educational integration in the short- as well as in the long-run. First, birthright
citizenship may stimulate parents’ cultural and social assimilation efforts. Indeed, ex-
ploiting the same reform as we do, Avitabile et al. (2013) and Sajons (2012) provide
evidence that foreign-born parents are more likely to interact with the local community
and use the language of the host country if their children are entitled to citizenship at
birth.17 Second, Avitabile et al. (2014) find that birthright citizenship leads to a reduc-
tion in immigrant fertility and thus potentially frees up parental time available for each
child. In line with the theoretical predictions of the quantity-quality model put forward
by Becker and Tomes (1976), they furthermore provide evidence on positive short-run
15Civil servant posts in Germany are either prestigious (e.g., teachers or judges), or include jobs that
might appeal to children, such as firefighters or police officers.
16That said, with the exception of Gathmann and Keller (2017), these studies cover periods with no
exogenous policy variation.
17Yet, they do not find any effect on parental naturalization rates nor on parents’ socioeconomic
status (e.g., by stimulating their employment or earnings) which may act as further stimuli to children’s
development.
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effects on behavioral and health outcomes among immigrant children affected by the
reform of the German naturalization law.
Whether birthright citizenship leads to human capital investments that improve im-
migrant children’s educational outcomes in the longer-term is, however, still an open
question. In fact, it is far from clear whether the observed initial parental assimila-
tion efforts and investments translate into visible improvements in children’s educational
achievements. In light of a human capital development framework, two scenarios are
conceivable:18 on the one hand, parental assimilation may result in educational decisions
that are similar to the ones made by natives – e.g., increased preschool enrollment or
academic track enrollment in secondary school – and result in improved child outcomes
in the short-run and in the long-run. On the other hand, if initial assimilation and in-
vestment do not yield the expected returns and/or are not reflected in improved official
recommendations, it may well be the case that parental efforts fade out over time and
no lasting effect on immigrant children’s education is observed. In summary, whether
birthright citizenship has a lasting impact on immigrant parents’ educational decision-
making and their children’s subsequent educational progress is an empirical question for
which we provide some answers.
3.3 Institutional Background
3.3.1 Reform of the German Nationality Law in 1999
In May 1999, the German parliament undertook a major revision of the “German Cit-
izenship and Nationality Law” dating back to 1913. On 15th July 1999, the German
parliament ratified the new version of the law, which included two major changes: (1) it
changed the eligibility criteria for naturalization; and (2) it introduced birthright citizen-
ship.
This project focuses on the second change. Until 1999, citizenship was granted accord-
ing to jus sanguinis, i.e., children became German citizens only in cases where at least
one parent held the German citizenship. As of 1st January 2000, the prevailing regime
changed to jus soli, granting each child born on German territory a conditional right to
18For an overview of the human capital production theory, see Cunha et al. (2006)
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German citizenship at birth. The conditionality attached to birthright citizenship was
that at least one parent had been a legal resident in Germany for eight years or more at
the time of birth. Upon satisfying this condition, German citizenship was automatically
recorded in the register of birth with no need for the parents to apply for it. There were
no known cases of refusal of German citizenship at birth, not at last due to the allowance
of dual citizenship until age 23.
Parents of children born between 1991 and 1999 could take advantage of a transition
rule: conditional on having legally resided in Germany for at least eight years, they could
retrospectively apply for their children’s citizenship within a transition period of one year
(1st January to 31st December 2000). However, only a small fraction of eligible families
made use of this transition rule. In what follows we present evidence showing that the
number of eligible children born in 1999 and whose parents made use of the transition
rule is only about one-seventh of the number of eligible children born in 2000 who were
automatically granted citizenship. The main reason why only a small fraction of families
made use of the transition has to do with a lack of diffusion of information. On the one
hand, families were not directly informed about the transition rule. On the other hand,
the public discussion mainly revolved around the two main aspects of the reform.
As mentioned above, the reform also changed the path to citizenship for adults. Im-
portantly, this aspect of the reform applied to all immigrant adults and thus to all immi-
grant parents, i.e., independently of whether their children were endowed with birthright
citizenship or not. While the reform relaxed the length-of-residence requirement from 15
years down to eight, it tightened the requirements regarding German-language proficiency
and explicitly forbade dual citizenship (after age 23). Thus, despite the relaxed residence
requirement, the costs and effort associated with a citizenship application increased.
Hence, while in principle granting children citizenship could have induced parental nat-
uralization, in practice it did not (Avitabile et al., 2013; Sajons, 2012).
3.3.2 The German Education System
The German education system is comprised of three parts: (1) the phase between birth
and primary school, which is divided into early care available for children up to age 2
and preschool available for children aged 3 to 5 years; (2) primary school, which usually
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starts at age 6 and continues for four years; and (3) secondary school, which typically
starts at age 10 and continues for between five (compulsory) and nine years.
Preschool attendance is non-compulsory in Germany. Notwithstanding this, since
1996, every child turning 3 years old has been legally entitled to a slot in preschool.
As a result, the supply of preschools rose dramatically in late 1990s and ultimately met
demand the early 2000s. Preschool is heavily subsidized on an income sliding scale. In
case of severe financial constraints, fees can be reimbursed by the local youth welfare
service (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2013). In 2012,
96 % of all 3-5 year-old native children attended preschool, while the corresponding share
of immigrant children was 87 % (Bildungsberichterstattung, 2012).
Between birth and primary school, children undergo several compulsory medical
screenings. These medical screenings are intended to document children’s health, di-
agnose medical anomalies, and provide necessary treatment as early as possible. An
important medical screening is the school entry examination, which is offered by the
local health service and takes place in the year prior to entering primary school. In par-
ticular, all children turning six years old between July of the year prior to enrollment
and June of the same year as enrollment are subject to the school entry examination.
In addition to documenting a child’s health, pediatricians determine whether a child is
“ready” to follow the school curriculum. The school readiness diagnosis is an important
factor in school enrollment: a negative assessment can lead to school entry being deferred
by one year. Yet, the ultimate decision when to enroll a child for primary school lies in
the hands of parents.
After passing all four grades of primary school, students are referred to secondary
school (around age 10). Secondary school is divided into the following three tracks:19 the
lowest track (the so-called Hauptschule) which continues up to Grade 9 or 10 and gives
student a general education in preparation for an apprenticeship; the intermediate track
(Realschule) which goes up to Grade 10 and can either lead to an apprenticeship or to
a higher-level vocational school; and the academic track (Gymnasium) which goes up to
Grade 12 or 13 and prepares students for university.
19There are also a number of alternative school types, such as the Waldorf schools and the com-
prehensive school (Gesamtschule). Overall, around 10 % of all children of secondary school age attend
alternative types of schools.
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The transition from primary school to the different secondary school tracks is a criti-
cal stage in the German education system. In the final year of primary school, teachers
make a recommendation which secondary school track their students should enter. These
recommendations are supposed to reflect students’ abilities and not their socioeconomic
background. During our study period, the ultimate track choice was at the discretion
of the parents in 10 out of 16 German federal states, among them Schleswig-Holstein.20
In 2009, 24.1 % of all 15-year-old immigrant children attended Hauptschule, in compar-
ison to 13.3 % of their native peers. In contrast, 25.9 % of all 15-year-old immigrant
students attended Gymnasium, whereas 37.1 % of their native peers did so (Bildungs-
berichterstattung, 2012). In other words, the unconditional immigrant-native enrollment
gap in the academic track amounted to 11.2 percentage points (ppt). Lüdemann and
Schwerdt (2013) show that half of this gap remains after accounting for children’s perfor-
mance during primary school, which might be due to discrimination by teachers or lower
educational aspirations among immigrant families (or a combination thereof).
3.4 Empirical Approach
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
We estimate the causal effect of automatic birthright citizenship on a range of educational
indicators. Our identification strategy rests on a difference-in-differences (DiD) design
which exploits the cut-off date of the German citizenship reform (i.e., 1st January 2000).
In particular, we first compare the educational outcomes of immigrant children who were
born shortly before and shortly after the cut-off date. To avoid differences across school
cohorts, we restrict our attention to one school cohort, i.e., we compare children born
six months before and after the cut-off date. A key concern with this simple difference
is that the characteristics of parents and children might systematically vary on the two
sides of the cut-off date. First of all, children belonging to one school cohort differ by up
to 12 months in age, with children born in the earlier months likely to be more mature
at any given point in time. In addition, there is evidence that children born in spring
20In the remaining states, a child either has to pass a special exam or undergo a probationary period
in case it wants to attend Gymnasium without a recommendation.
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come from more advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds than children born in winter
(Buckles and Hungerman, 2013). In order to avoid biased estimates due to such age
and seasonal effects, we use immigrant children from another school cohort as control
group. In particular, our control is comprised of immigrant children born in the 12-
months window centered around 1st January 1999.21 Notice that these children were all
born under the old ius sanguinis regime and no policy change occurred at this control
cut-off date.
Our regression model can be written in the following way:
Yi,m =α + βTreated Cohorti,m + γAfteri,m + δ (Treated Cohorti,m × Afteri,m)
+
∑
m
θmDi,m + i,m
(3.1)
where Treated Cohorti,m is a binary variable indicating whether child i born in month
m belongs to the school cohort that was subject to the policy change (i.e., it switches
on for children born between July 1999 and June 2000). The coefficient β captures
any differences between immigrant children born in the treated and the control cohort.
Afteri,m is a binary assignment variable indicating whether child i was born in the months
just after 1st January of a given year (i.e., it switches on for children born between January
and June); it captures differences (e.g., due to age or seasonal effects) between children
born in the different semesters of a school cohort. To allow for any heterogeneity of the
age and seasonal effects that may arise because children are born in different months, we
furthermore control for a full set of month-of-birth dummies Di,m.22 Finally, we include
the interaction between Treated Cohorti,m and Afteri,m which switches on for children
born between January and June 2000 and thus for all children born after the policy change
and thus under the newly-introduced ius soli regime. The corresponding coefficient δ is
21Similar identification strategies have been used by Lalive and Zweimüller (2009), Dustmann and
Schönberg (2012), Danzer and Lavy (2016), and Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) in the context of parental
leave reforms.
22The assignment variable Afteri,m correlates perfectly with the birth months January to June. We
therefore omit not just one, but two birth month dummies. Specifically, we omit January and December
as they are immediately around the cutoff date. Note that we can control for the set of birth months
dummies because we rely on a comparison between children born in the year of policy change and children
born in the preceding year in which there was no policy change. A simple regression discontinuity design
would not allow us to do so, as the assignment variable would be a perfect linear combination of the
included set of birth month dummies.
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the parameter of interest, whose interpretation we discuss below. We estimate equation
(1) separately for various educational indicators measured at the first three stages of the
German education system. Standard errors i,m are clustered at the birth month/year
level.
3.4.2 Interpretation of Estimates
The Effects of Automatic Birthright Citizenship vs. Optional Citizenship.—
It is important to be clear upfront that δ does not identify the effects of citizenship on
immigrant children’s educational integration. Instead, it captures the impact of a policy
switch from optional citizenship for immigrant children (under the “old” jus sanguinis)
to automatic birthright citizenship (under the “new” jus soli). Children fulfilling the
eligibility criteria and born after the policy change on 1st January 2000 were automatically
granted citizenship at birth. In contrast, eligible children already born at the time of
the policy change could become German citizens retrospectively in cases where parents
made use of the one-year transition rule or where at least one of the parents chose to
naturalize him or herself. As already mentioned above, the former option was hampered
by informational constraints, while the latter was associated with substantial costs for
the parents, most importantly the costs of giving up the citizenship of their country of
origin. Thus, our empirical approach centers around the comparison of a regime in which
citizenship was conferred automatically and costlessly to children born to foreign parents
versus a regime in which immigrant parents had the costly option of obtaining citizenship
for their children. For brevity, we will refer to δ as the causal effect of automatic birthright
citizenship.
In order to estimate δ, one would ideally restrict attention to eligible children whose
parents had the necessary years of residence (≥ 8 years) when the reform came into effect.
Since our main data sources do not contain information on length of parental residence,
we are not able to restrict our estimation samples to eligible children. As a result, the
regressions we run also cover children who were unaffected by the reform. Thus, our
estimates of δ capture the reform’s intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. This ITT effect will
be a conservative estimate of the reform’s average treatment effect on the treated (ATT),
since it is estimated on a sample which includes children who are all born to foreign
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parents who may or may not not fulfill the residency criterion and hence may or may
not qualify for birthright citizenship. To provide some numbers regarding the share of
eligible children and the share of ineligible children, we combine official citizenship data of
the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees with official birth statistics of the Federal
Statistical Office (see Figure 3.1): among the 91,273 children born to foreign nationals in
Germany in the year 2000, 41,257 were automatically granted citizenship at birth. Thus,
the fraction of eligible children in the cohort subject to the policy change was 45.2 %.
This suggests that the reform’s ATT is in the order of roughly 2.2δ.
Figure 3.1: Children born to foreign-born parents,
eligible children and children with citizenship
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
9,620 9,923 10,326 10,017
41,257
38,600 37,568 36,819
5,343 5,892 6,348 6,787
105,870 107,207
99,699
95,572
91,273
82,996
79,118
76,326
Number of births – both parents foreign-born Citizenship through transition rule
Citizenship through parental naturalization Automatic citizenship at birth
The Effects of Citizenship.— As an alternative to identifying the reform’s impact
in an ITT setting, one could ask: What is the causal effect of citizenship on immigrant
children’s educational integration? Our estimates of δ would identify this effect if the
birth-date cut-off perfectly determines whether a child obtains the German citizenship
or not. Since this is not the case, one is left with the possibility to exploit the birth-
date cut-off as a source of exogenous variation for a child’s citizenship and to employ an
instrumental variable approach. Yet, limitations of the data under study – the lack of
information on citizenship – prevent us from taking such an approach. Data limitations
are also the reason why we can not pursue a two-sample instrumental variables approach:
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available survey data suffer from misreporting of children’s citizenship and thus prevent
us from obtaining credible first-stage results. For example, in the 2003 and 2004 waves
of the German Microcensus – the earliest waves which contain detailed information on
individual month-of-birth –, only 67 % of all eligible immigrant children born in the year
2000 are reported to possess the German citizenship. One reason for why this share is
not equal to 100 % is that parents are likely to report their own nationality when asked
about their child’s citizenship despite the fact that their child possesses dual citizenship.
That said, the evidence presented in Figure 3.1 gives some idea about the first-stage
effect and how to calculate a back-of-the-envelope estimate. In particular, while 45.2 %
of all children of foreign citizens born in 2000 where automatically granted citizenship
at birth, only 10.5 % of those born in 1999 received German citizenship in the wake of
the reform (7.1 % via the transition rule and 3.4 % through parental naturalization23).
Thus, children born in the year after the reform were roughly 35 ppt more likely to hold
German citizenship as infants than children born in the year prior to the reform. To put
it differently, the first stage estimate likely amounts to a value of 0.35. We consider this
as suggestive evidence that the local average treatment effect of citizenship on immigrant
children’s educational integration is in the order of roughly 2.8δ.
3.4.3 Threats to Identification
There are several potential threats to identification. The major concern is that reform
had a direct effect on the composition of children born shortly before and shortly after
the reform. While descriptive evidence speaks against this concern (see Table 3.1 for
details), in what follows we discuss the reasons for potential compositional changes and
how we deal with the arising threats.
Fertility Behavior.— The German citizenship reform may have induced immigrant
parents to adjust their fertility behavior in three dimensions. First, parents may have
delayed conception to ensure that their child is born under the new ius soli regime.
23We have calculated the number of children obtaining the German citizenship through parental
naturalization by proxying the naturalization rate of immigrant parents giving birth in year t with
naturalization rate of all immigrants in year t. The annual naturalization rates of immigrants are
calculated by the Federal Statistical Office and are given by: 4.04 % (1996), 3.76 % (1997), 3.99 %
(1998), and 3.28% (1999).
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Second, and as mentioned above, the introduction of birthright citizenship is likely to
have enhanced children’s future labor market opportunities and thus have increased the
perceived “quality” of children. According to the quantity-quality tradeoff emphasized
by Becker and Tomes (1976), this may have caused immigrant parents to adjust their
desired number of children downwards. Avitabile et al. (2014) provide evidence that
the German citizenship reform indeed led to a reduction in immigrant fertility, but only
from 2001 onward. Hence, the children included in our sample, who were conceived
before September 2000, are unlikely to be affected by this concern. In fact, a histogram
of the number of immigrant children born around the cut-off date does not reveal any
discontinuity (see Appendix Figure B.1). Notwithstanding this, we test the robustness
of our results to restricting our sample to children who were conceived before the new
German naturalization law was ratified, i.e., to children conceived before July 1999 and
thus born by April 2000. This leaves us with a 8-months window centered around the
cut-off date. Finally, mothers scheduled to give birth shortly before the cut-off date may
have tried to postpone the birth date in order to benefit from ius soli. Although this type
of behavior is difficult to implement, we perform a robustness check in which we exclude
children born in the months right before and after the cut-off date (i.e., December 1999
and January 2000) – the so-called donut-strategy.
Return Migration.— A second concern is that the introduction of birthright citizen-
ship made return migration less attractive. As a result, the pool of families remaining in
the country may change after the introduction of birthright citizenship. As mentioned
above, we do not observe any significant differences in the available parental background
characteristics between immigrant children born shortly before and after the cut-off date
(see Table 3.1). Differences in background characteristics not captured in our data may,
however, still be a threat to identification. In fact, Sajons (2016) argues that the re-
form likely induced more families, in particular families from the lower end of the socio-
economic distribution, to stay in Germany. Yet, in this case any differences would lead
to an underestimation of the effect. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our results to
potential sample selection bias, we extend our baseline specification and include a series
of family background characteristics, such as single parenthood, parental education and
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parents’ country of origin. Notice that this is only possible in two out of three data sets
used in this study (see Section 3.5 for more details).
Miscellaneous.— Finally, we address potential concerns about remaining differences
between children born in the different semesters of a school cohort that may not be
captured by the preceding cohort by adding yet another school cohort to the control.
Specifically, we draw upon the adjacent post-reform cohort, children belonging to the
cohort born in the 12-months window around 1st January 2001, and control flexibly for
cohort dummies as well as their interactions with birth semester.
3.5 Data
The questions we ask – and how we answer them empirically – require very comprehensive
data. First, we need information on immigrant children throughout the first three stages
of the German education system. Second, our identification strategy relies on a very
small subgroup of the German population: a few cohorts of immigrant children. We
therefore draw upon two unique administrative data sources available in a suitable way
in the German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein: school entry examinations and school
registers. Both data sources allow us to proxy immigrant status. However, both data
sources lack information necessary to infer whether or not immigrant children are eligible
for automatic birthright citizenship: parents’ length of residence in Germany and in the
case of the school entry examinations also children’s country of birth. To gain insights
into the potentially arising selection due to the lack of this information, we use the
German Microcensus as an additional data source. We now describe these three data
sets in detail.
3.5.1 School Entry Examination
Data on educational outcomes during the preschool phase are contained in the admin-
istrative records from the so-called school entry examination (SEE). This examination
is compulsory for all children who turn six in the 12-months period before a new school
year begins. Children born between July 1998 and June 2000 are thus included in the
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SEEs 2005 and 2006. The SEE records contain several measures of child development
(e.g., language proficiency, behavior problems, emotional stability, social skills) as well as
physicians’ assessments of children’s school readiness. Parents fill out an accompanying
questionnaire about their children’s previous preschool enrollment and their own back-
ground. As for the latter, the questionnaire contains information about parents’ country
of birth, but not about their nationality and length of residence in Germany. As a result,
we are unable to restrict our sample to eligible children. In fact, all we know is whether a
child’s family was living in Germany at the time of the survey, but not whether the child
was born in Germany. Data from the German Microcensus, however, suggest that 85 %
of all children with foreign-born parents who reside in Germany at the age of 6 were born
in Germany. In other words, the scaling factor for our ITT estimates based on the SEE
records needs to be adjusted upwards from 2.2 to 2.6.
In summary, we restrict our attention to children whose parents were both not born
in Germany. This sample restriction leaves us with 4,450 observations including both
first-generation immigrant children as well as second-generation immigrant children who
may or may not be eligible for birthright citizenship. The SEE records allow us to
construct the following binary dependent variables (some of them may not be available
for all counties of Schleswig-Holstein – either because they have not been surveyed or not
been transferred to the central authority in charge of data collection):
• Preschool Enrollment: equal to one for children that have attended preschool and
zero otherwise (available in all counties/ no missings).
• Language proficiency: equal to one for children who are fluent in German or make
at most small mistakes and zero otherwise (available in 2005 for only 1 out of 15
counties and in 2006 for 11 out of 15 counties/ missing for 72% of the sample).
• Socio-Emotional Maturity: a combined measure of several developmental deficits
– attention deficits, emotional instability (e.g., anxiety, nervousness, lack of self-
confidence), antisocial and deviant behavior (e.g., lying, fighting, stealing) – which
is equal to one if none of the mentioned deficits is diagnosed and zero otherwise
(available in 11 out of 15 counties/ missing for 22%).
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• School Readiness: equal to one for children assessed to be ready to follow the pri-
mary school curriculum and zero otherwise (available for all counties/ no missings).
Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics from the SEE records for both native and
immigrant children born prior to the reform as well as immigrant children born around
the introduction of the reform. In terms of the dependent variables (panel A), a raw
comparison between children born shortly before (II/99) and shortly after (I/00) the cut-
off date suggests several differences. The preschool enrollment rate of immigrant children
born after the cut-off date comes close to that of their native peers (94.2% vs. 95.4%), but
it is roughly 3 ppt lower for immigrant children born shortly before the cut-off (91.7%).
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics: school entry examination (SEE)
Natives Migrants Migrants Migrants Diff
Pre-reform Pre-reform II/99 I/00 I/00 - II/99
A. Dependent Variables
Preschool Enrollment 0.954 0.925 0.917 0.942 0.025**
Language Proficiency - - 0.580 0.504 -0.077***
Socio-Emotional Maturity 0.904 0.918 0.902 0.903 0.001
School Readiness 0.909 0.849 0.863 0.772 -0.091***
B. Background Variables
Age in Months 75.176 73.805 76.396 70.724 -5.672***
Female 0.473 0.468 0.478 0.498 0.020
Nr. of Siblings 0.869 1.207 1.287 1.257 -0.030
Single Parent 0.131 0.085 0.088 0.087 -0.001
Mom’s Education: Low 0.200 0.217 0.220 0.235 0.014
Mom’s Educ.: Intermediate 0.332 0.245 0.240 0.240 0.000
Mom’s Educ.: High 0.234 0.164 0.154 0.169 0.015
Mom’s Educ.: Missing 0.234 0.374 0.386 0.356 -0.030
Dad’s Education: Low 0.236 0.235 0.236 0.222 -0.014
Dad’s Educ.: Intermediate 0.229 0.222 0.229 0.240 0.011
Dad’s Edu.: High 0.266 0.168 0.154 0.181 0.027
Dad’s Educ.: Missing 0.269 0.375 0.381 0.357 -0.024
Mom’s Origin: Turkey - 0.315 0.306 0.315 0.009
Mom’s Origin: East Europe - 0.389 0.405 0.395 -0.011
Mom’s Origin: Balkan - 0.085 0.082 0.074 -0.008
Mom’s Origin: EU 12 - 0.048 0.045 0.050 0.005
Mom’s Origin: missing - 0.166 0.162 0.166 0.004
Dad’s Origin: Turkey - 0.319 0.311 0.316 0.005
Dad’s Origin: East Europe - 0.377 0.393 0.376 -0.016
Dad’s Origin: Balkan - 0.087 0.081 0.077 -0.004
Dad’s Origin: EU 12 - 0.047 0.042 0.051 0.009
Dad’s Origin: Missing - 0.170 0.173 0.180 0.007
Notes: Migrants Pre-reform refers to children born between June 1998 and December 1999 and
whose parents were both not born in Germany. Migrants II/99 refers to immigrant children born
between July and December 1999. Migrants I/00 refers to immigrant children born between January
and June 2000. Natives Pre-reform refers to all non-immigrant children born between June 1998 and
December 1999.
In terms of children’s socio-emotional maturity no significant differences between chil-
dren born shortly before and after the cut-off date are observed, but controlling for age
effects might well change this picture. The significantly higher probability of being as-
sessed as “fluent in German” and “ready for school” among children born before the
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cut-off is in fact likely to reflect such age effects. And indeed, the descriptive statistics
on background variables (panel B) show that the average age difference between the two
groups of immigrant children amounts to 5.7 months. Aside from this age gap, there are
no significant demographic and socioeconomic differences between immigrant children
born shortly before and after the cut-off date – a fact which supports the assumption of
comparability between the children born before and after the cut-off date.
3.5.2 School Registers
Educational outcomes during the primary and secondary school phase are taken from
school register (SR) data. In Schleswig-Holstein, all primary and secondary schools are
legally obliged to provide individual student records to the federal ministry of education
at the beginning of each school year (i.e. September). The two birth cohorts we study
were scheduled to be admitted to secondary school in 2009 and 2010, respectively. We
therefore draw upon the records from these two years.
The SR data provide basic information about children’s gender and birthdate. In
addition, they include two variables that allow us to proxy children’s migrant status:
country of birth and main language spoken at home. We restrict our sample to children
who are born in Germany, but use a language different from German as their first language
at home.24 Particularly the latter restriction is likely to exclude a substantial share of
immigrant children – in fact, despite the fact that they are based on the same population,
the sample based on the SR records from 2009 and 2010 contains substantially fewer
observations than the sample based on the SEE records from 2005 and 2006 (1,611
versus 4,450 observations). Calculations based on the German National Educational
Panel Study (NEPS) suggest that slightly less than half of all children with foreign-born
parents do not speak German at home25. Further inspections of the NEPS indicate
that this subsample of immigrant children consists of disproportionately more children
from disadvantaged backgrounds and from Turkish families. To address the concern that
our baseline estimates may be sample-specific, we conduct additional analyses using the
24We additionally exclude children who are ethnic Germans (“Aussiedler”) and thus possess of German
citizenship by definition
25In contrast, in the NEPS data only a negligible fraction of children whose parents were both born
in Germany speak a language other than German at home.
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German Microcensus. As already discussed, this allows us furthermore to address issue
of children’s eligibility for birthright citizenship, an issue also present in the SR data.
The SR data allow us to construct the following dependent variables for the primary
school phase:
• Age at School Entry: continuous variable measuring the age of children in months
at the time of primary school entry.
• Early School Entry: equal to one for children who have entered primary school
prior to the scheduled year of admission and zero otherwise.
• Grade Retention: equal to one for children who have repeated one or more grades
during primary school and zero otherwise.
As for secondary school education, we are able to draw upon the following dependent
variables:
• Recommendation: equal to one for children who have received the official recom-
mendation to attend the academic track of secondary school and zero otherwise.
• Gymnasium: equal to one for children who are enrolled in the academic track of
secondary school.
• Gymnasium with Recommendation: equal to one for children who are enrolled in
the academic track of secondary school based on the recommendation from their
primary school teacher.
• Gymnasium w/o Recommendation: equal to one for children who are enrolled in the
academic track of secondary school despite no recommendation from their primary
school teacher.
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics from the SR data for both “ native” – compris-
ing all children speaking German at home and thus also a substantial share of immigrant
children – and immigrant children – consisting, as discussed above, of children not speak-
ing German at home and thus likely being a selected subsample of all immigrant children.
Compared to their native peers, immigrant children are less likely to enter primary school
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ahead of the scheduled year of admission (5.2% vs. 8.2%), are more likely to be retained
(27.1% vs. 15.6%) and less likely to receive a recommendation for the academic track of
secondary school (13.1% vs. 39.1%). Based on the SR data, the actual immigrant-native
enrollment gap in the academic track of secondary school amounts to 20.0 ppt (16.3%
vs. 36.3%) – a gap which is substantially higher than the officially reported gap which
amounts to approximately 11.2 ppt (25.9% versus. 37.1%). This difference is in line with
the issue discussed above that our SR sample is disproportionately made up of children
from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics: school registers (SR)
Natives Migrants Mi-
grants
Mi-
grants
Diff
Pre-
reform
Pre-
reform
II/99 I/00 I/00 -
II/99
A. Dependent Variables: Primary School
Age at School Entry 79.843 80.491 76.906 83.974 7.068***
Early School Entry 0.082 0.052 0.086 0.019 -0.067
Grade Retention 0.156 0.271 0.236 0.305 0.069**
B. Dependent Variables: Secondary School
Recommendation for
Gymnasium
0.391 0.131 0.154 0.105 -0.048**
Gymnasium 0.363 0.163 0.194 0.132 -0.062**
– with Recommendation 0.293 0.087 0.108 0.067 -0.041**
– w/o Recommendation 0.070 0.075 0.086 0.065 -0.021
C. Background Variables
Age in Months 126.400 126.506 123.410 129.573 6.163***
Female 0.490 0.494 0.506 0.482 -0.024
Notes: Migrants Pre-reform refers to children born in Germany between June 1998 and December 1999
and use a language different from German as their main language at home. Migrants II/99 refers to
immigrant children born between July and December 1999. Migrants I/00 refers to immigrant children
born between January and June 2000. Natives Pre-reform refers to all non-immigrant children who were
born in Germany between June 1998 and December 1999. Notice, however, that given our definition of
natives – everyone who speaks German at home – this group likely comprises a non-negligible number
of immigrants. As such, the reported immigrant-native differences are likely to differ from gaps based
on alternative statistics.
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A comparison between immigrant children born shortly before and shortly after the
cut-off date suggests several differences: children born before the cut-off start school at
an earlier age (77 vs. 84 months), repeat more often a grade during primary school
(23.6% vs. 30.5%), receive more frequently a positive recommendation for the academic
track of secondary school (15.4% vs. 10.5%), which finally results in a higher enrollment
rate (19.4% vs. 13.2%). As previously discussed these differences are likely driven by the
imminent age difference and underlines the importance of using a difference-in-differences
approach netting out the effects of age. Unfortunately, the SR does not provide detailed
background information and thus prevents us from conducting useful balancing tests
between immigrant children born shortly before and after the cut-off date. Yet, analysis
based on the German Microcensus, introduced in the next section, does not reveal any
significant differences between children born before and after the cut-off date, except the
previously discussed differences in children’s age and number of siblings (see Table B.1
in the Appendix).
3.5.3 German Microcensus
To discuss potential sample issues arising due to the lack of information on children’s
eligibility status in our baseline samples, we additionally draw upon the German Mi-
crocensus (GMC). Providing information on children’s country-of-birth, their parents
country of birth as well as their parents’ year of arrival to Germany, the GMC allows
us to define the group of second-generation immigrant children as well as their eligibility
status. A comparison between the average second-generation migrant child – defined as
children born in Germany, but to foreign-born parents – and the migrant child eligible
for birthright citizenship – defined as as children born in Germany whose parents immi-
grated to Germany prior to 1992 – is shown in Table B.1 in the Appendix. Yet, given
few information on children’s educational outcomes – the GMC only contains children’s
secondary school track –, we only draw on the GMC for robustness analysis (see Section
6.4).
The only notable difference between children eligible for birthright citizenship and
the average second-generation migrant child relates to their parents’ country of origin.
The arising pattern – disproportionally many children with Turkish ancestors qualify for
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birthright citizenship, while disproportionally few children with ancestors from the former
Soviet Union and the Balkans do so – aligns well with the different immigration waves
and thus the necessary parental length-of-residence to qualify for birthright citizenship:
larger immigration from Turkey occurred during the 1960ies, while immigration from the
former Soviet Union and the Balkan occurred predominantly in the mid and late 1990ies.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Preschool
Table 3.3 presents our results for the effects of automatic birthright citizenship at the
preschool level. Column (1) only controls for the full set of month-of-birth dummies, while
columns (2) to (3) sequentially condition on child and family background characteristics.
In line with our assumption of random sorting around the cut-off, the estimates are robust
to augmenting the set of control variables. In what follows, we discuss the results of our
preferred specification controlling for the full set of background characteristics shown in
column (3).
The estimates shown in Panel A show that the introduction of automatic birthright
citizenship led to an 3.1 ppt increase in the preschool enrollment rate of immigrant
children. Thus, the share of immigrant children not enrolled in preschool (8.3% among
those born shortly before the cut-off date) decreased by 37%. Interestingly, this effect
appears to have closed the preschool enrollment gap between native children – with an
enrollment rate of 95.4% – and their immigrant peers completely.
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Table 3.3: The effects of automatic birthright citizenship at the preschool level
(1) (2) (3)
A. Participation in the Early Education System
Preschool Enrollment 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
[0.917] (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
N 4,450 4,450 4,450
B. Assessed Outcomes
German Language Proficiency 0.029∗ 0.028∗ 0.035∗∗
[0.580] (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
N 1248 1248 1248
Socio-Emotional Maturity 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗
[0.902] (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
N 3,441 3,441 3,441
C. Recommendation
School Readiness 0.024∗ 0.025 0.022
[0.863] (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
N 4,540 4,540 4,540
Birth Months Yes Yes Yes
Child Characteristics Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) using the school entry examination (SEE) records 2005 and
2006. Mean of dependent variable for children born between July and December 1999 reported in
square brackets. Child characteristics include gender and age at the SEE. Family characteristics
include number of siblings, a dummy for single-parent household, parents’ educational degree and
parents’ country of origin. Standard errors are clustered on a birthmonth/year level. ∗ 10 percent,
∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent confidence level.
Parental investments early in life together with preschool exposure are important
inputs into children’s human capital production function. In fact, it is well understood
that preschool participation exerts positive effects on children’s language, motor and
social skills, particularly among children at risk for poor outcomes (see, for instance,
Cornelissen et al. (2016) and Felfe and Lalive (2014)). In panel B, we therefore examine
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the impact of birthright citizenship on immigrant children’s proficiency in German as well
as their socio-emotional maturity measured at the end of the preschool phase. The results
suggest positive and significant effects on immigrant children’s language proficiency: the
share of immigrant children speaking fluently German rises from 58.0% to 61.5%. We
also observe an improvement in immigrant children’s socio-emotional development by
1.9 ppt – evidence in line with the results in Avitabile et al. (2014). Further inspection
reveals that the improvement of children’s socio-emotional maturity is mainly driven by
a reduction in emotional problems, less so by a reduction in social deficits.
As part of the school entry examination, pediatricians provide an overall assessment of
children’s school readiness and may recommend deferred school entry. The results in panel
C indicate that the reform had a positive, albeit no significant effect on pediatricians’
recommendations regarding immigrant children’s school readiness. This seems puzzling
in light of the sizable positive effects on children’s developmental indicators just discussed.
One explanation for the lack of an effect might be that the positive findings for preschool
enrollment and children’s development were not driven by marginal children at risk of
being identified as not ready for school. An alternative explanation might be that the rules
governing the school readiness recommendation give rise to institutional discrimination
against immigrant children, the incidence of which might have been unaffected by the
reform. That said, and as mentioned earlier, the ultimate decision when to enroll a child
for primary schools lies in the hands of parents, to which we now turn.
3.6.2 Primary School
Table 3.4 documents the effects of automatic birthright citizenship at the primary school
level. Recall that our analysis here is based on the SR data and thus on estimation
samples which are restricted to immigrant children who use a language different from
German as their main language at home – a subsample which is likely dominated by
children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
The key message that emerges from the first row in panel A is that the introduction of
automatic birthright citizenship led to a reduction in immigrant children’s school starting
age by 1.6 months. As we can see in the second row in panel A, this effect is driven by an
increased incidence of early school entry among immigrant children and not by a reduction
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in children deferred from regular school entry: the share of immigrant children starting
primary school at age 5 instead of age 6 increases by 9.9 ppt or to put it differently, more
than doubles in comparison to the pre-reform mean.
Table 3.4: The effects of automatic birthright citizenship at the primary school
level
(1) (2)
A. Age At Primary School Start
Age at School Entry -1.562∗∗∗ -1.571∗∗∗
[76.906] (0.327) (0.329)
N 1,587 1,587
Early School Entry 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
[0.086] (0.020) (0.020)
N 1,611 1,611
B. Educational Progress
Grade Retention -0.056∗ -0.058∗∗
[0.236] (0.028) (0.028)
N 1,576 1,576
Birth Months Yes Yes
Child Characteristics Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) using the school register (SR) data from 2009 and
2010. Mean of dependent variable for children born between July and December 1999
reported in square brackets. Child characteristics include gender. Family characteristics
are not available for the SR data. Standard errors are clustered on a birthmonth/year
level. ∗ 10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent confidence level.
The timing of primary school entry may have an effect on children’s educational
outcomes, although the direction of this effect is a priori unclear. On the one hand, being
older at school entry comes along with being relatively more mature. If early relative
maturity effects may propagate themselves over time, starting school younger may have
an overall negative effect on children’s educational outcomes (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006).
Yet, starting school younger may be an advantage if children learn more in school than
at home or in preschool environments. For immigrant children, with relatively high rates
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of social and economic disadvantages among their families, an earlier integration into the
school system may indeed be beneficial. Moreover, parents may be encouraged or even
forced to get more involved in their children’s education if children are enrolled earlier
in school. Due to data limitations, we are not able provide a comprehensive analysis of
children’s educational outcomes during primary school. However, the data allow us to
examine the effects of the reform on the probability of grade retention. Panel B shows
a sizable reduction post-policy in the probability of grade retention among immigrant
children. The point estimate from our preferred specification indicates a reduction in
grade retention by 5.8 ppt or 24.6%. This effect reduces the difference in grade retention
between immigrant children and their native counterparts by roughly one-half.26
3.6.3 Secondary School
In Table 3.5, we focus on the effects of birthright citizenship at the secondary school
level. After four years of primary school, the German education system separates chil-
dren into three educational tracks that differ in academic orientation: secondary lower
school, intermediate school, and Gymnasium, the academic track. Before children are
tracked into these differing-ability schools, primary school teachers make a recommenda-
tion which secondary school track a child should attend. The results in panel A show
that the likelihood of immigrant children receiving a recommendation for the academic
track of secondary school was not significantly affected by the reform – the estimate of
our preferred specification shown in column (2) corresponds to an increase by 4.2 ppt or
26.4%, but lacks significance at any conventional level. While this finding is somewhat
unexpected given the positive effects we have uncovered at the preschool and primary
school level, it is in line with existing evidence that parental background, even conditional
on student achievement, is a key explanatory factor for teachers’ track recommendations
(Lüdemann and Schwerdt, 2013). Such discriminatory behavior is unlikely to have been
affected by the policy.
Recall, however, that in the state and period under study, the ultimate decision which
track a child should follow in secondary school was at the discretion of parents. As such,
26Indeed, the grade retention rate among pre-reform native children (15.6%) was 11.5 ppt lower than
that of pre-reform immigrant children (27.1%)
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we may still observe an effect of the policy change on immigrant children’s selection into
different secondary school track. Panel B shows this to be, indeed, the case. In particular,
the reform increased the share of immigrant children attending the academic track of
secondary school by 9.5 ppt, or 49.0% of the pre-reform mean. The summary statistics
in Table 3.2 suggest that the estimated effect reduces the academic-track enrollment gap
between native and immigrant children by 38.0%. We next ask: is this effect driven
by immigrant parents being more likely to comply with teachers’ recommendations to
enroll their children in Gymnasium; or are immigrant parents more likely to override
teachers’ recommendations, and send their children to Gymnasium despite the lack of
an official recommendation? We find that both possibilities play a role. On the one
hand, the proportion of immigrant children attending the high school track of secondary
school with an official recommendation increases by 4.9 ppt or by 49.0 %. On the other
hand, the share of immigrant children attending the academic track without an official
recommendation rose by 4.5 ppt or 52.3% of the pre-reform mean. The latter result
suggests that the policy induced immigrant parents to override the recommendations of
teachers to enable their children access to higher education.
87
Why Birthright Citizenship Matters
Table 3.5: The effects of automatic birthright citizenship at the secondary school
level
(1) (2)
A. Recommendation
Recommendation for 0.042 0.042
Gymnasium [0.154] (0.027) (0.027)
N 1,299 1,299
B. Track Choice
Gymnasium 0.093∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
[0.194] (0.027) (0.027)
N 1,611 1,611
Gymnasium with 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗
Recommendation [0.108] (0.022) (0.022)
N 1,611 1,611
Gymnasium w/o 0.045∗ 0.045∗∗
Recommendation [0.086] (0.022) (0.022)
N 1,611 1,611
Birth Months Yes Yes
Child Characteristics Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) using the school register (SR) data from 2009 and
2010. Mean of dependent variable for children born between July and December 1999
reported in square brackets. Child characteristics include gender. Family characteristics are
not available for the SR data. Standard errors are clustered on a birthmonth/year level. ∗
10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent confidence level.
3.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sample issues: representativeness, eligibility.— The results presented so far are
based on administrative data which do not allow us to determine immigrant children’s
eligibility status. The SEE samples contain immigrant children who are not necessarily
born in Germany and whose parents may not have resided long enough in Germany; the
SR samples – while containing information on the country of birth – are restricted to
88
Why Birthright Citizenship Matters
Table 3.6: Evidence from the German Microcensus
(1) (2) (3)
Eligible Children: Gymnasium 0.047* 0.054* 0.059**
[0.246] (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)
N 961 961 961
Birth Months Yes Yes Yes
Child Characteristics Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) using the GMC waves 2010 and 2011. Mean of
dependent variable for children born between July and December 1999 reported in square
brackets. Child characteristics include gender and age quarter dummies. Family character-
istics include number of siblings, a dummy for single-parent household, parents’ educational
degree and parents’ country of origin. Standard errors are clustered on a birthmonth/year
level. ∗ 10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent confidence level.
(Source: Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State,
Microcensus, 2010-2011, own calculations.)
immigrant children who use a language different from German at home. To address these
issues, we provide results based on data from the GMC (see Table 3.6). To reiterate,
the GMC has two advantages over administrative data. First, we can properly define
the group of second-generation immigrant children based on information of their own
country-of-birth as well as their parents country of birth. Second, the GMC contains
the information necessary to construct children’s eligibility status. Yet, as mentioned
previously, the GMC allows us to analyze only one educational outcome, secondary school
track choice. Finally, given the rather small sample size, 916 eligible second-generation
immigrant children across the whole federal territory of Germany born between July 1998
and June 2000 and observed at the onset of secondary school, we can not distinguish
between different federal states and thus between states with binding and non-binding
teacher recommendation.
Table 3.6 shows that our results based on the SR data are not specific to immigrant
children who do not speak German at home, but hold true for all second-generation immi-
grant children eligible for automatic birthright citizenship. Importantly, estimates barely
vary when augmenting the set of control variables providing the balancing test we were
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unable to conduct with the SR data. When controlling for the full set of individual back-
ground characteristics, the results suggest that automatic birthright citizenship led to an
increase in immigrant children’s enrollment in the academic track of secondary school by
5.9 ppt, or to put it differently to an increase by 24.0%. Interestingly, this point estimate
lies in between our baseline estimates for the effect of automatic birthright citizenship
on immigrant children’s enrollment with recommendation and on immigrant children’s
overall enrollment rate – a result which is in line with the fact that the results based on
the GMC data rely on both states with and without binding teacher recommendations.
Specification issues.— We also subject our results to robustness checks by repeating
the analysis for the alternative specifications discussed in Section 3.4.3: (i) we implement
the so-called donut strategy by dropping the months just around the cut-off date (i.e.,
December and January); (ii) we restrict our samples to children born before the ratifi-
cation of the citizenship reform by narrowing the window around the cut-off date (from
12 to 8 months); (iii) we draw on one additional post-reform cohort and control flexibly
for possible time trends by interacting being born between January and June with each
birth cohort.
Table 3.7 presents the results. The following points are worth noting. The fact that
our results are robust to specifications (1) and (2) indicates that patterns of selective
timing of fertility are unlikely to be a concern in our setting. The estimates for immi-
grant children’s participation in the early education system, primary school starting age
and secondary school track choice remain unchanged no matter the sample restriction.
This also holds true for the estimate related to immigrant children’s enrollment in the
academic track of secondary school without an official recommendation. The estimates
related to teachers’ recommendation regarding children’s secondary school track choice,
however, looses magnitude once restricting the sample to an 8-months window around
the cut-off date – a result pointing towards increased parental investment being the driv-
ing force behind immigrant children’s improved access to the highest educational track.
Finally, estimates based on three cohorts and controlling flexibly for possible time trends
– see column (3) in Table 8 – are also comparable in size and precision. This result
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raises confidence that there are unlikely any further differences between children born in
different semesters of a school year that could bias our results.
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Table 3.7: Robustness
(1) (2) (3)
Donut 8-month
window
Trend
A. Preschool
Preschool enrollment 0.042*** 0.033** 0.034***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
N 3,713 3,046 6,740
Language Proficiency 0.413* 0.037*** 0.035**
(0.239) (0.010) (0.016)
N 1,019 841 2,730
Socio-Emotional Maturity 0.007 0.021* 0.029**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
N 2,813 2,306 5,169
School Readiness 0.026 0.015 0.016
(0.028) (0.014) (0.016)
N 3,713 3,046 6,740
B. Primary School
Age at School Entry -1.925*** -1.145** -1.577***
(0.341) (0.401) (0.357)
N 1,323 1,028 2,498
Early School Entry 0.122*** 0.063** 0.100***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022)
N 1,343 1,037 2,530
Grade Retention -0.032 -0.070* -0.056*
(0.030) (0.039) (0.030)
N 1,313 1,019 2,482
C. Secondary School
Recommendation 0.077*** 0.025 0.041
(0.026) (0.034) (0.030)
N 1,073 832 1,959
Gymnasium 0.116*** 0.085*** 0.093***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
N 1,343 1,037 2,530
Gymnasium with 0.075*** 0.029 0.050**
Recommendation (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
N 1,343 1,037 2,530
Gymnasium w/o 0.041* 0.057* 0.044*
Recommendation (0.021) (0.031) (0.025)
N 1,343 1,037 2,530
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (1) using the school entry examinations (SEE)
2005 and 2006 and the school register (SR) 2009 and 2010, the estimates shown in
specification (3) draw additionally on the SEE 2007 and the SR 2011. Control variables
include age and gender. Standard errors are clustered at the birth month/year level.
∗ 10 percent, ∗∗ 5 percent, ∗∗∗ 1 percent confidence level.
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3.7 Conclusion
Successfully integrating children with migrational backgrounds into the education system
is high on the policy agenda in many countries. Yet, surprisingly little is known about
causal factors underlying immigrant children’s educational integration. In this project,
we have taken some steps to fill this void by evaluating whether a major citizenship
reform in Germany – one that saw the introduction of automatic birthright citizenship
– helps closing the immigrant-native gap in a series of education outcomes over the
early life cycle. Theoretically, a link might be expected because granting citizenship at
birth can be viewed as a positive shock to the long-run rate of return on investments
in children’s human capital. Yet, in practice the effect is far from being clear: while an
initial increase in parental investments may stimulate children’s development and thus
provoke continuous parental as well as child efforts, a lack of an echo in official evaluations
and success may discourage parents as well as children from maintaining their efforts and
thus have no result on children’s educational outcomes in the long-run. We address
this question empirically and exploit a birth date cut-off determining whether a child
became eligible for birthright citizenship or not. This allows us to overcome problems
of endogeneity using a difference-in-differences approach: our treatment group comprises
children born shortly before and shortly after the reform’s cut-off date, while children
from the preceding birth cohort are used as the control group.
Our results show that the introduction of automatic birthright citizenship had sizable
positive effects on the educational integration of immigrant children at the first three
stages of the German education system. In particular, the policy (i) increased immigrant
children’s participation in non-compulsory preschool education; (ii) had positive effects
on key developmental outcomes (e.g., German language proficiency) measured at the
end of the preschool period; (iii) caused immigrant children to progress faster through
primary school; and (iv) enabled them better access to the academic track of secondary
school, a precondition for higher education and university studies. Our interpretation of
these results is that the introduction of birthright citizenship has incentivized immigrant
parents to provide their children with more similar educational opportunities as children
in native families.
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Our study offers some lessons for policy-makers and raises interesting questions for
future research. Granting citizenship rights to immigrant children in places where they
are poorly integrated into the education system might be an effective policy lever for re-
ducing educational disparities. Indeed, when taken at face value, our results suggest that
automatic birthright citizenship helps closing the immigrant-native gaps in key measures
of educational success. While our analysis provides a range of insights, much remains
to be done to understand the longer-run effects of birthright citizenship. The cohorts
born around the German citizenship reform will soon enter the labor market, form their
own families and participate in civic life. Understanding the long-run effects of birthright
citizenship in these domains presents an important and rich agenda for future research.
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Appendix B
Figure B.1: Number of births by month of birth
(a) All immigrant children (b) Eligible immigrant children
Source: Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices of the Länder and the
Federal State, Microcensus, 2009-2012, own calculations.
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Chapter 4
Citizenship, Identity, and Trust in a
Migration Society: Combining a
Large-Scale Behavioral Experiment
with a Natural Experiment
This chapter is joint work with Christina Felfe from the University of St. Gallen, Martin
Kocher from the University of Munich and the Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna,
Helmut Rainer from the ifo Institute and the University of Munich, and Thomas Siedler
from the University of Hamburg.
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4.1 Introduction
Immigration has shaped, and continues to shape, many rich nations. This brings with it
the challenge of integrating immigrants and their children into society and labor markets.
Among economists, the common take on integration—and on policies that promote it—is
to emphasize convergence in the outcomes of immigrants and those of the host population
in economic dimensions such as educational attainment and labor market participation.
Another fundamental, but much less scrutinized, aspect of integration pertains to
non-market interactions between immigrants and natives. Many such interactions, from
basic exchanges in everyday life to workplace cooperation to the provision of neighbor-
hood amenities, are not governed by complete contracts and therefore require informal
underpinnings such as a common understanding that a handshake is a handshake. When
this is in doubt, mutual gains from exchange may not be realized due to distrust (Bowles,
2015). For this reason, it is often said that trust is the lubricant of social systems (Arrow,
1974)27.
But does trust also tie together segmented migration societies? If a nation is fractured
along lines of race, religion or country of origin, and if people only trust those with whom
they share a common identity, then cooperation between social groups can break down,
with consequences such as conflict, inefficient outcomes and high transaction costs (Basu,
2010). In a similar vein, the role of trust in generating efficient outcomes would also seem
limited when social exclusion or lack of economic opportunity leads to the adoption of
oppositional identities by those in disadvantaged groups (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
Evidence that supports these lines of thought shows that ethnic cleavages in communities
or societies at large are inimical to trust (Zak and Knack, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2002). Thus, to think clearly about integration interventions, we need to not only know
about their impact in terms of convergence; we should also be concerned about their
potential in building trust and cooperation between social groups.
We study the effects of a major citizenship reform in Germany—a change from the
“law of blood” to the “law of soil”—in terms of social difference, trust and discrimination
between immigrant and native youth. Our unique setup combines the advantages of
27The general importance of trust and social capital for economic development and growth has been
highlighted again and again—one influential survey of the literature is provided by Fehr (2009).
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experimental economics in studying in-group and out-group phenomena with the way
in which labor economists have come to frame causal questions. In particular, we (i)
conducted an artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) based on the trust
game with a large, non-selected sample (N=4,436) of German adolescents;28 (ii) asked
participants to condition their strategies on the migration background of their opponents;
(iii) matched the experimental data with individual background information from an
extensive, self-conducted socioeconomic survey; and (iv) chose a design that allows us to
connect the artefactual field experiment with a natural experiment—i.e., the citizenship
reform—using quasi-experimental strategies.
Three aspects of our approach deserve comment: the context of the study, the arte-
factual field experiment, and the citizenship reform to which we connect it.
In recent years, Germany has become the OECD’s second largest country of immi-
gration after the United States (OECD, 2017), and immigrant youth currently account
for one-third of the nation’s children under the age of 15. A first major dividing line
between natives and immigrants in Germany is religion: the majority of native German
children have a Christian religious affiliation, while Islam is the dominant religion among
immigrant children. Next, the evidence from our own survey, as well as other household
surveys in Germany, suggests that immigrant children are more likely than non-immigrant
children to have parents with low educational attainment, to grow up under low-income
conditions, and to experience little language assimilation within their families. Finally, a
good deal of evidence also indicates that immigrant children are outperformed by their
German peers along multiple indicators of academic achievement. Thus, we are dealing
with native and immigrant children who are strongly segmented in terms of socioeconomic
and cultural characteristics.
Our artefactual field experiment builds on the pioneering work of Fershtman and
Gneezy (2001), who were among the first to use the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) as
a vehicle for measuring trust and discrimination therein between real social groups.29
28As will be explained in more detail below, we have avoided attrition in the experiment by running it
in 219 classes of 57 German schools during regular school hours in the final year of compulsory schooling.
We incentivized the trust game monetarily, and paid out all 4,436 participants privately and in cash.
29In another study based on a real-group design, Falk and Zehnder (2013) conducted a trust game
experiment in the city of Zurich, in which first movers could condition their investments on the residential
districts of second movers.
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We take trust as measure for cooperation (or, efficiency of social interaction) within
and between social groups, and the version of the trust game we implement is based
on the following idea.30 In a segmented migration society like the German, “being a
native” or “being an immigrant” are amongst the core attributes of individuals (next to
gender) that determine their social identity. Moreover, these attributes are ubiquitous
and difficult not to perceive and therefore likely to feed into social interactions. Thus,
we asked participants to condition their strategies on the identity of their opponents,
classified as belonging to six possible social groups: (i) boys with German parents, (ii)
girls with German parents, (iii) boys with foreign parents, (iv) girls with foreign parents,
(v) naturalized boys with foreign parents, and (vi) naturalized girls with foreign parents.
Our survey, in turn, allows us to determine which social group a participant belongs
to, allowing us to study cross-group discrimination in trust behavior (henceforth, trust
discrimination). To be clear, we use the term discrimination to describe the actions of
players—in particular, differential trust decisions vis-a-vis in-groups and out-groups—
but do not intend it to be a description of their underlying motives. These motives may
involve statistical discrimination, wrong stereotyping or identity-based social preferences,
and we will analyze how relevant these are in our context. Our experiment was run at the
schoolclass-level in 57 German schools, and each of our 219 sessions was either preceded
or succeeded by a one-hour slot in which we administered an extensive socioeconomic
survey to our participants.
The citizenship reform to which we connect the experiment was implemented on Jan-
uary 1, 2000 and saw the introduction of birthright citizenship. This new regime based
on jus soli (right of soil) replaced the principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood) under
which German citizenship could only be acquired by descent from a German legal mother
and/or a German legal father. The nature of the reform, and the way we exploit it em-
pirically, allows us to causally analyze whether it changed the behavior of immigrants
towards natives but not vice versa.31 Our motivating hypothesis was as follows. In theory,
30We do not attempt to provide a preference or motivational anatomy of trust, but are, of course,
aware of the fact that decisions to trust can involve different motivations such altruism, risk attitudes et
cetera (see, e.g., Fehr (2009)).
31Naturally, the behavior of natives towards immigrants may also depend on whether the latter are
naturalized or not. We investigate this possibility through our experiment but not by exploiting the
citizenship reform.
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socioeconomic differences between social groups may prevent efficient social interactions
between the members of these groups (Lazear, 1999). Now, through the reform, a signif-
icant portion of immigrant children automatically acquired German nationality by birth,
and thus the same legal rights—and as such political and professional opportunities—as
their native counterparts. In Chapter 3 a subset of us argues that this increased the
returns to education for immigrants, and found indeed evidence that the policy substan-
tially reduced a pronounced, pre-existing immigrant-native gap in education. Thus, we
held the expectation that the introduction of birthright citizenship may have also had
a positive effect on the efficiency of interactions between immigrant children and their
native peers in social dilemma situations. We test this hypothesis among the first co-
hort of immigrant children affected by the reform, more than 15 years after it took effect.
With regard to empirics, the reform provides us with a birth date eligibility cut-off, which
serves as our source of exogenous variation.
We present four main sets of results. First, we document an asymmetric pattern of
trust and discrimination therein: immigrant children (i.e., those with foreign parents)
show a high willingness to trust those with whom they share a migration background,
which, however, does not extend to natives (i.e. children with German parents). For
example, one of our results shows that immigrant children transfer (on average) 60%
of their initial endowments to other immigrants, while their transfers to native German
children are 13% lower. Native children, by contrast, are much less inclined to condition
their trust decisions on the identity of their opponents: they transfer 58% of their initial
endowment to other natives, but their out-group investments to immigrants are only 2%
lower. Looking at these results in terms of propensities to discriminate, they imply that
roughly one in three immigrant children can be classified as strong discriminators (in-
group investment/out-group investment>1.25), while the corresponding share for native
children is only half as large. The data also reveal that immigrant girls discriminate
more against natives than immigrant boys. Native girls, by contrast, show no signs of
discrimination against immigrants, while native boys discriminate moderately.
Second, we seek to provide an explanation for the observed patterns of trust dis-
crimination. We first check for statistical discrimination in our experiment. The idea
is that the discriminatory trust decisions of children with migrational backgrounds can
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be considered as statistically rational if they receive lower back transfers from native
children than from other immigrants. Our results show this not to be the case. We
next check for discrimination based on wrong stereotypes. After the first stage of the
trust game, we asked participants to indicate their expectations about the back payments
of the six possible receiver types. Looking at these expectation data, we find that im-
migrant children expect natives to show a higher willingness to reciprocate than their
own peers, suggesting that their discriminatory trust decisions are not due to mistaken
stereotypes. This then points to preference-based discrimination—that is, different trust
norms for in-groups and out-groups—as the likely explanation for immigrants’ differential
trust decisions. We furthermore show that immigrants’ discriminatory actions impose a
pecuniary externality on native children and involve monetary losses for themselves. This
provides an analogy to economic models of identity, in which the behavior of individuals
adopting oppositional identities can be “anti-social” and “self-destructive”. We therefore
interpret our results as reflecting an oppositional culture of trust.
Third, we recognize that frictions in social interactions might be related to how cul-
turally distant or proximate different social groups are. In our data, we detect a strong
correlation between religious background and the extent to which different immigrant
groups discriminate against natives: we observe above-average levels of trust discrimina-
tion for immigrant groups with Muslim backgrounds and below-average levels of trust
discrimination for immigrant groups that share with the native majority a Christian
religious background. In fact, the most-pronounced above-average discriminatory trust
choices are made by immigrant children of Turkish origin—the by far largest minority of
youths in Germany and almost exclusively of Muslim background.
As our main contribution, we finally turn to the question of whether governments
can use citizenship law to create and nurture mutual trust between immigrants and
natives. As mentioned above, the introduction of birthright citizenship in Germany
provides us with a birth date eligibility cut-off determining whether children born to
foreign nationals were automatically granted the German nationality at birth or not. This
birth date cut-off serves as our source of identification. In particular, we use a difference-
in-differences design which not only compares the experimental choices of immigrant
children born shortly before and shortly after the cut-off date, but also draws upon
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native German children—who were unaffected by the birth date cut-off—as a control
group. Our main finding is that the policy substantially reduced the degree of trust
discrimination among male, but not among female, immigrants. We furthermore show
that this effect is particularly pronounced for immigrant children of Turkish origin, i.e.,
the largest group of immigrant youth in Germany. Several robustness checks corroborate
this result. Last, we provide evidence suggesting that the main channel for this effect is
an improved educational integration of immigrant males.
To date, there is an impressive body of experimental research on discrimination in
economics and psychology (for an insightful review up until the mid-2000s, see Anderson
et al. (2006)). Notably, many of these studies induce group membership in the laboratory.
In contrast, we deliberately ran a lab-in-the-field experiment with immigrant and non-
immigrant children, and allowed participants to condition their choices on the migration
background of possible opponents. To our knowledge, this type of design was originally
implemented by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) to study trust and discrimination in the
segmented Israeli society. In another study closely related to our own, Falk and Zehnder
(2013) conducted a trust game experiment in the city of Zurich, in which first movers
could condition their investments on the residential districts of second movers.
Our study adds several unique aspects to the existing literature. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to combine a large-scale artefactual field experiment with
a natural policy experiment. Delivering such a connection and determining the causal
effect of a particular integration policy on experimentally-elicited discriminatory behavior
is one of our key contributions. A second unique aspect of our study is that we provide
experimental data for a large, non-selected sample of adolescents. In particular, we have
avoided selection effects in the artefactual field experiment by conducting it during regular
school hours in the last year of compulsory schooling. For the 57 participating schools,
our sample comprises almost the universe of all adolescents in a particular age cohort.
In terms of policy implications, we believe that our results suggest a need to rethink
conventional wisdom about migrant integration. Discrimination and prejudice against
immigrants is an issue that figures prominently in many public and scholarly debates.
This largely ignores the oppositional culture of trust that we have identified, i.e, that
immigrants’ trust appears, to an extent, confined to those with whom they share a
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migration background. The consequences of this include potentially large reductions
in social welfare, especially if one recognizes that greater trust and cooperativeness in
a society is like a public good. On the positive side, the oppositional trust choices of
immigrant children are not set in stone. In particular, immigrant children who—through
the introduction of birthright citizenship—were raised to the same legal status as their
native counterparts appear to have extended their innate sense of trust to their native
peers. Thus, an important takeaway message is that governments can modify and nurture
social values, in our case resulting in greater trust between strongly segmented social
groups.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes our exper-
imental design and provides descriptive statistics from our survey. Section 4.3 presents
results, and Section 4.4 contains our conclusions.
4.2 Experiment and Survey
Our experiment took place between June and November 2015, and was conducted in 219
classes (=sessions) of 57 German schools during regular school hours. At the time of the
experiment, all participants were in their final year of compulsory schooling.
4.2.1 Setting, Subject Pool, and Sample Description
The experiment was run in two German federal states, each characterized by an inde-
pendent education system: Schleswig-Holstein (SH), where the duration of compulsory
schooling is 9 years; and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), where compulsory education
lasts for 10 years. In both federal states, a school year starts in August/September and
ends in June/July. There were two waves of data collection. In the first wave lasting from
June 2 to July 16, our target population were all 9th graders of 31 schools (spread over
122 classes) in six cities of SH.32 In the second wave lasting from October 19 to Novem-
ber 16, we targeted all 10th graders of 26 schools (spread over 97 classes) in two cities
of NRW.33 Our chosen target populations allow us to focus on a school cohort comprised
32The cities are Flensburg, Kiel, Lübeck, Neumünster, Elmshorn, and Pinneberg, with population
sizes ranging from 42,266 in Pinneberg to 246,306 in Kiel.
33The cities are Duisburg and Wuppertal, with population sizes of 491,231 and 350,046, respectively.
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of children mainly born in 1999 and 2000—thus 15 to 16 years of age at the time of the
experiment. This, in turn, will allow to study a major German citizenship reform, which
took affect on January 1, 2000 and saw the introduction of birthright citizenship.
In both SH and NRW, we sought approval for our study by submitting the design
and a list of target schools to the respective ministries of education. Both ministries
approved the study and encouraged the principals of the targeted schools to participate
in it. Upon this, we contacted the principals themselves and asked for formal permission
to conduct the experiment and survey in all classes of grade 9 in SH and in all classes of
grade 10 in NRW, respectively. The participating schools belong two five school types: 10
schools are secondary general schools (“Hauptschule”); 8 are intermediate schools (“Re-
alschule”); 29 are comprehensive schools without the final years of grammar school-type
education (“Gesamtschule ohne gymnasialer Oberstufe”); 8 are comprehensive schools
with the final years of grammar school-type education (“Gesamtschule mit gymnasialer
Oberstufe”); and 2 are grammar schools (“Gymnasium”). Two weeks prior to the study,
school principals informed parents about the study, who were given an opt-out option,
i.e., they could proscribe their children’s participation. Moreover, immediately before
the experiment started, all students present in class were informed by us that partici-
pation is voluntary. The experiment was run at the schoolclass-level during two regular
consecutive school hours.34
At the day of the experiment, a total of 4,634 students were present in the 219 classes.
Parents made use of the opt-out option for 44 of them (less than 1%), while 154 students
(3.5%) chose to opt out themselves. Thus, 4,436 students participated in the study.
Of those, 133 participants did not fully complete the experimental task, while 226 did
not provide the survey information necessary for our basic analysis (i.e., on own gender
and/or parental migration background). This leaves us with a baseline sample of 4,077
students.
Each of our 219 sessions was either preceded or succeeded by a 45-minute slot in
which we administered an extensive socioeconomic survey to the participants. The survey
includes a total of 55 questions, and provides information, inter alia, about participants’
personal background, school achievements, aspirations, preferences and interests, and
34A school hour in Germany lasts 45 minutes.
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family background. Key participant variables include date of birth, place of birth, and
gender. Two key family background variables are the birth places of both parents, which
we use to categorize participants into three groups: (i) native children, whose parents
are both German-born; (ii) immigrant children, whose parents are both foreign-born;
and (iii) mixed-background children, who have one German-born and one foreign-born
parent. Overall, our sample comprises 2,201 native children (54%), 1,218 immigrant
children (30%) and 658 mixed-background children (16%). Roughly 77% of all immigrant
children in our sample are German-born (i.e., second-generation immigrants), while 23%
are foreign-born (i.e. first-generation immigrants).
Through the bulk of our analysis we will focus on native and immigrant children, while
discussing results for mixed-background children only in passing. Thus, the now following
sample description will be confined to the former two groups (for details, see Appendix
Table D.1). In Germany, the by far largest minority of youths are immigrant children of
Turkish origin. This is also evident in our sample. Specifically, 38% of immigrant children
have parents who are Turkey-born, 14% have Middle-Eastern or African backgrounds,
12% have parents born in a post-Soviet country, 11% have parents from a Balkan country,
10% have Eastern European backgrounds, and 14% stem from other countries. A com-
parison of native and immigrant children suggests several marked differences, of which
we mention four. First, roughly one-third of immigrant children have parents with low
educational attainment, while the corresponding share for native children is just under
one-fourth.35 Second, immigrant children are more likely than non-immigrant children to
live in two-parent households (74% vs. 55%). Third, the majority of native children re-
port a Christian (i.e., Catholic or Protestant) religious affiliation (67%), while the group
of immigrants is predominantly made up of Muslim children (59%). Finally, we observe
a low degree of language assimilation in migrant families, with 69% of immigrant chil-
dren reporting that they speak a language other than German with their parents. We
interpret this evidence as reflecting the pronounced cultural, social and economic gaps
between native and immigrant children that we also observe in representative surveys of
German households.
35As Appendix Table D.1 also shows, a relatively large portion of immigrant children report that they
don’t know their parents’ educational attainment.
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4.2.2 The Trust Game
Our experiment is a modified version of the standard trust game (Berg et al., 1995), which
consists of two players called the first-mover (sender) and the second-mover (receiver).
We endowed all players with five euros at the beginning of the game. The first-mover
decides whether to send any money to the second-mover, and if so, how much. The
transferred amount of money (x) is then tripled by the experimenter. The second-mover
is informed about the first-mover’s decision and the transferred amount (3x) and can
then decide whether to send back any amount y ∈ [0, 5+3x] to the first-mover. The final
payoff for the first-mover is 5− x+ y, and for the second-mover it is 5 + 3x− y.
In our trust experiment, we employed the strategy method, i.e., each participant had
to play the trust game both as first-mover and as second-mover. Moreover, and most
importantly for the purpose of this paper, we allowed first-movers to condition their
investment decisions on the gender and migration background of possible interaction
partners. We implemented this by letting first-movers decide whether, and if so, how
much to transfer to six possible receiver types (indexed by k): a boy with German-born
parents (S1), a girl with German-born parents (S2), a boy with foreign-born parents (S3),
a girl with foreign-born parents (S4), a naturalized boy with foreign-born parents (S5),
and a naturalized girl with foreign-born parents (S6). In principal, this setup allows us to
understand the extend to which trust is dependent on opponents’ migration background
as well as gender. However, the main task that this paper sets itself is to trace whether
there is trust discrimination based on migration background. To achieve it in the simplest
possible way, we will largely abstract away from trust conditional on gender, apart from
sporadic remarks when deemed necessary. Thus, we collapse the six choices {S1, ..., S6}
into two variables: a participant’s average investment to natives (SN) and his or her
average investment to immigrants (SI), defined as
SN =
1
2
2∑
k=1
Sk and SI =
1
4
6∑
k=3
Sk.
36
36It should be noted that receiver types k ∈ {3, 4} capture immigrants generally (i.e., boys and girls
with foreign-born parents), while receiver types k ∈ {5, 6} only the subset of naturalized immigrants (i.e.,
naturalized boys and girls with foreign-born parents). The reason why we have allowed for this distinction
will become clear in Section 4.3.4, where we examine the effects of the German citizenship reform. For
our main results, we have chosen not to drop any data and hence compute SI by averaging of their
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Throughout the paper, we will refer to SN as native children’s in-group investments and
as immigrant children’s out-group investments, respectively. Likewise, we will refer to SI
as native children’s out-group investments and immigrant children’s in-group investment,
respectively. Our main outcome measure of interest, which we shall call trust discrimi-
nation (see, e.g., Falk and Zehnder, 2013), is the in-group/out-group investment gap of
children with and without migrational backgrounds. Formally, it is defined as
TD =

SN − SI for native children;
SI − SN for immigrant children.
After participants had completed the investment stage of the trust game, they were
asked to indicate on their decision sheet the expected back payment from the six possible
interaction partners.
At the final stage of the trust game, participants were asked to play the role of second-
movers, and we employed the contingent response method to elicit their back payments.
For example, on a first decisions sheet, participants were asked to decide on their back
transfers to a boy with German-born parents. Specifically, for each of the eleven possible
investments of the first-mover (i.e., a boy with German-born parents), the second-mover
had to decide whether and how much to send back. Using the same strategy vector
variant, we elicited back payments to the other five potential interaction partners.
4.2.2.1 Implementation
The experiment was conducted as a paper-and-pen experiment. It lasted approximately
one school hour (45 minutes). We ensured anonymity by assigning a unique identity code
to each participant. Before the experiment started, the instructions were distributed to
all students in class and read out by an experimenter.37 To guarantee privacy, we installed
investments to receiver types k ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}. That said, our results do not hinge on this specifications
and we will present robustness checks where we compute SI by averaging over participants’ investments
to receiver types k ∈ {3, 4}, i.e., by letting SI = 12 (S3 + S4).37The German instructions can be found in Appendix C. All the study sessions were run by either
one of the authors or a student assistant, who was prior trained by the authors. The experiments were
conducted by one leading conductor and one or two assistants. We randomized the sequence of survey
and experiment on a daily basis in order to avoid any potential bias stemming from that sequence.
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mobile privacy screens between students.38 Students were informed that they would first
play the trust game as first-movers and thereafter as a second-mover. They were told
that they can earn real money and that their payoffs would depend on their own choices
and those of another, randomly assigned experiment participant from a different school.39
The average payoff in the experiment was 7.26e. Participants received their payoffs no
later than two weeks after the experiment took place (in envelopes with their identity
codes, distributed by school secretaries or head teachers), which was know to them at
the beginning of the experiment. All participants faced exactly the same decision tasks,
instructions, and payoffs.
4.3 Results
The material in this section is divided into two main parts. The first (Sections 4.3.1 to
4.3.3) analyses how children with and without migrational backgrounds interact in our
trust game, while the second (Section 4.3.4) connects the artefactual field experiment
with the natural citizenship experiment.
4.3.1 General Patterns of Trust and Reciprocity
We begin with a brief description of general patterns of trust and reciprocity in our
experiment. Panel (a) in Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of all investment decisions in the
experiment. On average, first movers invest 2,85e or 57% of their initial endowment.
The two most frequent investment choices are transfers of respectively 50 and 100% of the
initial endowment. These investment patterns are comparable to what has been observed
in laboratory experiments.
38See picture C.1 in Appendix C.
39To be precise, participants were informed that we would calculate final payoffs as follows: (i) we
randomly match two participants from two different schools; (ii) we randomly assign the roles of first-
and second-mover; (iii) we determine the true type k of both the first- and second-mover based on survey
information on own gender and whether parents are German-born or foreign-born; (iv) we implement
the first-mover’s decision for the true type of the second-mover; (v) we implement the second-movers
back payment for the true type of the first-mover and his or her choice implemented in step (iv); and
(vi) based on the pair of choices implemented in steps (iv) and (v), we calculate the participants’ final
payoffs.
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Figure 4.1: Trust, reciprocity and expectations
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Notes: Panel (a) shows a histogram of all investment decisions in the experiment. Since we used the
strategy method to collect the decisions, each subject made 6 investment decisions, one for each of
the possible groups of the second movers. All these decisions are included in the data underlying this
figure. Panel (b) shows actual and expected second-mover back transfers. Red bars show averages of
second mover transfers for each possible first mover investment. Note that each second mover indicated
a transfer decision for each possible first mover investment. The data underlying this figure thus contains
eleven decisions per second mover. Blue bars show means of expected back transfers conditional on own
first mover investments.
Panel (b) in Figure 4.1 shows (i) averages of second mover back transfers for each
possible first mover investment and (ii) average expected back transfers conditional on
own first-mover investment. It is apparent that second movers show reciprocal behavior:
the higher first mover investments, the higher are back transfers. The degree of reciprocity
appears to be quite high. For example, second movers are willing to send back about
4.50e if they receive 2.50e , which almost equalizes final payments. Over the whole range
of investments, the ratio of pay backs to investments estimated from an OLS-regression
is 1.42.
Finally, Panel (b) also reveals that, on average, the level of actual back transfers
matches first-movers’ expectations about back transfers almost one-to-one, especially for
intermediate investments.
4.3.2 Who Discriminates against Whom?
We now examine the prevalence of trust discrimination among children with and without
migrational backgrounds. For the main part of the analysis, we restrict our sample to
native German children (i.e., both parents German-born) and their immigrant peers (i.e.,
110
Citizenship, Identity, and Trust
both parents foreign-born). At the end of the section, we briefly discuss the experimental
choices of children with one native and one foreign-born parent.
4.3.2.1 Trust Decisions
The first question we focus on is whether the migration background of game partners af-
fects the trust decisions of first movers. To that end, we first exploit for each participant
the average investment to natives (SN) and immigrants (SI), respectively. Figure 4.2
illustrates the group-conditioned investment decisions of native and immigrant children,
both for the entire sample and separately by gender. There are several interesting take-
away messages here. First, for native German children, the evidence speaks against a
strong pattern of mistrust toward immigrant children. In the full sample, natives’ in-
group investments exceed their out-group investments by a statistically significant 2.1%
(SN = 2.90, SI = 2.84; paired t-test with p < 0.00). Looking at this result separately
by gender, we observe that there is no in-group/out-group variation in the trust deci-
sions of immigrant girls (SN = 2.70, SI = 2.72). Native boys, by contrast, reveal a
moderate degree of trust discrimination: their in-group investments exceed their out-
group investments by a statistically significant 4.8% (SN = 3.08, SI = 2.94; p < 0.00).
Second, among immigrant children, we detect a strong mistrust toward natives which
manifests itself in a statistically significant in-group/out-group investment gap of 13.4
percent (SI = 2.97, SN = 2.62, p < 0.00). The subgroup results by gender suggest that
this investment gap is more pronounced for immigrant girls (16.1%; p < 0.00) than for
immigrant boys (10.1%; p < 0.00).40
40In Figure E.1 we show how the migration background and gender of game partners affects the
trust decisions of first movers. A general finding is that first movers investment more of their initial
endowment when the second mover is a girl rather than a boy. Moreover, this result does not depend
on the migration background of first movers and that of their game partners. Specifically, both children
with and without migration backgrounds appear to positively and in almost equal measure discriminate
between native girls and native boys and immigrant girls and immigrant boys, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Investments of native and immigrant children
by migration background of second movers
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In Figure 4.3, we look at trust decisions in terms of propensities to discriminate be-
tween in-group and out-group opponents. To do so, we classify participants as discrim-
inators (respectively, strong discriminators) if their in-group investments exceed their
out-group investments by 10% or more (respectively, 25% or more). The results are quite
striking. Panel (a) suggests that about one in five native German children make discrim-
inatory trust decisions (21.6%), while the corresponding share is almost twice as large for
immigrant children (39.7%). A two-sample t-test reveals that the difference is significant
(p < .00). Next, it is interesting to point toward the apparent gender-specific patterns of
trust discrimination: the immigrant-native gap in the propensity to discriminate is more
pronounced among girls (41.7 v/s 17.7%) than among boys (37.1 v/s 24.9%)—a result
mainly driven by the fact that native girls display a fairly low propensity to discriminate.
Panel (b) illustrates the incidence of strong discrimination. It can been seen that roughly
one in three immigrant children (31.6%) strongly discriminate against second movers of
German origin. By contrast, the share of strong discriminators among native children is
only half as large (15.7%).
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Figure 4.3: Proportions of (strong) discriminators
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We now turn attention to our main dependent variable of interest: trust discrimina-
tion (TD), which is defined for each first mover as the difference between average in-group
investment and average out-group investment. Compared to the propensities to discrim-
inate discussed above, this variable thus captures the full variation in discriminatory
behavior. Consider the following simple regression model:
TD = α0 + α1Migrant+ ε. (4.1)
In this specification, the omitted category are native children, i.e., those whose parents
are both German-born. Migrant is a binary variable indicating whether a child has
parents who are both foreign-born. Standard errors are clustered by school programme
and location.
Figure 4.4 presents unconditional OLS estimates of equation (4.1). The key message
here is that the pattern of trust discrimination that we identified above is statistically
highly significant. In the full sample (labeled “All” on the x-axis), the mean of trust
discrimination is 0.07e for native children, while for immigrants it is a statistically sig-
nificant 0.28e higher. Among boys, the in-group/out-group investment gap for natives
mounts to 0.14e, while for their immigrant peers it is exactly twice as high, with the
difference being significant at the 1% level. For native girls, the mean of trust discrimi-
nation is both quantitatively and statistically indistinguishable from zero (-0.02e), while
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the average level of trust discrimination for immigrant girls is a statistically significant
0.42e higher.
Figure 4.4: Trust discrimination
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Notes: Unconditional OLS estimates of Equation (1). Standard errors clustered by
school programme and location. Whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. In
square brackets, we report means of average in-group investments (first entry) and
average out-group investments (second entry), respectively. Sample Sizes: 3,419
(All); 1,789 (Boys); 1,630 (Girls).
4.3.2.2 Which Types of Discrimination Can Explain Observed Behavior?
After discussing who discriminates against whom, we now examine which types of dis-
crimination can explain the in-group/out-group patterns we identified in the trust game.
In particular, we first exploit children’s second mover decisions to determine whether
there is statistical discrimination. Second, to shed light on the role of discrimination
based on stereotypes, we ask whether children’s trust decisions vis-a-vis players of differ-
ent migrational backgrounds are mirrored in differential expectations of reciprocity. To
economize on space, we provide an in-depth discussion of our results in Appendix A and
summarize the main findings here.
Immigrant Children.—In their seminal paper on trust in the segmented Israeli society,
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) pointed out that ethnic trust discrimination may be ratio-
nal when a comparison of different ethnic groups reveals systematic statistical differences
with respect to reciprocal behavior. In a similar vein, in our study, the discriminatory
trust decisions of children with migrational backgrounds could be considered as justified
on statistical grounds if they receive lower back transfers from native children than from
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other immigrants. We find this not to be the case. In particular, the average (of the
11 contingent) back transfers of native children to immigrant first mover types (4.43e)
are almost identical to the average back transfers of immigrant children to immigrant
first mover types (4.47e), with the difference being statistically indistinguishable from
zero and the pattern not being dependent on the gender of immigrant first movers (see
Appendix Figures F.1 and F.2). We conclude, therefore, that the discriminatory trust
decisions of immigrants are not a reflection of statistical discrimination.
Although immigrant children do not receive lower back transfers from natives than
from immigrants, they may have the wrong perception that they do. If this were the case,
the trust decisions of immigrants vis-a-vis natives could be interpreted as discrimination
based on wrong stereotypes. In our experiment, first movers indicated on their decision
sheet the expected back transfer from the six possible receiver types. We find that,
conditional on own investments as first movers, immigrant children do not systematically
expect that they will receive lower back payments from native than from immigrant
receiver types. This result holds for both immigrant boys and girls (see Appendix Figures
F.3 and F.4). We therefore conclude that discrimination based on wrong stereotypes does
not drive the differential trust decisions of immigrants. Since our results on repayment
behavior also speak against statistical discrimination, this points to preference-based
discrimination—that is, different trust norms for in-groups and out-groups—as the likely
explanation for immigrants’ differential trust decisions. In terms of social efficiency,
immigrants’ discriminatory actions impose a pecuniary externality on native children
and involve monetary losses for themselves (see Appendix Table F.1). This then provides
a link to economic models of identity, in which the equilibrium choices of individuals
adopting oppositional identities can be “anti-social” and “self-destructive”. We therefore
view the discriminatory trust decisions of immigrants as reflecting an oppositional culture
of trust.
Native Children.—Applying the same analysis to children without migrational back-
ground, we find that the average (of the 11 contingent) back transfers of native children to
native first mover types (4.51e) exceed the average back transfers of immigrant children
to native first mover types (4.31e) by a statistically significant 4.6%. This result applies
equally if we consider the average back transfers of native and immigrant children to
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native boys and girls, respectively (see Appendix Figures F.1 and F.2). Thus, a possible
interpretation is that the first mover in-group/out-group investment gap of 4.8% among
native boys (see Figure 4.2 above) reflects discrimination against immigrants on statisti-
cal grounds. An analysis of our expectations data supports this interpretation, showing
that native boys have the (correct) expectation that they will receive higher back trans-
fers from native than from immigrant children (see Appendix Figure F.4). The final open
question then relates to the trust decisions of native girls: although they receive lower
back transfers from immigrants than from natives, they do not discriminate against im-
migrants as first movers. Our expectations data suggest that this could be due to wrong,
positive stereotypes whereby they misjudge the behavior of immigrants as second movers.
In particular, native girls do not reveal a substantial expectation differential with respect
to back transfers from immigrants and natives, respectively.
4.3.3 Do Different Immigrant Groups Discriminate the Same
Way?
Intuition would suggest that immigrant children’s discriminatory trust decisions are re-
lated to how culturally distant or proximate they are to their native peers. In the Ger-
man context, religion is one potentially important marker of cultural similarity between
children with and without migrational backgrounds, with different immigrant groups
displaying a high degree of heterogeneity in this respect.
We now once more run Equation (1), but with the variable Migrant replaced by
dummy variables for six mutually exclusive groups of immigrant children with varying
religious backgrounds. The first group (Turkey; 461 observations) comprises immigrant
children of Turkish origin—the by far largest minority of youths in Germany. In the sec-
ond group (Middle East & Africa; 280 observations) we pool together immigrant children
with Middle-Eastern and African backgrounds. The third group (Balkan, 137 observa-
tions) is made up of second-generation immigrant children whose parents come from a
Balkan country. The fourth group contains immigrant children with an Eastern European
background (Eastern Europe; 130 observations), while the fourth group is made up of
immigrant children whose parents come from a post-Soviet-country (Post-Soviet; 130 ob-
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servations). The final, miscellaneous group (Other Countries, 176 observations) contains
all other immigrant children. The first three immigrant groups share the characteristic
that they are predominantly made up of children with a Muslim background (Turkey:
92%, Middle East & Africa: 75%, Balkan: 68%). By contrast, the religious background of
immigrant children with an Eastern European or post-Soviet background—with shares
of Christians of 84% and 61%, respectively—is comparable to that of native German
children (67%). The final group comprises immigrant children with mixed religious back-
grounds (share of Muslims: 39%, share of Christians: 31%).
Figure 4.5 shows that the most pronounced above-average discriminatory trust de-
cisions are made by immigrant children of Turkish origin. In particular, while the in-
group/out-group investment gap for German native children amounts to 0.07e (Boys:
0.14e; Girls: -0.02e), it is 0.37e (Boys: 0.24e; Girls: 0.50e) higher for children with
Turkish-born parents. The second group of immigrants that displays an above-average
level of trust discrimination are children with Middle Eastern and African backgrounds.
By contrast, immigrant children whose parents come from Eastern European and Post-
Soviet countries reveal a below-average level of trust discrimination. Noticeable in this
respect is that the in-group/out-group investment gap of boys in these two immigrant
groups is identical or even lower than that of German native boys. F-tests on equality of
coefficients on the dummies Turkey and Eastern European reject equality at p-values of
0.006 (full sample), 0.02 (boys) and 0.11 (girls). A comparison of the coefficients on the
dummies Turkey and Post-Soviet yields a qualitatively similar conclusion.
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Figure 4.5: Trust discrimination, by ethnic background
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Notes: Unconditional OLS estimates of Equation (1), with Migrant replaced by 6 dummy
variables indicating whether a child’s mother was born in Turkey, an Eastern European or
post-Soviet country, a Balkan country, a country of the Middle East, an African country, or a
country other than those. Standard errors clustered by school programme and location. The
omitted category are native German children. Estimates of the constant (=trust discrimination
among native children; non-reported) correspond to those reported in Figure 4.4 (All: 0.07,
Boys: 0.14, Girls: -0.02). Whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval. Sample Sizes: 3,419
(All); 1,789 (Boys); 1,630 (Girls).
Two final points should be made about the analysis so far. First, we have focused
on comparing the experimental choices of children with and without migrational back-
grounds, but have been silent on the behavior of children with mixed-backgrounds (658
observations). Appendix Figure G.1 reveals that mixed-background children also dis-
criminate in favor of immigrants and against natives (SI = 2.88; SN = 2.69; gap 7.1%;
p < .00), but to a lesser extent than immigrant children and with less pronounced gender
differences. Second, in discussing the choices of children with migrational backgrounds,
we have made no distinction between first-generation (i.e., foreign-born) and second-
generation (i.e., German-born) immigrant children. Our empirical strategy in the next
section requires us to narrow our sample to second-generation immigrant children. Ap-
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pendix Figure G.3 shows that the extent of discrimination that we identified in the trust
game does not differ markedly between first- and second-generation immigrant children.
4.3.4 Birthright Citizenship and Trust Discrimination
This section turns to the final question posed at the outset: can governments of immigrant-
receiving countries influence the interface between trust and social identity through inte-
gration measures? We address this question by analyzing how one important instrument
of integration policy—that is, access to the host-country nationality—affects children’s
experimentally-elicited trust decisions.
4.3.4.1 Pathways to Citizenship for Immigrant Children: Jus Soli vs. Jus
Sanguinis
The path to citizenship for immigrant children varies considerably across immigrant-
receiving countries. In the United States, any person born on the nation’s territory
automatically gains U.S. citizenship, regardless of the nationality or immigration status
of the person’s parents. This rule based on jus soli (“right of soil”) has been in place since
the 19th century and is commonly referred to as birthright citizenship. By contrast, many
countries in Europe have historically granted citizenship at birth based upon the principle
of jus sanguinis (“right of blood”), meaning that citizenship is inherited through parents
rather than determined by the place of birth. For children born to foreign nationals,
this rule implies that citizenship can only be acquired through naturalization (i.e., upon
application) later in life. Not surprisingly, in countries which have jus soli virtually all
native-born children of immigrants have the host-country nationality, while the lowest
percentages of children of immigrants with host-country nationality are found in countries
that adhere to jus sanguinis (OECD, 2011). The context of our study is Germany, a
country which has recently witnessed a switch from jus sanguinis to jus soli. This switch
provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of birthright citizenship on immigrant
children’s behavior.
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4.3.4.2 A Natural Experiment: The Introduction of Birthright Citizenship
in Germany
Throughout the 20th century, German citizenship could not be acquired through birth on
German territory but by descent from a German mother and/or a German father. With
the turn of the millennium, this principle of jus sanguinis was replaced by a conditional
version of jus soli. In particular, a child born to foreign parents after December 31, 1999
automatically acquired German nationality at birth if at that time one of its parents
had been living in Germany habitually and legally for at least eight years and had per-
manent residency rights. Official German citizenship data show that among the 91,273
children born to foreign nationals in Germany in the year 2000, 41,257 were automati-
cally granted citizenship at birth (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2012). This
suggests that roughly 45% of all immigrant children born in the first post-policy year
were eligible for automatic birthright citizenship. For immigrant children with parents of
Turkish origin—the by far largest minority in Germany—the share of eligible immigrant
children amounted to 78%. In contrast, children born before January 1, 2000 could only
become German citizens later in life if at least one of the parents chose to naturalize him
or herself.41 This setting allows for an analysis of the effects of a policy change from
restricted citizenship for immigrant children (i.e., the old jus sanguinis) to automatic
birthright citizenship (i.e., the new jus soli).
4.3.4.3 Possible Effects of Birthright Citizenship
There are (at least) two channels through which the introduction of birthright citizenship
could have influenced the discrimination that we identified in the trust game. The first is
what we shall call social identity change. The acquisition of host-country nationality en-
titles immigrants to full citizen rights in spheres such as politics, employment, welfare or
health care, and is consequently seen by many as promoting their identification with the
host country. Thus, one might hypothesize that the reform reduced the social distance
between immigrants and their native peers, which in turn may have affected immigrants’
discriminatory trust decisions in two ways: directly by influencing the degree to which
41Briefly describe transition rule here; state that the reform did not increase parents willingness to
naturalize; refer to our previous paper.
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they themselves differentiate between in-groupers and out-groupers; and indirectly, if im-
migrant children are treated differentially by their native peers based on their citizenship
status. A second candidate channel to consider is educational integration. As discussed
earlier, immigrant children in Germany are lagging behind in school performance when
compared to their native counterparts. In the previous Chapter 3 a subset of us argued
that the introduction of birthright citizenship in Germany increased the returns to edu-
cation for immigrants,42 and found indeed evidence for a positive human capital effect.
In particular, the policy caused immigrant parents to send their children to preschool
more often, to enroll them earlier in primary school, and to enable them access to the
academic track of secondary school. This reform effect has reduced the distance between
immigrant children and their native peers in the sphere of education, which might give
rise to a different degree of differentiation between in-groupers and out-groupers.
4.3.4.4 Empirical Strategy
We consider the introduction of birthright citizenship on January 1, 2000 as an exoge-
nously timed event that substantially facilitated access to host-country nationality for
immigrant children. To isolate the causal effect the reform had on immigrant children’s
behavior, we compare the experimental decisions of second-generation immigrant children
(i.e., German-born children with foreign-born parents) born before and after January 1,
2000. A potential concern with this comparison is that children born after the policy
change are always younger than those born before. Moreover, it is possible that season
of birth effects influence the composition of parents over the year. If age or season of
birth has an impact on immigrant children’s behavior, any potential reform effect will
be biased. To net out these potential biases, we therefore construct a second difference
between pre-policy and post-policy native German children (i.e., German-born children
with German-born parents) to estimate a difference-in-difference (DiD) effect of birthright
citizenship on experimentally-elicited behavior.
42There are several reasons for this. For example, citizenship improves immigrant children’s future
professional opportunities by enabling them access to employment in the public sector. Moreover, em-
ployers frequently face lower administrative costs if they wish to employ a naturalized person rather
than a foreigner. Naturalization might also function as a signaling device for the employer for better
integration, which in turn may influence immigrants’ bargaining power. Last, it is conceivable that
discrimination reduces degree of discrimination against children with a migration background from the
side of the teachers.
121
Citizenship, Identity, and Trust
In our DiD approach, it is important to ensure that immigrant parents could not
self-select into treatment. Since our source of identification is a birth date cut-off, the
main concern is strategic fertility behavior. We address this issue in two ways. First, we
restrict our sample to children born in the ±4-month window around January 1, 2000.
This ensures that our sample only comprises children who were conceived before July
1999, the month in which the German citizenship reform was ratified and announced.
The ±4-month window has the additional advantage that it maintains the comparability
of pre-policy and post-policy children with respect to educational progress. In particular,
it excludes pre-policy children who (i) had to repeat a grade or (ii) entered school after
their scheduled year of admission (i.e., “late school starters”).43 Moreover, it excludes
post-policy children who entered school prior to their scheduled year of admission (i.e.,
“early school starters”). Second, we implement a “donut” DiD that drops children born
in the ±2-week window around January 1, 2000. This avoids potential selection into
treatment through birth-date-manipulation by parents.
Data limitations do not allow us to restrict the sample to eligible children, namely
those born to foreign nationals who fulfilled the residency criterium (≥ 8 years) when the
reform came into effect.44 We instead restrict the treatment group to second-generation
immigrant children, i.e., those whose parents are both foreign-born. Thus, the DiD es-
timates capture the intention-to-treat effect (ITT) of access to the German nationality
at birth. This ITT effect is a lower bound of the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) since it is estimated on a sample which includes (i) pre-policy children who qual-
ified for citizenship at birth through jus sanguinis and (ii) post-policy children who were
ineligible for birthright citizenship due to their parents’ residency status.
Throughout this section, we use two samples: a broad sample (BS) in which the con-
trol group comprises native children and the treatment group is made up of all second-
generation immigrant children; and a narrow sample (NS) in which we restrict the treat-
ment group to second-generation immigrant children with a Turkish background. As
mentioned above, children with a Turkish background are the by far largest minority of
43In Germany, children usually enter school in June/July after turning six years old.
44Explain that our survey contains a question on parents’ length of residence in Germany, but that
this measure is prone to measurement errors. If results are ok, refer to a possible robustness checks that
narrows the sample towards eligibles.
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children in Germany, and we use them as a separate treatment group because they share
a homogeneous cultural background and were more strongly affected by the introduction
of birthright citizenship than the average immigrant child. In particular, for our two es-
timation samples, official German citizenship statistics (Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees, 2012) and data from the German Microcensus suggest the following treatment
intensities around the reform cut-off. In the broad estimation sample, roughly 45% of all
post-policy second-generation immigrant children were eligible for automatic birthright
citizenship, while 14% of all pre-policy second-generation immigrant children qualified
for citizenship at birth through jus sanguinis. In the subsample of second-generation im-
migrant children with a Turkish background, the treatment intensity was substantially
higher: 78% of all post-policy children where eligible for the new jus soli, while 14% of
pre-policy children qualified for citizenship at birth through jus sanguinis. Thus, we will
think of immigrant children with a Turkish background as a high-eligibility treatment
group.
Taken together, the reform had a substantial impact on whether immigrant children
possessed the German nationality from infancy onwards or not. However, it also had
longer-term consequences for children’s citizenship status which are still visible today:
in our survey, administered 15 years after the policy change, 88.7% of all post-policy
immigrant children in the broad sample report to possess the German citizenship, while
the corresponding share for pre-policy immigrant children is only 71.7%. For immigrant
children with a Turkish background, this difference still amounts to 33 percentage points
(pre-policy: 62.7%; post-policy: 94.6%).
The DiD model we estimate is:
TD =β0 + β1Migrant+ β2Born Post-Reform+ β3(Migrant× Born Post-Reform)
+ θBirth Month+ ξFamily+ ϑClassroom+ ε,
(4.2)
where TD is our experimental measure for trust discrimination. Migrant is a binary
variable indicating whether a child is a second-generation immigrant (=1) or a native
(=0). The parameter β1 captures differences between immigrant and native children born
prior to the policy change. Born Post-Reform is a binary assignment variable indicating
whether a child was born in the months just after January 1, 2000 (i.e., it is equal to one
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for children born between January and April 2000, and zero for children born between
September and December 1999). The coefficient β2 measures general differences between
children born before and after the birthright citizenship reform that could cause changes
in trust discrimination even in absence of a policy change. The ITT coefficient of interest,
β3, multiplies the interaction Migrant×Born post-reform, thus identifying all immigrant
children born after the policy change. To net out possible age and season of birth effects,
we include a set of Birth Month dummies in all regressions. In extended specifications,
we also include Family characteristics (i.e., maternal age, maternal education, family
structure), and Classroom characteristics (i.e., class size, proportion of students with
migration background, the gender ratio and five victimization measures45).
Our broad (respectively, narrow) estimation sample comprises 920 native German
children and 360 second-generation immigrant children (respectively, 158 immigrant chil-
dren with a Turkish background).46 In order to verify whether treatment was balanced on
observables, we present the mean values of key family and classroom characteristics for
native and immigrant children and for children born before and born after the birthright
citizenship reform in Appendix Tables H.1 and H.2. Importantly, the evidence shows
that there are no considerable, systematic differences between children born before and
after January 1, 2000. Among the 46 mean differences tests in both samples (see p-values
in the last column of Tables H.1 and H.2, respectively), only four mean differences are
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent significance level47. This supports the
notion that the German citizenship reform was an “as-good-as-random” event with no
systematic self-selection of particular types of immigrant families across the cut-off date.
4.3.4.5 Correlational Evidence
We first provide descriptive evidence on the behavior of second-generation immigrant chil-
dren born around the reform’s cut-off date. To do so, we restrict attention to immigrant
45These victimization measures capture the proportions of students who report having been victims,
in the past year, of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft and exclusion
46We exclude children with incomplete information on parental migrant status and those with missing
or inconsistent information about own country of birth.
47Two of the significant differences refer to mother’s age, a difference that is to be expected given the
nature of our reform threshold.
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children and estimate the following (unconditional) simple regression model:
TD = α0 + α1Born Post-Reform+ ε
The dependent variable of main interest is Trust Discrimination. The explanatory vari-
able Born Post-Reform is a binary variable indicating whether a child was born in the
months before (=0) or after (=1) January 1, 2000. The sample is restricted to a 8-month
window centered around this cut-off date and excludes children born in the 4-week win-
dow around it. Estimates of the parameter α0 thus capture the behavior of children born
pre-reform, while estimates of α1 show how the behavior of children born post-reform
differs from those born pre-reform.
Panel (a) of Figure 4.6 illustrates the results for second-generation immigrant children
from our broad sample, revealing interesting gender-specific patterns. Let us first con-
sider the behavior of boys: among pre-reform immigrant boys, investments to immigrants
(3.15e) exceed investments to natives (2.75e) by 0.40e or 15%. By contrast, among
post-reform immigrant boys, the level of trust discrimination is 0.13e and therefore a
statistically significant 68% or 0.27e lower, i.e., discriminating behavior almost vanishes
for boys affected by the introduction of birthright citizenship. Turning now to the behav-
ior of immigrant girls, it is interesting to observe that the birth date cut-off appears not
to matter at all: among pre-reform immigrant girls, investments to immigrants exceed
investments to natives by 0.42e or 17%, and this level of trust discrimination persists
for post-reform immigrant females.
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Figure 4.6: Trust discrimination among immigrants born around the cut-off date
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Notes: Sample comprises all immigrant children born between September 1999
and April 2000. 4-week donut around the cut-off. Standard errors clustered
by school programme and location. In square brackets, we report mean invest-
ments to immigrants (first entry) and mean investments to natives (second
entry), respectively. Whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Panel (b) of Figure 4.6 displays the point estimates for immigrant children with a
Turkish background from our narrow sample. On average, pre-reform Turkish boys send
3.18e to immigrants and 2.66e to natives, respectively. The difference of 0.52e corre-
sponds to a (raw) trust differential of nearly 20%. Strikingly, this differential decreases by
a statistically significant 0.54e for post-reform Turkish boys. Put differently, on average,
Turkish boys born under jus soli no longer discriminate between immigrants and natives
in the trust game. In stark contrast, and consistent with the findings in Panel (a), we do
not find evidence for a reduction in trust discrimination among immigrant Turkish girls.
In sum, the descriptive evidence in Figure 4.6 suggests that the introduction of jus soli
substantially reduced trust discrimination among immigrants and that this reduction is
an entirely male phenomenon.
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4.3.4.6 Causal Analysis
We now investigate whether the results presented so far can be given a causal interpreta-
tion. Table 4.1 presents estimates for several variants of equation (2), both for the broad
sample (columns (1)-(3)) and the narrow sample (columns (4)-(6)). In each Panel (A-C),
the estimated coefficients in the first row (βˆ1) capture differences in trust discrimination
between second-generation immigrant children and native children born prior to the pol-
icy change. The coefficient of interest is βˆ3, which identifies the intention-to-treat effect
of the citizenship reform on the extent of trust discrimination among immigrant children.
We start by discussing the results of regressions run for boys and girls together (see
Panel A). In column (1), we estimate Equation (2) for the broad sample and condition
only on gender and a full set of birth month fixed effects. For children born pre-policy,
the immigrant-native gap in trust discrimination amounts to 0.36e. The DiD estimate
of -0.103 suggests that the introduction of birthright citizenship reduced this difference
by about 29%, although the estimate is not statistically significant at conventional lev-
els. Columns (2) and (3) show the result to be robust to including controls for family
background and classroom characteristics, respectively. In Columns (4) to (6), we repeat
the exercise for the narrow sample. Since immigrant children with a Turkish background
were more strongly affected by the introduction of jus soli than the average immigrant
child, we would expect a more pronounced reform effect. This is confirmed by all three
specifications. For example, the DiD estimate of -0.254 from our preferred specification in
Column (6) suggests that the policy reduced the pre-reform immigrant-native difference
in trust discrimination (=0.497e) by 51%. Moreover, in all three specifications based on
the narrow sample, the reform effect gains statistical significance.
The remaining two panels of Table 4.1 break down the DiD estimates by gender.
Panel B presents the results for boys. Consider first the estimated coefficients for the
broad sample. Throughout all specifications, the reform effect turns out negative, large
in magnitude and statistically significant at 5% level. In our preferred specification [Col-
umn (3)], the immigrant-native gap in trust discrimination among boys born pre-policy
amounts to 0.281e, but the introduction of jus soli reduced this difference by 0.26e or
93%. In the narrow sample, this effect is even more pronounced and becomes statistically
significant at the 1% level. For example, the DiD estimates from our preferred specifi-
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cation [Column (6)] show a pre-reform immigrant-native gap in trust discrimination of
0.459e and a policy-induced reduction thereof of 0.565e. This suggests that the reform
induced Turkish boys to discriminate less between in- and out-groupers than their native
peers. In Panel C, where we repeat the analysis for immigrant girls, we find confirmation
for the correlational evidence presented above: the effect of birthright citizenship on trust
discrimination is an entirely male phenomenon. Specifically, both in the broad and the
narrow sample, and irrespective of the specification, the DiD coefficients for immigrant
girls are small in magnitude—both in absolute terms and relative to estimates of βˆ1—and
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Table 4.1: Birthright citizenship and trust discrimination: diff-in-diff analysis
Dependent Variable: Trust Discrimination
Broad Sample Narrow Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.360*** 0.343*** 0.337*** 0.505*** 0.494*** 0.497***
(0.084) (0.067) (0.054) (0.154) (0.138) (0.126)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) -0.103 -0.099 -0.106 -0.245** -0.244** -0.254**
(0.078) (0.073) (0.071) (0.085) (0.086) (0.089)
Observations 1,280 1,280 1,280 1,078 1,078 1,078
R-squared 0.038 0.048 0.056 0.045 0.054 0.060
Panel B: Boys
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.278** 0.314*** 0.281** 0.402** 0.460*** 0.459***
(0.109) (0.100) (0.112) (0.157) (0.153) (0.157)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) -0.261** -0.284** -0.260** -0.558*** -0.571*** -0.565***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.094) (0.157) (0.146) (0.150)
Observations 618 618 618 529 529 529
R-squared 0.017 0.049 0.062 0.026 0.056 0.070
Panel C: Girls
Pre-Reform Difference 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.418*** 0.589*** 0.610*** 0.586***
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.418*** 0.589*** 0.610*** 0.586***
(0.083) (0.085) (0.066) (0.176) (0.176) (0.156)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) 0.045 0.037 0.034 0.0128 -0.060 -0.056
(0.085) (0.095) (0.090) (0.143) (0.170) (0.172)
Observations 662 662 662 549 549 549
R-squared 0.086 0.107 0.118 0.104 0.134 0.142
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Pre-reform difference refers to the conditional pre-reform
difference in trust discrimination between treatment and control group. Standard errors clustered by
school programme and location and reported in parentheses; p-values reported in square brackets.
All specification in Panel A control for gender. Family characteristics include mothers’ age, dummy
variables for mothers’ education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure (five groups)
. Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students with migration background, the
gender ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having been
victims, in the past year, of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft and exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗)
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
Overall, we conclude that the introduction of birthright citizenship substantially re-
duced the degree of trust discrimination among immigrant boys, but had no measurable
impact on the behavior of immigrant girls. Moreover, we observe above-average reform
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effects for boys with a Turkish background, our high-eligibility treatment group for whom
we have documented an above-average level of trust discrimination.
4.3.4.7 Robustness
We now probe the robustness of our main findings, both in the broad and the narrow sam-
ple. All sensitivity checks, which are reported in Table C.1 and Table C.2, are conducted
for our preferred specification (see Table 4.1, columns (3) and (6), respectively).
For our first robustness check, we recalculate our main dependent variable, trust
discrimination (TD), by letting SN = 12(S1+S2) and SI =
1
2(S3+S4) (see our discussion
in Footnote 8). Columns (BS.1) and (NS.1) in Table C.1 show that the DiD estimates
based on this alternative outcome measure remain qualitatively unchanged compared to
benchmark results in Table 4.1.
In the next two robustness checks, we use the dichotomous outcome measures Dis-
criminator and Strong Discriminator as dependent variables [see Columns (BS.2) to
(NS.3)].48 In a nutshell, the results suggest that the citizenship reform substantially
reduced the share of (strong) discriminators among immigrant boys, especially in the
narrow sample. For example, in Column (NS.3) of Panel B, we observe that Turkish
boys born pre-policy are 20.4 percentage points more likely to be strong discriminators
than their native counterparts, but the statistically significant reform effect of -20.8 per-
centage points eliminates this difference completely. By contrast, both in the broad and in
the narrow sample, immigrant girls’ propensity to (strongly) discriminate was unaffected
by the introduction of jus soli.
In our DiD analysis, standard errors are clustered by school program and location,
and there is a total of 18 clusters. Since reliable inference is a concern when there are
few clusters (Donald and Lang, 2007; Cameron et al., 2008), our fourth robustness check
probes whether the results also hold using wilder cluster bootstrap t-procedures instead
of clustering standard errors.49 The estimates in Columns (BS.4) and (NS.4) show that
48Recall that we have defined participants as discriminator (respectively, strong discriminator) if
their in-group investment exceed their out-group investment by 10% (respectively, 25%) or more.
49We estimated the wild cluster bootstrap standard errors using 1000 replications under H1 as dis-
cussed in Cameron et al. (2008).
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the p-values obtained from this alternative bootstrap procedure support the levels of
statistical significance reported in Table 4.1.
The citizenship reform we study was ratified and announced in July 1999, but was
already openly discussed in the German parliament during the previous month. Thus,
our fifth robustness check provides DiD estimations with a narrower ±3-month window
around January 1, 2000.50 This additional restriction reduces the sample size by around
25%. Notwithstanding this, the results in Columns (BS.5) and (NS.5) show that the co-
efficients on the DiD interaction term remain largely unchanged compared to benchmark
estimates in Table 4.1, although they are somewhat less precisely estimated.
Our sixth and final robustness check involves placebo reform regressions. In particular,
we virtually shift the introduction of jus soli forward in time, assuming that it took effect
on November 1, 1999. Moreover, we exclude all children born on or after January 1,
2000 from our placebo sample. The results in Columns (BS.6) and (NS.6) show that
the coefficients on the DiD interaction term are close to zero (or even positive) and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. We conclude, therefore, that the immigrant-
native gap in trust discrimination did not converge in the pre-policy period.
4.3.5 Possible Explanations for the Reform Effect
In this section, we seek to provide possible explanations for the reform effect. In so doing,
we also address the question of why it is gender-specific.
4.3.5.1 Differential Treatment by Natives?
The reduction in trust discrimination due to jus soli could be interpreted as a rational
response by immigrant children if their native peers treat them differentially based on
their citizenship status. Recall that, in our design, opponent types k ∈ {3, 4} refer
to immigrants as a whole (i.e., boys and girls with foreign parents), while opponent
types k ∈ {5, 6} to the subset of naturalized immigrants (i.e., naturalized boys and girls
with foreign parents). In Figure 4.7, we analyze whether this distinction matters for
the behavior of native children. In brief, the evidence suggests that native children do
50In line with our main specification, we continue to exclude children born in the ±2-week time
window around the cut-off date
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not systematically treat immigrants differentially based on their citizenship status. For
example, in Panel (a), in which we illustrate the investment choices of native children as
first movers, we observe a small bias in favor of naturalized immigrants, but the depicted
investment gaps to immigrants as a whole hardly exceed 1%. In Panel (b), where we
look at the back transfers of native children as second movers, the citizenship status of
immigrant children appears not to matter at all. Finally, no gender-specific patterns
can be observed. Thus, based on these findings, we conclude that differential treatment
by natives is unlikely to be a main channel for the reform effect and its gender-specific
nature.
Figure 4.7: Investments and back transfers of native children by gender and citi-
zenship status of immigrant opponents
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4.3.5.2 Educational Integration?
Evidence suggests that having the host country’s citizenship has a positive impact on the
labour market outcomes of immigrants: it allows them to earn higher wages (Chiswick,
1978; Steinhardt, 2012), to find jobs more easily (Fougère and Safi, 2009; Gathmann and
Keller, 2017), and to steepen their wage-tenure profiles (Bratsberg et al., 2002). Thus, by
increasing the long-run rate of return to education, the introduction of jus soli in Germany
may have induced immigrant parents to invest more in their children’s human capital. If
this in turn decreases the degree of educational segmentation between immigrants and
natives, it may also affect inter-group interactions. Thus, as a first possible channel,
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we now examine whether the reform had an impact on immigrant children’s educational
integration.
Based on our survey, we compute two educational outcome measures. The first is
intended to capture children’s school performance. In the German school system, grades
vary discreetly from 1 (excellent) to 6 (insufficient), with grades below 3 being consid-
ered as achievements that exceed average requirements. In a first step, we calculate an
average test score based on participants’ self-reported grades in the subjects “German”
and “Mathematics”.51 From this, we create the indicator Above-Average Score which
equals one if a participant’s average test score is better than 3, and is zero otherwise.
The second outcome measure intends to capture parents’ involvement in their children’s
learning. Specifically, we create the indicator Parental Involvement which equals one if
a participant reports to receive parental support in homework, and is zero for those who
do not obtain such support. Both in the broad and in the narrow sample, roughly 40%
all children report above-average grades, while slightly more than 70% receive learning
support from their parents.
We now once more run our preferred DiD specification, but with the variable Trust
Discrimination replaced by the indicators Above-Average Score and Parental Involve-
ment, respectively. Table 4.2 presents the results. We start by discussing the estimates
for the school performance measure [Columns (BS.1) and (NS.1)]. The key message one
may extract from Panel A, in which all regressions are run for boys and girls together,
is that the citizenship reform substantially reduced the immigrant-native gap in school
performance. For example, in the broad sample [Column (BS.1)], immigrant children
born pre-policy are 9.9 percentage points less likely than their native peers to achieve
above-average grades. The statistically significant DiD estimate of 8.9 percentage points
suggests that the policy reduced this achievement gap by almost 90%. As should be
expected, once we restrict our attention to the high-eligibility treatment group of immi-
grants with a Turkish background [Column (NS.1)], this effect becomes more pronounced,
though somewhat less precisely estimated. In Panels B and C, in which the analysis is
broken down by gender, it is evident that the reform effect is almost entirely driven by
51We have chosen an average test score as this constitutes a more comprehensive measure of academic
achievement than a single-subject indicator.
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male immigrants. For example, in Column (NS.1) of Panel B, we see that Turkish boys
born pre-policy are 27.3 percentage points less likely than their native peers to achieve
above-average grades, but the statistically significant (at the 1%-level) DiD estimate of
24 percentage points implies a reduction of this gap by 88%. For immigrant girls (see
Panel C), we obtain a different picture: the pre-reform immigrant-native achievement
gap (βˆ1) among girls is much lower, both in the broad (-3.6 percentage points) and in the
narrow sample (-4.4 percentage points). Loosely put, this implies that immigrant girls
had much less to catch (educationally) than immigrant boys. Moreover, the coefficients
on the DiD interaction are, tough positive, statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The remaining two columns of Table 4.2 use our measure of parental involvement as
the dependent variable. Overall, we find that the introduction of jus soli led immigrant
boys to receive more learning support from their parents. For example, in Column (BS.2)
in Panel B, we find that immigrant boys born pre-policy are 33.8 percentage points
less likely than their native peers to have parents who support their learning, but for
those born post-policy the gap is a statistically significant 21.3 percentage points or 63%
smaller. As before, this effect is more pronounced in the narrow sample: we observe
a pre-reform immigrant-native gap in parental support of -30.5 percentage points and
a policy-induced reduction thereof of 24.5 percentage points. For immigrant girls, the
coefficients on the DiD interaction have the opposite sign but are not statistically different
from zero.
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Table 4.2: Birthright citizenship and education: diff-in-diff analysis
Dependent Variable: Trust Discrimination
Above-Average Score Parental Involvement
(BS.1) (NS.1) (BS.2) (NS.2)
Panel A: All
Migrant (βˆ1) -0.099** -0.123** -0.194*** -0.147
(0.040) (0.054) (0.053) (0.086)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) 0.089** 0.128* 0.033 0.007
(0.035) (0.062) (0.069) (0.122)
Observations 1,256 1,057 1,262 1,060
R-squared 0.045 0.044 0.107 0.084
Panel B: Boys
Migrant (βˆ1) -0.199*** -0.273*** -0.338*** -0.305***
(0.056) (0.063) (0.075) (0.074)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) 0.184*** 0.240*** 0.213** 0.245***
(0.060) (0.052) (0.081) (0.075)
Observations 604 517 610 521
R-squared 0.052 0.054 0.150 0.095
Panel C: Girls
Migrant (βˆ1) -0.036 -0.044 -0.096* -0.029
(0.067) (0.079) (0.050) (0.085)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) 0.014 0.056 -0.109 -0.219
(0.048) (0.106) (0.073) (0.153)
652 540 652 539
R-squared 0.067 0.065 0.125 0.140
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Standard errors clustered by school
programme and location and reported in parentheses. All specification in Panel A
control for gender. Family characteristics include mothers’ age, dummy variables
for mothers’ education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure
(five groups) . Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students
with migration background, the gender ratio and five victimization measures (i.e.,
the proportion of students who report having been victims, in the past year, of
physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft and exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates
significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
Let us interpret the findings to this point. For immigrant boys, there is a strong
correlation between the educational gap separating them from their native peers and
inter-group trust: before the citizenship reform took effect, they were lagging behind their
native peers educationally and strongly discriminated against them in the trust game.
The introduction of jus soli, in turn, saw a substantial reduction in trust discrimination
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among immigrant boys together a with near-closure of the achievement gap between them
and their native peers. Thus, one suggestive interpretation is that the immigrant-native
gap in education is an important factor in immigrant boys’ in-group/out-group behavior
and a likely channel for changes thereof in the wake of the citizenship reform.
This explanation, however, leaves us with a puzzle regarding immigrant girls’ trust
decisions. In particular, in stark contrast to immigrant boys, immigrant girls were not
lagging much behind their native peers educationally before the citizenship reform took
effect. Despite this, we observe a substantial degree of trust discrimination among im-
migrant girls born pre-policy. Moreover, for them, the introduction of jus soli neither
had a discernible effect on their in-group/out-group behavior nor was it fostering their
educational integration. Overall, this suggests that education does not exert the same
influence on immigrant girls as on immigrant boys, potentially because it is overridden
by other identity-related (e.g., cultural) factors. In our final analytical step, we turn
attention to this issue.
4.3.5.3 Immigrant Girls: What Explains their Strong and Persistent Out-
Group Discrimination?
A consistent finding in many psychological and sociological studies of immigrant families
is that parents adopt different socialization strategies for their daughters and their sons
(for an insightful review, see Suárez-Orozco and Qin (2006)). In particular, across many
immigrant groups, girls are socialized to be “keepers of the culture” and often face strict
parental restrictions on extra-household activities that boys are free to choose (e.g., spend
time with friends, got to parties, participate in after-school programs). Moreover, this
double standard in parental control has been found to be particularly strong when im-
migrant parents perceive the host society as posing a threat to the values of their native
culture (Dion and Dion, 2001).
The existing literature suggests two implications of this gender-specific socialization
pattern that may be relevant in our context. First, it shapes the process of ethnic
self-identification. For example, in the United States, immigrant girls are more likely
than immigrant boys to ethnically self-identify with their parents’ immigrant origins;
immigrant boys, by contrast, are more likely to choose a national identity (Qin-Hilliard,
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2003; Yip and Fuligni, 2002). This, in turn, may influence the extent to which immigrant
boys and girls differentiate between in-groupers and out-groupers. Second, due to the
double standard in parental control, immigrant girls are more likely than immigrant boys
to face a high level of parent-child conflict and, consequently, have lower self-esteem
(Rumbaut, 1994). According to the “self-esteem hypothesis” in the psychological theory
of social identity (Hogg and Abrams, 1990; Rubin and Hewstone, 1998) immigrant girls
might restore a more positive self-concept through out-group discrimination.
Our survey allows us descriptively examine whether there are gender differences in
immigrants’ sense of identification with the host country and their self-esteem. Fig-
ure 4.8 presents the results. In Panel (a), we plot gender-specific proportions of second-
generation immigrants reporting a strong sense of identification with their host nation.52
In the broad sample, we detect no noticeable gender differences: roughly one-third of all
immigrant boys and girls self-identify with their host nation. However, once we restrict
our attention to Turkish immigrants in the narrow sample, we observe that roughly 30
percent of all Turkish boys self-identify with Germany, while the corresponding share
among immigrant girls is one-third lower. Unconditional OLS regressions reveal this dif-
ference to be statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding ties in well with the
above discussion: Turkish immigrants are predominately Muslim, and evidence suggests
that their identification with the Islamic culture is strong—not just in Germany, but
also in other major European destinations of Turkish migration, such as France and the
Netherlands (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2009). As argued above, such an environment
typically reinforces differential socialization pressures on immigrant girls and boys.
52In particular, the panel is based on the following question: How much do you feel like a German
(Very much, rather much, in some sense, not much, not at all)? Our outcome measure Strong Host-
Country Identification equals one for participants who choose the answer categories “very much” or
“rather much”, and is zero otherwise.
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Figure 4.8: Gender differences in immigrants’ sense of host-country identification
and self-esteem
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(b) Low Self−Esteem
Immigrant Boys Immigrant Girls
In Panel (b), we plot gender-specific proportions of second-generation immigrants
reporting a low level of self-esteem.53 In both the broad and the narrow sample, roughly
one-tenth of all immigrant boys report a low level of self-esteem, while the corresponding
share among immigrant girls is twice as a large. Unconditional OLS regressions show the
gender differences to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the results
hold for several alternative measures for self-esteem. Taken as whole, we view this as
suggestive evidence that immigrant boys show better psychological adaption than do
immigrant girls, a finding also reached in a recent cross-country study of offspring of
Turkish and Viatnamese immigrants (Berry et al., 2006). To the extent that low-self
esteem can reinforce inter-group discrimination, we also view it as a possible explanation
for the strong and persistent in-group/out-group bias shown by immigrant girls.
4.4 Conclusion
Immigration has put many developed countries on a new demographic path. Immigrant
children, in particular, make up a large and growing proportion of youth populations
around the western world. As a result, many scholars and policy makers argue that
53In our survey, we asked participants: Do what extent does the following statement apply to you
[on a discrete scale from 1 (does not apply to all) to 6 (applies completely)]: I have a positive attitude
towards myself. Our outcome measure Low Self-Esteem equals one for participants who place themselves
in the bottom half of the six-point scale, and is zero otherwise.
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success in integrating immigrant children will be a crucial nation-building tool for years
to come. Our starting point was the recognition that integration has many dimensions.
In particular, if we are to get a glimpse of the future face of western societies, it is not just
important to understand how today’s immigrant children fare in the education system,
but we also need to know how children with and without migrational backgrounds socially
interact and whether integration interventions can bring about cooperation between.
We have addressed this issue by combining a natural experiment—the introduction of
birthright citizenship in Germany—with an artefactual field experiment based on the
trust game with almost 4,500 adolescents in their final year of compulsory schooling.
Based on the artefactual field experiment, we have found empirical evidence for an
oppositional culture of trust in Germany: native children extent their trust in almost
equal measure to native and immigrant opponents, respectively. Immigrant children, by
contrast, show a high degree of trust towards those with whom they share a migration
background, but a low willingness to trust their native peers. This result makes cleavages
between immigrants and natives in Germany apparent.
In connecting the experiment to the introduction of birthright citizenship, we have
shown that these cleavages are not set in stone: the policy substantially reduced the
degree of trust discrimination among male, but not among female, immigrant children.
Moreover, there are convincing reasons to believe that the main channel for the effect of
birthright citizenship is through an improved educational integration of immigrant males.
Thus, we conclude that granting citizenship to all children born on a nation’s territory,
irrespective of their parents nationality, can have a strong positive effect on the social
interaction between children with and without migrational backgrounds.
That said, the results also point to an important, open challenge for policy makers:
we have found immigrant girls to strongly discriminate in their trust decisions against
their native peers; yet, the positive reform effects we have uncovered—both in terms of
cross-group trust and education—are an entirely male phenomenon. This suggests that
integration interventions targeted at immigrant children may need to be gender-specific
and take into account the different socialization pressures that immigrant girls and boys
experience in the process of assimilation.
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Appendix C
Anleitung
Deine Teilnahme ist freiwillig!
Vielen Dank für deine Teilnahme! Bitte sprich von nun an mit niemandem außer mit
uns! Leider musst du sonst aus dem Spiel genommen werden.
Wir wollen in diesem Spiel untersuchen, wie sich Menschen entscheiden. Es gibt
kein “Richtig” oder “Falsch” in diesem Spiel, und wir wollen auch nicht dein Wissen
überprüfen. Triff deine Entscheidungen, wie du sie gerne treffen möchtest. Du wirst dabei
echtes Geld verdienen. Wir garantieren, dass dir das Geld in spätestens zwei Wochen in
bar ausbezahlt wird. Du erhältst es in einem Kuvert, auf dem deine ID-Nummer steht.
Bewahre daher deine ID-Nummer sorgfältig auf! Die Kuverts werden von einem deiner
Lehrer verteilt bzw. können im Sekretariat abgeholt werden.
Wie viel Geld du verdienst, hängt von deinen Entscheidungen und von den Entschei-
dungen anderer Spieler ab. Die genauen Regeln erklären wir dir jetzt. Es ist daher
besonders wichtig, dass du jetzt aufmerksam zuhörst.
Es gibt in diesem Spiel keine richtigen oder falschen Entscheidungen. Triff deine
Entscheidungen nach deinen eigenen Überlegungen! Deine Entscheidungen werden anonym
bleiben, das heißt, niemand wird davon erfahren.
Wenn du nach dem Vorlesen dieser Anleitung Fragen hast, hebe bitte die Hand. Wir
werden dann zu dir kommen und die Fragen privat (das heißt: leise) beantworten.
Ablauf:
In diesem Spiel gibt es zwei Rollen: Sender und Rücksender.
So beginnt das Spiel: Jeder Sender und jeder Rücksender erhält jeweils 5 EURO. Der
Sender muss entscheiden, wie viel er von den 5 EURO an den Rücksender abgibt.
Die Summe, die der Sender an „seinen“ Rücksender abgibt, wird dann von uns
verdreifacht. Das heißt, der Rücksender bekommt genau dreimal so viel, wie ihm der
Sender abgegeben hat.
Danach ist der Rücksender an der Reihe. Er besitzt jetzt den verdreifachten Betrag,
den der Sender ihm abgegeben hat, plus seine eigenen 5 EURO. Der Rücksender muss jetzt
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entscheiden, wie viel er davon an „seinen“ Sender zurückgeben will. Bitte beachte: Die
Summe, die der Rücksender an den Sender zurückgibt, wird von uns nicht verdreifacht.
Auszahlung:
Der Sender erhält am Schluss den Betrag, den er nicht abgegeben hat, plus jenen, den
der Rücksender ihm zurückgegeben hat.
Auszahlung Sender = 5 EURO – gesendeter Betrag + rückgesandter Be-
trag (durch Rücksender)
Der Rücksender erhält die 5 Euro und den Betrag, den er vom Sender erhalten hat
(mal 3), minus dem, was er an den Sender zurückgegeben hat.
Auszahlung Rücksender = 5 EURO+ 3 x gesendeter Betrag (durch Sender)
– rückgesandter Betrag
Entscheidungen:
Du entscheidest einmal in der Rolle des Senders und einmal in der Rolle des Rück-
senders. Außerdem kannst du zwischen verschiedenen „Personengruppen“ von Sendern
und Rücksendern unterscheiden; du musst diese aber natürlich nicht unterschiedlich be-
handeln. Auf dem Entscheidungsblatt werden diese Personengruppen beschrieben. Zum
Beispiel wird unterschieden werden, ob du einem Mädchen oder einem Jungen Geld send-
est oder es an ihn bzw. sie zurücksendest. Die Entscheidung liegt bei dir, und es gibt
kein “Richtig” oder “Falsch”.
Bestimmung Deiner Auszahlung:
Einige der folgenden Punkte werden einfacher zu verstehen sein, nachdem du die
Entscheidungsblätter gesehen hast. Wir gehen die Punkte jetzt durch, sehen uns dann
gemeinsam die Entscheidungsblätter an, und wenn es dann noch Fragen gibt, können
wir gerne wieder zu diesen Punkten zurückkehren. Nach unseren Spielen an mehreren
Schulen wird Folgendes passieren:
1. Es werden zufällig zwei Schüler aus verschiedenen Schulen zusammengewürfelt; du
kennst also „deinen“ Sender oder „deinen“ Rücksender nicht persönlich; Er oder sie
ist aber in etwa gleich alt ist wie du und geht in Schleswig-Holstein zur Schule.
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2. Es wird zufällig bestimmt, wer die Rolle des Senders übernimmt und wer die Rolle
des Rücksenders übernimmt.
3. Danach wird bestimmt, aus welcher Personengruppe (siehe Entscheidungsbogen)
der Sender und der Rücksender jeweils kommen. Das wissen wir aufgrund deiner
Angaben im Fragebogen. Zum Beispiel kann der Sender ein Mädchen sein und der
Rücksender ein Junge.
4. Dann wird die Entscheidung des Senders für die tatsächliche Personengruppe des
Rücksenders umgesetzt.
5. Schließlich wird die Entscheidung des Rücksenders für die tatsächliche Personen-
gruppe des Senders und für den von „seinem“ Sender tatsächlich gesendeten Betrag
umgesetzt.
6. Wir wissen nun, was der Sender gesendet hat und was der Rücksender zurückge-
sendet hat und können daraus die Auszahlung des Sender und des Rücksenders
berechnen. Dann legen wir das Geld in die entsprechenden Kuverts mit den jeweili-
gen ID-Nummern des Senders und des Rücksenders und bringen es an die Schulen.
7. Im Anschluss daran kannst du deine Auszahlung in einem Kuvert an deiner Schule
abholen.
Sieh dir nun die Entscheidungsblätter an – dann werden einige Punkte leichter zu ver-
stehen sein. Überlege dir gut, welche Entscheidungen du treffen möchtest. Du hast
genügend Zeit dafür! Wenn du Fragen hast, heb bitte deine Hand! Jemand wird dann
zu dir kommen und die Frage privat (das heißt: leise) beantworten.
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Figure C.1: Photo of a classroom before starting the survey
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Table C.1: Birthright citizenship and trust discrimination: robustness - discrimi-
nator
Dependent Variable: Trust Discrimination
Alternative TD Discriminator Strong discriminator
(BS.1) (NS.1) (BS.2) (NS.2) (BS.3) (NS.3)
Panel A: All
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.300*** 0.459*** 0.164** 0.242** 0.135*** 0.173**
(0.059) (0.130) (0.062) (0.099) (0.043) (0.079)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) -0.112 -0.216** -0.039 -0.084 -0.035 -0.058
(0.082) (0.077) (0.063) (0.080) (0.062) (0.085)
Observations 1,280 1,078 1,280 1,078 1,280 1,078
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.052 0.05
Panel B: Boys
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.262* 0.381** 0.151* 0.267** 0.136* 0.204**
(0.130) (0.172) (0.080) (0.105) (0.069) (0.089) )
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) -0.282** -0.508** -0.098 -0.194** -0.086 -0.208**
(0.125) (0.211) (0.067) (0.077) (0.074) (0.082)
Observations 618 529 618 529 618 529
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06
Panel C: Girls
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.370*** 0.575*** 0.175** 0.238* 0.139*** 0.170*
(0.057) (0.176) (0.072) (0.114) (0.036) (0.080)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) 0.029 -0.020 0.013 -0.015 0.010 0.038
(0.108) (0.186) (0.064) (0.082) (0.064) (0.081)
Observations 662 549 662 549 662 549
R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (2). Pre-reform difference refers to the conditional pre-
reform difference in trust discrimination between treatment and control group. Standard errors
clustered by school programme and location and reported in parentheses. All specification in
panel A control for gender. Family characteristics include mothers’ age, dummy variables for
mothers’ education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure (five groups) .
Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students with migration background, the
gender ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having
been victims, in the past year, of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft and exclusion). ∗∗∗
(∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Table C.2: Birthright citizenship and trust discrimination: robustness - specifica-
tion
Dependent Variable: Trust Discrimination
t-wild cluster 3-month window Placebo reform
(BS.4) (NS.4) (BS.5) (NS.5) (BS.6) (NS.6)
Panel A: All
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.337*** 0.497*** 0.330*** 0.490*** 0.335** 0.430**
[0.000] [0.000] (0.085) (0.154) (0.121) (0.189)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) -0.106 -0.254** -0.069 -0.210* 0.048 0.014
[0.263] [0.020] (0.095) (0.113) (0.158) (0.149)
Observations 1,280 1,078 961 800 557 473
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.112 0.13
Panel B: Boys
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.281** 0.459** 0.226 0.505** 0.356** 0.420
[0.040] [0.020] (0.146) (0.238) (0.161) (0.257)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) -0.260** -0.565** -0.214 -0.612** -0.035 -0.002
[0.040] [0.020] (0.146) (0.222) (0.201) (0.270)
Observations 618 529 461 390 265 232
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15
Panel C: Girls
Migrant (βˆ1) 0.418*** 0.586*** 0.454*** 0.547*** 0.352** 0.476**
[0.000] [0.000] (0.085) (0.154) (0.149) (0.196)
Born post-reform*Migrant (βˆ3) 0.034 -0.056 0.027 0.007 0.114 0.010
[0.667] [0.889] (0.105) (0.161) (0.171) (0.126)
Observations 662 549 500 410 292 241
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.18
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (2). Pre-reform difference refers to the conditional pre-
reform difference in trust discrimination between treatment and control group. Standard errors
clustered by school programme and location and reported in parentheses. For the specifications
based on t-wild cluster bootstrap procedures, we report p-values in square brackets. All spec-
ification in panel A control for gender. Family characteristics include mothers’ age, dummy
variables for mothers’ education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure (five
groups) . Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students with migration back-
ground, the gender ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who
report having been victims, in the past year, of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft and
exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Appendix D
Table D.1: Descriptives for the full sample
Natives Immigrants
Gender and Family Structure
Female 0.536 0.500
Lives with both parents 0.547 0.738
Lives with one parent 0.381 0.172
Lives with: other 0.027 0.024
Lives with: missing 0.044 0.066
Mother’s Age 46.124 44.102
Mother’s Education
None or Low (“Hauptschule”) 0.248 0.324
Intermediate (“Realschule”) 0.412 0.173
High (“Abitur”) or University 0.206 0.169
Other, Unknown or Missing 0.134 0.334
Religious Affiliation
Catholic 0.141 0.163
Protestant 0.525 0.085
Islamic 0.018 0.590
None, Other, Missing 0.316 0.162
Language Spoken at Home
Mostly German 0.976 0.289
Mostly Foreign Language 0.011 0.690
Missing 0.013 0.021
Mother’s Country/Region of Birth
Turkey / 0.376
Middle East & Africa / 0.139
Post-Soviet Country / 0.123
Balkan Country / 0.112
Eastern Europe / 0.106
Other Country / 0.144
Observations 2,201 1,218
Notes: “Natives” are children whose parents are both German-born. “Im-
migrants” are children whose parents are both foreign-born.
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Appendix E: Trust Conditional on Migration Back-
ground and Gender
Figure E.1: Investments of native and immigrant children by migration background
and gender of second movers
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Appendix F: Which Types of Discrimination Can Ex-
plain Observed Behavior
In this Appendix, we provide an in-depth discussion of two questions related to sec-
ond mover behavior and expectations. First, do children with and without migrational
background receive lower back transfers from in-group opponents than from out-group
opponents. Second, are trust decisions vis-a-vis players of different migrational back-
grounds mirrored in differential expectations of reciprocity? Answering the first question
allows determining whether there is statistical discrimination in the trust game. Our
results with regard to the third question shed some light on the role of discrimination
based on stereotypes.
Back Transfers: Are Discriminatory Trust Decisions Statistically “Justified”
In their seminal paper on trust in the segmented Israeli society, Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001) pointed out that ethnic trust discrimination may be rational when a comparison of
different ethnic groups reveals systematic statistical differences with respect to reciprocal
behavior. In a similar vein, in our study, the discriminatory trust decisions of children
with migrational backgrounds could be considered as justified on statistical grounds if
immigrant children receive lower back transfers from native children than from other im-
migrants. Figure F.1 provides some insights into this issue. It shows the average of the
eleven contingent back transfers of native and immigrant children to different types of
first movers. The main results are as follows. The first pair of bars shows that the average
back transfers of native children to native first mover types (4.51e) exceed the average
back transfers of immigrant children to native first mover types (4.31e) by a statisti-
cally significant 4.6% (two-sample t-test, p < 0.05). Appendix Figure F.2 demonstrates
that this result applies equally if we consider the average back transfers of native and
immigrant children to native boys and girls, respectively. Thus, a possible interpretation
is that the first mover in-group/out-group investment gap of 4.8% among native boys
(see Figure 4.2 above) reflects discrimination against immigrants on statistical grounds.
The second pair of bars indicates that the average back transfers of native children to
immigrant first mover types (4.43e) are almost identical to the average back transfers
148
Citizenship, Identity, and Trust
Figure F.1: Averages of the 11 contingent back transfers
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of immigrant children to immigrant first mover types (4.47e), with the difference be-
ing statistically indistinguishable from zero and the pattern not being dependent on the
gender of immigrant first movers (see Appendix Figure F.2). We conclude, therefore,
that the discriminatory trust decisions of immigrants are not a reflection of statistical
discrimination.
Expectations: Are Discriminatory Trust Decisions Based on Wrong Stereo-
types?
Although immigrant children do not receive lower back transfers from natives than from
immigrants, they may have the wrong perception that they do. If this were the case, the
trust decisions of immigrants vis-a-vis natives could be interpreted as discrimination based
on wrong stereotypes. In our experiment, first movers indicated on their decision sheet
the expected back transfer from the six possible receiver types. Figure F.3 conditions
on own investments as first movers, and shows how much native and immigrant children
expect to receive back from native and immigrant receiver types, respectively. Panel (a)
reveals that native children have the (correct) expectation that they will receive higher
back transfers from native than from immigrant receiver types. By contrast, Panel (b)
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Figure F.2: Average of the 11 contingent back transfers by migration background
of second movers and gendered first mover types
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indicates that immigrant children do not systematically expect that they will receive
lower back payments from native than from immigrant receiver types. Last, Appendix
Figure F.4 shows that there are no noticeable gender differences in the just-described
patterns. We therefore conclude that discrimination based on wrong stereotypes does
not drive the differential trust decisions of immigrants. Since our results on repayment
behavior also speak against statistical discrimination, the mistrust of immigrants toward
natives is probably due to a “taste for discrimination”.
According to Becker (1957), taste-based discrimination arises from prejudices whereby
individuals are willing to pay a price to discriminate. This aspect of taste-based discrim-
ination is also apparent in our experiment: the discriminatory trust decisions of immi-
grants involve a sacrifice of money. Table F.1 illustrates this point. It first shows the
expected payoffs of first movers when we, in a thought experiment, randomly match them
with in-group and out-group opponents, respectively. The evidence indicates that first
movers do better in terms of expected payoffs when matched with an in-group rather
than an out-group opponent, a result that holds for both natives and immigrants.54
54Figure F.5 shows the expected payoffs of first movers as a function of their own investments according
to the migration background and gender of second movers. For both native and immigrant first movers,
we observe that their expected payoffs are strictly increasing functions of own investments, a result that
holds irrespective of the migration background and gender of second movers. This supports the notion
that the discriminatory trust decisions of immigrants vis-a-vis natives involves payoff losses.
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Figure F.3: Expected returns on investment
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The table then goes on to provide back-of-the-envelope calculations of the shares of the
in-group/out-group payoff gaps that are due to own discriminatory trust decisions (as
opposed to the shares of the payoff gaps that are due to reciprocity discrimination by
second movers). For immigrants, we observe that the in-group/out-group payoff gap is
almost entirely explained by their own discriminatory trust decisions vis-a-vis natives
(96% of the gap for boys, 84% of the gap for girls). For natives, by contrast, only a small
share of the in-group/out-group payoff gap stems from their own discriminatory trust
decisions (16% of the gap for boys, 0% of the gap for girls). This, in turn, implies that
their monetary losses when matched with out-group opponents can to a large extent be
explained by the discriminatory repayment choices of immigrants. To summarize, the
findings indicate that immigrants’ mistrust toward natives is likely due to a taste for
discrimination and appears to be reflected in a willingness to sacrifice money.
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Figure F.4: Conditional expected back transfers by gender
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Appendix G:Mixed-Background Children and Second-
Generation Immigrant Children
Figure G.1: Investments of mixed-background children by migration background
of second movers
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Table F.1: Payoff losses due to trust discrimination
Natives Immigrants
All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Expected in-group payoffs 7.27 7.38 7.13 7.22 7.23 7.21
Expected out-group payoffs 6.99 7.06 6.90 7.04 7.09 6.99
In-group/out-group payoff gap 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.22
Marginal out-group payoffs 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.46
In-group/out-group investment gap 0.07 0.14 -0.02 0.35 0.28 0.40
% of the in-group/out-group
payoff
gap due to trust discrimination 8.8% 15.8% 0% 91.4% 96% 83.6%
Notes: Expected in-group payoffs (respectively, expected out-group payoffs) are the payoffs a partic-
ipant can expect when randomly matched to second mover of his or her own migration background
(respectively, a second mover that is not of his or her own migrations background). Marginal out-
group payoffs are the slopes between expected out-group payoffs and out-group investments estimated
from OLS regressions. The share of the in-group/out-group payoff gap due to trust discrimination is
therefore the ratio of the product between marginal out-group payoffs and the in-group/out-group
investment gap to the in-group/out-group payoff gap.
Figure G.2: Investments of first- and second-generation immigrant children by
migration background of second movers
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Figure G.3: Investments of first- and second-generation immigrant children, by
migration background of second movers
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Figure F.5: Expected payoffs of first movers as functions of their own investments
and according to their own and their opponents’ migration backround.
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Appendix H: Descriptives for the Natural Experiment
Samples (Broad and Narrow)
Table H.1: Descriptive for the broad NE sample
Natives Immi-
grants
p-value Pre-
Reform
Post-
Reform
p-value
Gender and Family Structure
Female .499 .564 .005 .612 .521 .004
Lives with both Par-
ents
.570 .808 .000 .824 .795 .419
Lives with Mother .321 .103 .000 .100 .105 .796
Lives with Father .048 .022 .004 .012 .032 .229
Lives with: Other .014 .022 .225 .029 .016 .324
Lives with: Missing .048 .044 .719 .035 .053 .368
Mother’s Age 46.057 44.542 0 45.424 43.753 .009
Mothers’ Education
None .010 .172 .000 .165 .179 .566
Low .198 .144 .043 .159 .132 .456
Intermediate .432 .197 .000 .165 .226 .146
High .149 .092 .049 .088 .095 .828
University .077 .050 .042 .059 .042 .426
Other .005 .025 .011 .041 .011 .148
Unknown .100 .292 .000 .288 .295 .891
Missing .029 .028 .861 .035 .021 .359
Class Characteristics
Class Size 19.186 17.903 .021 17.924 17.884 .936
Share Immigrants .337 .569 .000 .562 .574 .695
Share Males .489 .500 .293 .503 .498 .643
Share Insulted .724 .702 .061 .696 .708 .272
Share Ignored .503 .473 .004 .460 .485 .223
Share Hurt .098 .116 .249 .119 .114 .470
Share Lied .827 .738 .027 .716 .759 .052
Share Stolen .217 .242 .016 .239 .245 .632
Observations 920 360 170 190
Notes: Sample restricted to a 8-month window centered around the reform’s cut-off date and
excluding a 4-week window around the reform’s cut-off date. “Natives” comprises children whose
parents are both German-born. “Immigrants” (1) refers to children who are German-born, but
whose parents are both foreign-born (second generation immigrants). “Pre-reform” and “Post-
reform” refers to “Immigrants” who are either born before (in 1999) or after (in 2000) the reform’s
cut-off date. P-values refer to the respective differences between the groups.
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Table H.2: Descriptives for the narrow NE sample
Natives Immi-
grants
p-value Pre-
Reform
Post-
Reform
p-value
Gender and Family Structure
Female .499 .57 .005 .59 .55 .49
Lives with both Par-
ents
.57 .829 0 .808 .85 .251
Lives with Mother .321 .076 0 .103 .05 .024
Lives with Father .048 .013 .004 .013 .013 .987
Lives with: Other .014 .025 .225 .026 .025 .97
Lives with: Missing .048 .057 .719 .051 .063 .74
Mother’s Age 46.057 44.335 0 45.654 43.05 .055
Mothers’ Education
None .01 .266 0 .231 .3 .147
Low .198 .19 .043 .205 .175 .624
Intermediate .432 .139 0 .115 .163 .327
High .149 .044 .049 .051 .038 .684
University .077 .019 .042 .013 .025 .625
Other .005 .038 .011 .051 .025 .55
Unknown .1 .285 0 .295 .275 .811
Missing .029 .019 .861 .038 0 .022
Class Characteristics
Class Size 19.186 17.411 .021 17.705 17.125 .437
Share Immigrants .337 .591 0 .59 .592 .959
Share Males .489 .494 .293 .5 .49 .559
Share Insulted .724 .694 .061 .697 .69 .601
Share Ignored .503 .447 .004 .443 .451 .766
Share Hurt .098 .107 .249 .11 .104 .502
Share Lied .827 .722 .027 .691 .752 .075
Share Stolen .217 .243 .016 .237 .25 .628
Observations 920 158 78 80
Notes: Sample restricted to a 8-month window centered around the reform’s cut-off date and
excluding a 4-week window around the reform’s cut-off date. “Natives” comprises children whose
parents are both German-born. “Immigrants” (1) refers to children who are German-born, but
whose parents are both foreign-born, with at least one parent being of Turkish origin. “Pre-
reform” and “Post-reform” refers to “Immigrants” who are either born before (in 1999) or after
(in 2000) the reform’s cut-off date. P-values refer to the respective differences between the groups.
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